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Abstract.
The development of the ability to explain was
investigated by studying children's comprehension and
production of the causal connectives, because and so, in
relation to various types of explanation which varied
with respect to content (physical/psychological/logical)
and with respect to explanatory mode (empirical/
intentional/deductive).
Three elicited production studies were carried out.
These involved asking 3- to 5-year olds to explain three
different types of phenomenon: physical, psychological
and logical. For all three types of content, cause-effect
inversions in the children's use of because and ^o were
extremely rare. Also, the children did not tend to
"psychologize", but gave explanations which were
appropriate to the type of phenomenon.
Experiment 4 was designed to test the causal
direction hypothesis: that children understand the
directional element of the causal connectives' meaning in
terms of causal direction before they understand that the
causal connectives can also convey information about
temporal order. This hypothesis was supported. In a
causal task, 5-, 8- and 10-year olds performed at a high
level and significantly better than in a temporal task.
Experiments 5 to 7 extended the investigation beyond
the empirical mode by assessing children's knowledge of
the causal connectives in the intentional and deductive
modes, and their ability to distinguish between the
empirical and deductive modes. Adult control groups were
also included. It was found that the children did use
appropriate linguistic constructions for the intentional
mode and for the deductive mode. However, many of the 5-
and 8-year olds had difficulty in distinguishing between
the empirical and deductive modes on the basis of
linguistic cues provided by the experimenter. There was
some evidence to suggest that these linguistic cues may
normally be partially redundant, and it was proposed that
such redundancy might have contributed to the children's
poor performance on this particular task.
In general, the findings created a very promising
picture of the young child's knowledge of the causal
connectives' meaning in relation to the various types of
explanation.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
"Explaining is a complex verbal activity; the
child has to express more or less complex
ideas or facts in a proper linguistic form.
This skill is involved in explaining the way
or in telling narratives, as well as in
giving metalinguistic answers."
(Levelt, Sinclair and Jarvella, 1978:10).
1.1 The child's ability to explain.
The ability to give and to understand explanations
is a prerequisite of success in many areas of human
endeavour. In particular, our educational system relies
heavily on explanations, both as a means of teaching and
as a means of assessment. Yet, very little is known
about the development of the ability to explain.
Developmental psychologists have tended to use
children's explanations and justifications as a research
tool: that is, as a means of assessing abilities other
than the ability to explain. For example, children's
explanations have been used as measures of: their
understanding of causality (Piaget, 1929, 1930;
Berzonsky, 1971); their social sensitivity (Flavell et
al., 1968); their meta-cognitive ability (Piaget, 1976;
1978); and their meta-linguistic ability (Gleitman, Gleitman
and Shipley, 1972). An implicit assumption underlying all
such studies is that the children already possess the
linguistic and cognitive resources which are required for
the production of explanations, and therefore that failure
to produce an adequate explanation is attributable to a
deficit in the ability under investigation. In this
thesis, we shall assess the validity of such an assumption
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by examining the development of the ability to explain.
However, we shall concentrate on three out of the four
modes of explanation which are distinguished in section
1.4. The three types of explanation which will concern
us ares explanations of an event, explanations of an
action, and explanations of a conclusion. Very little
consideration will be given to explanations of processes
or procedures, since these lie on the borderlines between
explanation and description, and between explanation and
demons tration.
1.2 Explaining viewed as a complex verbal activity
Explanation is one of the many areas where language
and cognition interact in an interesting manner. Although
explaining is essentially a verbal activity in that we
cannot explain without using language, the ability to
explain does presuppose a number of cognitive abilities.
For instance, the speaker has to be able to distinguish
between a cause and am effect, between a reason and a
result, and between a piece of evidence and a conclusion.
Also, the content of the explanation has to be appropriate
to the type of phenomenon being explained, and this, in
turn, presupposes that the speaker has some understanding
of the phenomenon. However, the speaker will not be able
to give an explanation unless he also has adequate
linguistic resources. In particular, it is important that
he be able to use the causal connectives, because and so,
appropriately, since they serve to make the links explicit
and also to signal which clause refers to the cause and
2
which to the effect.
The knowledge which a speaker has to have in order to
use because and so correctly is closely related to the
knowledge which he requires in order to produce adequate
explanations. The cognitive abilities which have just been
outlined are prerequisites of the ability to use the causal
connectives appropriately. In addition, the speaker
requires some specifically linguistic knowledge about how
each connective is used and about the distinction between
the two connectives. However, it will be argued (in
sections 1.4 and 1.5) that an adequate linguistic analysis
of the causal connectives has to take into account the
way the connectives function in various types of
explanation. Thus, the ability to explain and the ability
to use the causal connectives are closely intertwined. It
is therefore possible to approach the development of
explanation by investigating the development of the
comprehension and production of the causal connectives,
and this is the strategy which will be adopted in this
thesis"*". However, it should be emphasised that the
comprehension and production of the connectives will be
studied in relation to the way the connectives function
in various types of explanation. In this respect, the
present study differs from most previous studies of the
development of the connectives. (See Chapter 2.)
Previous studies have usually failed to take sufficient
account of the relationships between the types of
explanation and the use of the causal connectives, and
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this has resulted in a rather restricted and distorted
picture of the child's knowledge of the connectives'
meaning.
1.3 The content of explanations.
Very many phenomena could serve as the topics of
explanations. Therefore, an exhaustive investigation of
the effect of content on the child's ability to explain
could not be carried out. However, one way of making the
task more tractable is to group the phenomena into a small
number of general content categories. In this study, three
such categories will be distinguished: physical,
2
psychological and logical . This taxonomy is based on the
types of laws or rules which would have to be invoked to
account for the relation which holds between the elements
referred to in the explanation. Relations in the physical
category would be accounted for in terms of laws of
physical causality. Psychological relations draw on
notions of psychological causality, such as motivation
and the reasons for actions. Logical relations are based
on logical or arbitrary rules. The following sentences
illustrate the three categories:
(1.1) The window broke because a ball hit it. (Physical).
(1.2) Mary hit John because he pulled her hair.
(Psychological).
(1.3) Half nine is not four because four and four make
eight. (Logical).
These content categories are based on the three types of
causal relation which Piaget (1926, 1928) distinguishes.
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However, the definitions of the categories have been
modified slightly for a reason which will become apparent
after some further distinctions have been introduced.
(See section 1.4.2).
In this thesis, we shall be concerned with two
questions regarding the content of explanations:
(i) Does the content category affect the children's
ability to explain and to deal with the causal connectives?
(ii) Can the children differentiate appropriately among
the content categories?
Both questions will be addressed in the experimental
chapters which follow.
1.4.1 The modes of explanation.
In giving an explanation, the speaker is attempting
to provide an answer to a question (even though the
question is not always made explicit). This question may
be either a Why? question or a How? question. If it is a
Why? question, then it may be interpreted either as being
equivalent to a What has happened to cause ... ? question
or as being equivalent to a For what purpose ... ? question.
The How? questions can be sub-divided into How do you know
that ... ? questions and How do you DO ... ? questions,
where DO can be replaced by most dynamic verbs (e.g.
How do you bake a cake?).
We shall propose that, corresponding to these four
types of question, there are four different types of
explanation which will be termed the "modes of explanation":
empirical, intentional, deductive, and procedural. Each
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mode can be defined in terms of the speaker's aim in
giving an explanation, and in terras of the way he views
the phenomenon which he is explaining. Also, each mode
has associated with it a characteristic set of linguistic
structures. (See Table 1 in section 1.4.2.)
In giving an empirical explanation, the speaker's
aim is to provide an answer to the What has happened to
cause ... ? version of the Why? question. He views the
phenomenon he is explaining as an event or state which
requires an explanation in terms of a temporally prior
event or state. While there may be a certain amount of
temporal overlap between the two events/states, an
empirical explanation cannot refer to an event/state
which begins after the event/state being explained.
The speaker's aim in giving an intentional
explanation is to answer the For what purpose ... ?
version of the Why? question. He views the phenomenon
he is explaining as an action, as a goal-directed and
purposive element of behaviour, which requires an
explanation in terms of an aim or intention. Unlike
empirical explanations, intentional explanations are
"forward-looking" in that they include a reference to an
event or state which occurs, or is expected to occur,
after the action which is being explained.
When the speaker gives a deductive explanation, his
aim is to provide an answer to a How do you know that ...?
question. He views the phenomenon as an idea, a concept,
a judgement, or a conclusion. It is a "mental act" which
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requires an explanation or justification in terms of
either another mental act, or a rule, op some observable
evidence.
The speaker's aim in giving a procedural explanation
is to answer a How do you DO... ? question. His task is to
outline the steps leading up to a particular goal in such
a way that his description would tell the listener what
he would have to do in order to achieve the goal. For
example, many of the explanations which are given in
cookery books or in instruction manuals would fall into
the procedural category. Typically, the steps in the
procedure are mentioned in chronological order, and
information about temporal order is often more important
than information about causality in this explanatory
mode. Therefore, the links in a procedural explanation are
more likely to be made explicit by means of temporal
connectives (e.g. now, first, then) than by means of
causal connectives. For this reason, very little consid¬
eration will be given to procedural explanations in this
thesis.
1.4.2 The relationship between content and mode.
There is a certain amount of confusion in the
literature as to whether the physical/psychological/
logical distinction applies to the type of phenomenon
which is being explained or to the way in which it is
explained. Piaget (1928) distinguishes three types of
causal relation: empirical, psychological and logical.
He defines empirical relations as cause-effect relations
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between two events. Psychological relations are defined
as holding between two psychological actions, or between
an action and an intention, or between a psychological
state and its psychological "cause". A logical relation
holds between two ideas or judgements, or between a
judgement and its proof or logical antecedent. These
definitions have some features in common with our
definitions of the content categories and some features
in common with our definitions of the modes of explanation.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that
Piaget sometimes uses "empirical relations" to include
psychological relations, whereas at other times he
equates empirical relations with causal explanations
which, in turn, he equates with mechanical or physical
explanations. In fact, it is the latter distinction
( physieaZ/psychological/logical) which has come to figure
more prominently in Piaget's theory and in subsequent
research on the development of the causal connectives and
of notions of causality. Similarly, the features of the
definition of the logical relation which have assumed the
greatest prominence in subsequent research are those which
correspond to our logical content category rather than
to our deductive mode. However, it is worthwhile
preserving both aspects of Piaget's rather ambiguous
taLXonomy, and this is the motivation for the distinction
which we have drawn between the content and the mode of
an explanation.
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The content categories are based on the types of
relations which hold between the events/states/actions/
mental acts referred to in the explanation. These
relations may be expressed linguistically. Nevertheless,
they hold independehtly of their expression in language.
In contrast, the modes of explanation are based on the
speaker's view of his task and on how this affects the
type of relation which he expresses in his explanation.
However, the two taxonomies are not totally
independent of one another. It is not the case that any
content category can be combined with any mode. There
is a complex relationship between the content categories
and the modes. This relationship is summarised in Table
1. Explanations in the empirical mode may express either
physical or psychological relations. In giving an
intentional explanation, the speaker asserts that a
psychological relation holds between an action (e.g.
John wound up the toy car) and an intention (e.g. he
wanted it to go). At the same time, the speaker presupposes
that there is also a causal relation between the action
and the effect which the agent is aiming to achieve. This
presupposed relation may be either physical or
psychological, and it can be made explicit by means of a
sentence in the empirical mode:
(1.4) The toy car went because John wound it up.
(1.5) Mary got a fright because John put a mouse in her
bed.
9































John wound up the
toy car because he
wanted it to go.




(We can tell that)
the window broke
because there is
glass on the ground.
(We can tell that)
Mary is sad
because she is crying.
half nine is not
four because four
and four make eight.
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Thus, the intentional mode can be seen as being parasitic
on the empirical mode. Because of this relationship,
explanations in the intentional mode sometimes involve
more than one type of content. A similar position obtains
regarding the deductive mode. In giving a deductive
explanation, the speaker asserts that a logical relation
holds. However, the speaker's deduction may draw on his
knowledge of a physical relation, such ass
(1.6) There is glass on the ground because the window
broke,
or on his knowledge of a psychological relation, such as:
(1.7) Mary is crying because she is sad.
In such cases, the deductive explanation is parasitic
on the empirical mode, and the deductive explanation
involves two types of content. On the other hand, a
deductive explanation may be based on knowledge of logical
rules or relations, as in:
(1.8) (We can tell that) half nine is not four because
four and four make eight.
In such cases, the deductive explanation is not
parasitic on the empirical mode.
1.5 Linguistic analysis of the causal connectives.
It was claimed earlier (see section 1.4.1) that
there are differences of linguistic structure between the
modes, and the examples presented in Table 1 illustrate
some of these differences. However, we shall leave a
detailed consideration of the linguistic characteristics
of each mode until later. (See sections 4.1.2, 5.1.2 and
6.1.2). In this section, a more general linguistic
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analysis of the causal connectives will be presented. At
times, this account may be biased towards the empirical
mode, since most of the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 are
based on the empirical mode and since it is important to
understand the assumptions underlying these studies.
The causal connectives lie in an area of overlap
between semantics, syntax and pragmatics. In order to
explore the nature of the interaction among these three
areas, we shall adopt the strategy of focussing on the
semantic approach, and then assessing its limitations.
Lyons (1977) distinguishes three types of meaning
relations sense, denotation and reference. Sense
relations hold between linguistic expressions, rather than
between a linguistic expression and an entity in the
world. One of the sense relations which Lyons identifies
is the relation of converseness, and it could be argued
that this relation holds between because and jso. When the
relation of converseness holds, it is possible to
substitute one member of the converse pair for the other
in a sentence and to transpose the relevant terms without
altering the truth-conditions of the sentence. In other
words, if because and jso are members of a converse pair,
3
then X so Y should be equivalent to Y because X. The
equivalence of pairs of sentences, such as the following,
suggests that the relation of converseness does hold
between because and so;
(1.9a) A ball hit the window so the window broke.
(1.9b) The window broke because a ball hit the window.
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(1.10a) John wanted to frighten Mary so he put a mouse
in her bed.
(1.10b) John put a mouse in Mary's bed because he wanted
to frighten her.
(1.11a) Four and four make eight so we can tell that half
nine is not four.
(1.11b) We can tell that half nine is not four because
four and four make eight.
As for other converse pairs, the order of the elements
is important in sentences containing because or so. When
one member of a converse pair is substituted for the other
without the remaining parts of the sentence being
transposed, the new sentence expresses a proposition which
is the converse of the proposition expressed by the original
sentence. Therefore, there is a contrast in meaning
between X so Y and X because Y. Similarly, there is a
meaning contrast between sentences which differ with
respect to the order of the clauses while the connective
remains the same. Such a contrast holds between X because Y
and Y because X, and between X so Y and Y so X. It is
interesting to note that the relation of converseness
only holds when the connective occurs in the sentence-
medial position. When because occurs in sentence-initial
position, it cannot be replaced by so;
(1.12a) Because a ball hit the window, the window broke.
(1.12b) *So the window broke, a ball hit the window.
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The contrast in meaning between Because X,Y and X because Y
is equivalent to the meaning contrasts between the other
pairs of sentences mentioned above.
The nature of these meaning contrasts is such that
the two propositions expressed by the sentences in a
contrasting pair cannot both be true of the same situation.
However, in order to consider how one would decide which
sentence expresses a true proposition, we must move
beyond the notion of sense, and examine the meaning
relations which hold between linguistic expressions and
the world.
Lyons defines "denotation" as the relationship which
holds between a linguistic expression and the class of
persons, things places, properties, processes and
activities external to the language system to which the
expression correctly applies. The relation of denotation
holds independently of particular occasions of utterance.
In contrast, the relation of reference is an utterance-
bound relation which holds of expressions in context. The
notion of reference applies to the speaker's use of a
linguistic expression to pick out an entity or group of
entities.
The causal connectives have neither denotation nor
reference. It simply does not make sense to ask what class
of entities or properties because applies to. On the other
hand, it does make sense to ask about the language-world
relationship with respect to sentences containing the
causal connectives, and to ask about the causal connectives'
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influence on that relationship. Lyons' notions of
denotation and reference cannot readily be applied to
sentences. In particular, he restricts the notion of
reference to expressions which serve to identify entities.
However, it seems worthwhile preserving the distinction
between the class of properties etc. to which a linguistic
expression correctly applies and the way in which the
linguistic expression is used on a particular occasion.
There seems to be no reason, in principle, why this
distinction should not be applied to the relationship
between sentences and the situations, events or sequences
of events which they may be used to describe. In very
general terms, the distinction corresponds to a
distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
From a semantic point of view, the pertinent
question is: which types of situations or sequences of
events can sentences of the form X so Y or Y because X be
applied to correctly? These sentences could be assigned
a semantic representation of the form: CAUSE (X,Y),
where CAUSE is a two-place predicate and X and Y are its
4
arguments. This captures the fact that the relation
between X and Y is a causal one, and also that it is
ordered. We can now say that the relation of converseness
which holds between because and so is based on the fact
that because signals that the following clause is a
description of a cause, whereas so signals that the
following clause is a description of an effect. The
situations to which X so Y and Y because X are applicable
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are those situations which involve a causal relation
between X and Y such that X is the cause and Y the effect.
If X and Y are events, then X will be temporally prior to
Y, since a cause begins before its effect. Thus, sentences
containing because or so can convey information about
temporal order.However, this information is derived
from the information which they convey about causal
direction, and from the nature of causality.
In order to decide whether or not a particular
sentence is being used to express a true proposition, it
is necessary to move into the realm of pragmatics and to
consider the way in which the sentence is being used in a
particular context of utterance. The characteristics of
the causal relation are dependent on the mode of
explanation, and this has certain linguistic consequences.
In particular, a linguistic expression may correspond to
a true proposition if it is being used in the deductive
mode and yet correspond to a false proposition if it is
being used in the empirical mode. (See section 6.1.2).
An example of this would be:
(1.13) Mary is sad because she is crying.
In the light of this evidence, it is necessary to modify
our earlier claim that the two propositions expressed by
the sentences in a contrasting pair (e.g. X because Y and
Y because X) cannot both be true. This claim holds only
if both sentences are being used in the same mode.
The linguistic structure of the clauses, X and Y,
varies according to the explanatory mode. In the
16
intentional mode, X contains a linguistic form which
indicates that it is an intention rather than an event
that is being referred to (e.g. wanted to, was going to,
would, could). In the deductive mode, Y sometimes contains
a linguistic form which indicates that a conclusion is
being expressed (e.g. can tell that, know that, must).
Also, when one considers the intentional mode, it becomes
necessary to distinguish two uses of so. In all the
modes, ^o may be used in the sense of "therefore", but in
the intentional mode so may also be used in the sense of
"so that" or "in order that". These linguistic character¬
istics of the intentional and deductive modes will be
explored in more detail at the beginning of the relevant
chapters. (See sections 5.1.2 and 6.1.2.)
1.6 Assessing children's linguistic knowledge
As we shall see in Chapter 2, different methods yield
rather different pictures of children's ability to use and
understand the causal connectives. In particular, children
show an ability to use the causal connectives appropriately
in their spontaneous speech from about the age of 3, yet
the evidence from comprehension experiments seems to
indicate that they do not understand the causal connectives
until the age of 7 or even later. Similar discrepancies
have been observed in other areas of developmental
psycholinguistics (Bloom, 1974; Chapman and Miller, 1975;
Donaldson, 1978; Donaldson, 1980). These discrepancies
are enigmatic in that they run counter to the traditional
assumption that comprehension will always be either in
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advance of or equal to production. Moreover, the ability
to use a form appropriately presupposes some understanding
of the form, yet this understanding is not evident in the
results of the comprehension experiments.
The process of comprehension and the process of
production must both be guided by some type of knowledge
about the language. One question which then arises is:
What is the relationship between the knowledge which guides
comprehension and the knowledge which guides production?
There are a number of possible answers to this question.
The first of these would involve adopting Chomsky's
approach and arguing that both processes are guided by a
single "store" of linguistic knowledge which is neutral
with respect to the comprehension/production distinction.
However, this approach could not readily account for the
comprehension/production discrepancies referred to above,
without invoking a much more detailed analysis of the
processes than is usually offered in this approach.
A second possibility would be that there are two
separate stores of linguistic knowledge: one guiding
comprehension and one guiding production^. These stores
would be separate in the sense that information could not
readily be exchanged between them. This would mean that
a considerable amount of linguistic knowledge would be
represented in duplicate, since it would be in both stores.
It would also mean that, at a given point in development,
the two stores might be out of phase. If the production
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store contained some linguistic knowledge which the
comprehension store lacked, then production would be
in advance of comprehension in that particular area, since
the comprehension process would not have access to
information which was only in the production store. This
model does face a problem (although probably not an
insurmountable one) in accounting for how knowledge in the
production store could be acquired other than through
comprehension.
A third possible approach would be to argue that the
comprehension and production processes both have access to
the same store of linguistic knowledge, but that the two
processes differ with respect to the type of knowledge
which they require. Thus, discrepancies in performance
between comprehension and production would be attributed
to the differential demands of the two processes rather
than to the differential accessibility of a particular
item of linguistic knowledge. The differential demands
might be due either to differences between the task of
being a speaker and the task of being a hearer, or to
methodological differences between comprehension studies
and production studies. In practice, it may often be
difficult to distinguish between these two types of task
demand. However, even if the effects have a methodological
origin, they may still tell us something about the nature
of the child's linguistic knowledge.
The child's comprehension of linguistic forms is
usually assessed by means of experimental rather than
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observational studies, because of the difficulty of keeping
linguistic and non-linguistic variables separate when
dealing with comprehension in a natural setting.
Comprehension experiments are usually designed in such a
way that systematically correct performance can be
attributed unequivocally to comprehension of the linguistic
form or construction which is being studied. Furthermore,
many comprehension experiments are designed to test
comprehension of one particular aspect of the meaning of
a linguistic form. In order to achieve this, other
linguistic and non-linguistic variables have to be
controlled. Because of these constraints, the design of a
comprehension experiment usually reflects the investigator's
assumptions about the nature of the knowledge which
underlies linguistic comprehension. Therefore, if these
assumptions are not consistent with the type of knowledge
which guides the child's comprehension and production of
the linguistic form in normal discourse, then the child
may fail in the comprehension experiment even though he
has some knowledge of the form's meaning.
In contrast, children's production of linguistic
forms is usually assessed by means of observational
methods or by means of experiments which are less
constrained than those typically used to assess
comprehension. This means that the children have much more
control over the type of knowledge which they use to
achieve success. They do not necessarily have to use the
20
particular type of knowledge which the investigator
believes is relevant. Thus, there is an asymmetry between
comprehension studies and production studies. The
advantage of comprehension studies is that they can identify
the particular type of knowledge which the child possesses
about a word's meaning, but they are less useful as a means
of establishing whether or not the child has some knowledge
of the word's meaning. On the other hand, the advantage
of production studies is that they can establish whether
or not the child has some knowledge of the form's meaning,
but they are less useful as a means of identifying the
precise nature of the knowledge. This asymmetry may account
for some of the comprehension/production discrepancies. It
also implies that production studies should be carried
out before comprehension studies, since it makes sense to
establish whether or not some knowledge is present before
trying to investigate the nature of the knowledge. This
is the approach adopted in the present study.
When children are producing language spontaneously,
they have a large measure of control not only over the
type of knowledge they draw on but also over what they
talk about. Therefore, another possible reason for the
comprehension/production discrepancy would be that
knowledge of a linguistic form or construction is
initially restricted to particular contexts or to particular
content areas. This limitation in ability would be more
likely to become apparent in a comprehension experiment
than in an observational study of production. Elicited
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production studies may provide a useful compromise in
this respect, in that they enable the investigator to
exercise some control over the content of the children's
utterances without introducing the other constraints
commonly associated with comprehension experiments.
Linguistic knowledge may be used not only to guide
the comprehension and production processes, but also as a
basis for making judgments about language. Some studies
have attempted to assess children's linguistic knowledge
by asking them to carry out metalinguistic tasks, such
as judging the acceptability of sentences or the synonymy
of pairs of sentences. Metalinguistic tasks require the
children to reflect on and comment on language, rather
than to use language to express a message or to obtain a
message. While children's success on these tasks is
dependent on their having linguistic knowledge of the
relevant forms or constructions, failure does not
necessarily imply that they lack such knowledge. For
instance, it may be that^initially, children's linguistic
knowledge is not at a sufficiently high level of awareness
to be used as a basis for metalinguistic judgments. This
proposal has received some support from recent research
(e.g. from some of the studies reported in Sinclair,
Jarvella and Levelt (1978)). Although the issue of
metalinguistic awareness will not be investigated directly
in this thesis, it is relevant to our assessment of some
of the tasks which have been used to study children's
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knowledge of the causal connectives' meaning. (See section
2.1.2.)
One lesson to be learnt from the fact that different
methods yield different results is that it is not
appropriate to ask whether the child knows what a particular
word means. We must rather ask - "What type of knowledge
(if any) does the child have about the meaning of the word,
and how does this knowledge develop?"
1.7 Hypotheses about the development of the causal
connectives.
A number of hypotheses about the development of the
causal connectives can be derived from the arguments
presented in sections 1.5 and 1.6.
One hypothesis would be that the development consists
of an increase in the child's knowledge of the directional
element of the causal connectives' meaning. In other words,
the child acquires the knowledge that Y because X, X so Y
and Because X,Y all express the proposition CAUSE (X,Y) and
not the proposition CAUSE (Y,X). All the previous studies
of the development of the causal connectives have aimed to
test this hypothesis. If a child treats Y because X (or
any of the equivalent constructions) as if it corresponded
to CAUSE (Y,X), then he is said to have produced an
inversion of the cause-effect relation. These inversions
are assumed to be indicative of a lack of knowledge of
the directional element of the causal connectives' meaning.
Therefore, the hypothesis predicts that the frequency of
inversions will decrease as the children grow older. As we
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shall see in Chapter 2, previous studies have yielded
conflicting results regarding this hypothesis. Children's
spontaneous production of the causal connectives indicates
that inversions are very rare even among 2- to 3-year olds
and therefore that there is very little development in
children's knowledge of the directional element. On the
other hand, the results of most of the comprehension
experiments suggest that such knowledge does develop up to
the age of about 7 or 8.
A second hypothesis would be that the particular type
of knowledge assessed by the comprehension experiments
differs from that which guides the children's comprehension
and production of the causal connectives in normal
discourse. Thus, rather than involving the acquisition of
the directional element, development would involve a
change in the nature of the child's knowledge of the
directional element. The primary function of the causal
connectives, because and so, is to convey information about
the direction of a causal relation. These connectives can
also convey information about temporal order, but this
information is derived from the information which they
convey about causal direction via the hearer's knowledge
of the nature of causality. Therefore, indicating the
temporal order of events is a secondary function of the
7
causal connectives. Most of the previous comprehension
experiments have employed tasks which require the children
to base their responses on the causal connectives'
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secondary function of indicating temporal order. In order
to succeed on such tasks, the children would have to know
that because introduces the event which happened first
whereas so introduces the event which happened second.
However, it may be that children's knowledge of the
directional element of the causal connectives' meaning is
based initially on their primary function of indicating
causal direction. In other words, the children may know
that because introduces a cause whereas j=o introduces an
effect, without knowing that because introduces the first
Q
event whereas so introduces the second event. This will
be referred to as the "causal direction hypothesis". The
young child's lack of knowledge about the connectives'
secondary function of indicating temporal order would tend
to go unnoticed in production studies, but would become
apparent in comprehension experiments involving temporal
order tasks. The causal direction hypothesis would predict
that if a comprehension experiment were carried out which
allowed children to base their responses on knowledge of
the causal connectives' primary function of indicating
causal direction, then performance would be better than
in a comprehension experiment requiring knowledge of their
secondary function of indicating temporal order. The
experiment reported in Chapter 4 was designed to test this
prediction.
A third hypothesis would be that the child's knowledge
of the causal connectives' meaning is initially restricted
to one of the content categories. (See section 1.3.) The
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development of the connectives would then involve the
extension and elaboration of this knowledge to include
other content areas. In particular, Piaget (1926)
proposed that children understand psychological relations
before physical or logical relations. This hypothesis
would predict either that young children will invert the
cause-effect relation more frequently for non-psychological
relations than for psychological relations, or that young
children will tend to "convert" non-psychological relations
into psychological relations (or both). Both of these
predictions are tested by the elicited production studies
reported in Chapter 3. The first prediction is also tested
in Experiments 4 to 7.
A fourth hypothesis would be that the child's knowledge
of the causal connectives is initially restricted in terms
of the mode of explanation. For instance, since the
empirical mode is more basic than the intentional and
deductive modes (see section 1.4), the child might begin
by comprehending and producing the connectives appropriately
only in the empirical mode. Therefore, the development of
the connectives would involve the child's knowledge being
extended and modified to take account of the other modes.
Such a development might be either cognitive or linguistic
(or both), since the modes differ both in terms of the
cognitive demands and in terms of the linguistic demands
which they impose on the child. This hypothesis is tested
by the experiments reported in Chapteis 4 (empirical),
5 (intentional) and 6 (deductive).
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1.8 Outline of thesis
In Chapter 2, previous research on the development of
the causal connectives and on the development of causality
is reviewed. It becomes apparent that there is a discrepancy
between the results of the comprehension experiments and
the results of an observational study of children's
production of the causal connectives (Hood, 1977). However,
there is a dearth of systematic studies of children's
production of the causal connectives, especially during
the preschool period.
Chapter 3 reports three elicited production studies
which were carried out with 3 to 5-year olds in order to
provide data on young children's production of the causal
connectives in an experimental setting. The results are
consistent with Hood's findings, and therefore the need
for an explanation of the comprehension/production
discrepancy is confirmed.
In Chapter 4, the causal direction hypothesis is put
forward as a possible explanation of the discrepancy, and
an experiment is reported which tests and supports this
hypothesis. Like most previous experiments, this experiment
is based on the empirical mode.
The tendency to concentrate on studying empirical
explanations is likely to result in a restricted picture
(and perhaps even a distorted picture) of children's
knowledge of the causal connectives' meaning. Therefore,
the remaining experimental chapters seek to extend this
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picture by investigating children's knowledge of the causal
connectives in relation to the intentional mode (Chapter
5) and the deductive mode (Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER 2 s THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAUSAL CONNECTIVES AND
OF CAUSALITY; SOME PREVIOUS STUDIES.
2,1 Children's comprehension and production of causal
connectives.
2.1.1 Piaqet's theory and research
Piaget's work yields two main hypotheses regarding
children's comprehension and production of the causal
connectives:
(a) Children younger than about 7 or 8 years will tend to
invert the cause-effect relation when they are producing
and comprehending causal sentences.
(b) Children younger than about 7 or 8 years will fail to
differentiate among physical, psychological and logical
relations, and will tend to over-generalize the
psychological relations. They will understand psychological
relations first, then physical relations, and finally
logical relations.
Piaget's own research provides some support for these
hypotheses.
Piaget (1926) reports an experiment in which 6 to
8-year-olds were told a story or given an explanation of
a mechanical object by the experimenter, and were then
asked to reproduce the story or explanation to another
child of the same age.1" Although Piaget does not give
any detailed numerical results, he states that the
children rarely expressed causal relations explicity, but
rather tended to juxtapose statements. Moreover, Piaget
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claims that even when the children did link two statements
with (the French equivalent of) because, they did not
intend to express a directional causal relation:
"... because does not yet denote an unambiguous
relation of cause and effect, but something much
vaguer and more undifferentiated, which may be
called the 'relation of juxtaposition', and
which can best be rendered by the word and ...
When the child replaces and by because,he means
to denote, sometimes the relation of cause and
effect, sometimes the relation of effect and
cause."(p.116)
In support of this claim, Piaget quotes some examples
from his data of uses of because which involved inversions
of the cause-effect relation, but he does not report the
frequency of such inversions. Piaget does not make a
specific prediction about the relative frequencies of
correct and inverted uses of because. On the other hand,
he gives us no reason to suppose that the child will
systematically favour one of the two causal directions,
and so he can be interpreted as implying that correct and
inverted uses of because will be equally likely.
Later, Piaget (1928) reports a more systematic study
of children's understanding of because, in which a written
sentence completion task was administered to 7- to 9-year-
olds. The children were asked to write completions for the
following sentence fragments:
(2.1) I shan't go to school tomorrow, because ...
(2.2) That man fell off his bicycle, because ...
(2.3) Paul says he saw a little cat swallowing a big dog.
His friend says that is impossible (or silly)
because ...
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(2.4) Half 9 is not 4 because ...
Piaget predicted that the sentences involving
empirical because ((2.1) and (2.2)) would be easier than
those involving logical because ((2.3) and (2.4)), and the
results support this prediction. Piaget regards a given
age group as having succeeded on an item when 75% of the
children pass. On the basis of this criterion, success is
achieved on (2.1) at 7 years, on (2.2) at 8 years, and on
(2.3) at 9 years. None of the age-groups tested succeeded
on (2.4). Piaget concludes that correct use of empirical
because begins between the ages of 7 and 8, and that
logical because develops later. However, he pays very
little attention to the variations in results which occur
between items of the same type. In particular, he fails
to comment on the significance of the fact that 85% of
the 7-year-olds passed the first item - a fact which
suggests that even younger children might have been
capable of passing this item (if it had been presented in
2
an oral rather than a written form). Thus, Piaget's
research does not establish the lower limit of children's
ability to handle because.
2.1.2 Metalinguistic tasks
(a) Acceptability tasks
These tasks are based on the assumption that the
child's knowledge of the causal connectives' meaning will
be reflected in his ability to judge the acceptability of
sentences containing causal connectives. Some studies
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(Corrigan, 1975; Epstein, 1972; Emerson, 1979) have used
tasks which require the child to make judgments about the
absolute acceptability of sentences. For each item in
these tasks, the child was presented with a single
sentence which he was required to judge as acceptable or
unacceptable. The terms which were used to convey the
acceptable/unacceptable distinction to the children vary
from study to study. Corrigan asked her subjects to say
whether the sentence was "yes or no, right or wrong",
while Emerson used the terms "sensible" and "silly".
Epstein's subjects were asked to say whether they thought
the sentence had been produced by a "silly" lady or by an
"okay" lady. The studies also vary with respect to the
age of the subjects and the types of sentences used.
Corrigan tested 3- to 7-year-olds, while Epstein and
Emerson both tested 6- to 11-year-olds. Corrigan and
Emerson used only sentence-medial because sentences.
Epstein used four types of sentence: so sentences, and
sentences, and both types of because sentence (sentence-
medial and sentence-initial). In all the studies,half of
the sentences were acceptable and half were unacceptable.
In Corrigan's study, both types of item were sub-divided
into physical, affective and logical items. (These
categories are similar to Piaget's physical, psychological
and logical categories.)
Corrigan's results provide some support for Piaget's
hypothesis about the order of emergence of the relations
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expressed by because, in that performance was best on the
affective items and worst on the logical items. Corrigan
also found that performance was much better for
acceptable items than for unacceptable items. In
discussing the results, Corrigan stresses the more
negative aspects, such as the fact that the younger
children performed badly on the logical items, and she
suggests that the attainment of concrete operations may
be a prerequisite for understanding the logical use of
because. However, it was only on the unacceptable items
that the younger children performed really badly. For
example, 70% of the 4-year-olds passed on the acceptable
logical items, whereas none of them passed on the
unacceptable logical items.
Epstein and Emerson also found that performance was
much better on acceptable items than on unacceptable
items. They both argue that a child should not be
credited with knowledge of the connectives' meaning until
he has succeeded on both types of item. On this basis,
they conclude that full knowledge of the connectives'
meaning is not acquired until between the ages of about
10 and 12 years.
There are, however, a number of problems associated
with the method employed by Corrigan, Epstein and
Emerson. First, there is the problem of interpreting the
discrepancy between performance on acceptable items and
performance on unacceptable items. One plausible
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explanation of this discrepancy would be that the children
have a tendency to acquiesce and that this may mask, their
knowledge. This could result in false positives on
acceptable items and false negatives on unacceptable items.
Therefore, by requiring correct performance on
unacceptable as well as acceptable items, Epstein and
Emerson may under-estimate the children's knowledge of
the connectives' meaning.
A second, and related, problem is that the request
for a judgment about the absolute acceptability of a
sentence implies that there is a clear-cut distinction
between acceptable and unacceptable sentences. We have
already seen that this is not a valid assumption, since
a sentence may be interpreted in a variety of ways
depending on the context in which it is used. When a
sentence is presented out of context (as in these studies),
the subject is likely to construct a context on which to
base his interpretation of the sentence. If the subject
is accustomed to making use of the assumption that what
3
a speaker says will make sense, then it is reasonable
to suppose that he will attempt to construct a context
which will render the sentence acceptable. Therefore, the
indeterminacy will tend to be resolved as an "acceptable"
rather than as an "unacceptable" judgment. Emerson
actually admits that the unacceptable sentences may be
simply less plausible than the acceptable sentences,
rather than being totally unacceptable. She then says
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that the child's understanding of because can be assessed
by looking at his ability to judge an inverted sentence
as less acceptable than the corresponding correct-order
sentence. However, this is not what she asked her
subjects to do. They had to make absolute rather than
relative judgments. Indeed, each subject received either
the inverted version or the correct version of a given
sentence, but not both.
A third problem is that the child may be basing his
judgments on the semantic content of the two clauses
rather than on the way the connective is being used. In
other words, he will judge a sentence as acceptable if
each of its clauses describes an event or state which is
compatible with his view of the world. Since the
connectives themselves have neither denotation nor
reference, it would not be surprising if the child were
to focus on the parts of the sentence wbich do have
denotation or reference, when he is being asked a
question about the match between language and the world.
This problem is likely to have been particularly acute
in Emerson's study, since she trained her subjects using
a "silly" item which was silly because of the relations
between the content words within a single clause: The
dog drove the car. This may have encouraged the children
to focus on the semantic content of the clauses linked
by the connective, rather than on the relationship
between the connective and the order of the clauses. In
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addition to asking the children to judge the
acceptability of the sentences, Emerson asked them to
change the sentences which they judged "silly" into
"sensible" sentences and vice versa. She found that,
particularly among the younger subjects, the strategies
used for converting "silly" into "sensible" sentences
involved changing the content of one of the clauses. This
suggests that the original judgments were based on the
content of the clauses, rather than on the relation
between the clauses. Emerson interprets this as evidence
that the young child does not know that because specifies
the direction of the causal relation. She argues that the
child focuses on the semantic content of the clauses
because of his lack of knowledge about because. However,
an alternative interpretation would be that the child's
apparent lack of knowledge of the directionality of
because is due to his tendency to focus on the semantic
content of the clauses, and that this tendency is in fact
encouraged by Emerson's training procedure.
The problems associated with asking the child to
make judgments about the absolute acceptability of
sentences can be avoided (or at least reduced) by asking
the child to make judgments about the relative acceptability
of two or more sentences. This approach has been adopted
in a number of studies (Katz and Brent, 1968; Kuhn and
Phelps, 1976; Flores d'Arcais, 1978b). These studies
differ from one another in several respects.
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Katz and Brent were interested in studying various
aspects of children's understanding of complex sentences,
and their study included only one item which is relevant
to the question of whether children understand the
directionality of the causal connectives. For this item,
the experimenter read out a correct and sentence and an
inverted because sentence, and asked the child to
choose the sentence which "seemed better". The two
sentences were identical except for the connective. Katz
and Brent found that, in all the age groups (6- to 7-
year-olds, 11- to 12-year-olds, and adults), there was a
strong preference for the non-inverted sentence. Even in
the youngest group, 82% of the subjects chose the non-
inverted sentence. Katz and Brent interpret this as
evidence that 6- to 7-year-olds have a less ambiguous
understanding of the meaning of because than Piaget
would claim. However, Katz and Brent's method can be
criticised on the grounds that the subjects might have
chosen the non-inverted and sentence because they were
more familiar with and than with because,rather than
because they preferred non-inverted sentences to inverted
sentences.
Kuhn and Phelps avoided this problem by using pairs
of sentences which differed with respect to the order
of the two clauses rather than with respect to the choice
of connective. Half of the sentence-pairs consisted of
because-initial sentences and half consisted of because-
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medial sentences. The child was presented with a picture
of an event and with two written sentences. The
experimenter read out the sentences and asked the child
to choose the sentence which "goes best with the picture".
Kuhn and Phelps tested a group of 5- to 8-year-olds.
They found that most of the youngest group (mean = 5;9)
were responding randomly, whereas 67% of the middle group
(mean = 6;9) and 87% of the oldest group (mean = 7;10)
succeeded on the task (according to a criterion of 13/16
items correct). Kuhn and Phelps conclude that their
results support Piaget's hypothesis, in that the youngest
children did not seem to understand that because expresses
a unidirectional relation between cause and effect.
Flores d'Arcais used a similar technique to Kuhn and
Phelps' to study Dutch and Italian children's knowledge of
the causal connectives. The main difference between the
studies is that Flores d'Arcais asked his subjects to
choose one sentence from a set of three sentences, whereas
Kuhn and Phelps used pairs of sentences. Flores d'Arcais'
results are broadly compatible with those of Kuhn and
Phelps. Although he found that performance improved
throughout the 7 to 12 age range, even the youngest
subjects seemed to be responding at an above-chance level.
The results of the studies which call for judgments
of relative acceptability suggest that children understand
the directional element of because from the age of about
7 or 8. On the other hand, the results of Epstein's
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and Emerson's studies, which call for judgments of
absolute acceptability, suggest that children do not
understand the directional element of because until between
the ages of 10 and 12. Epstein argues that the fact that
the child judges one sentence to be "better" than another
does not necessarily mean that he would not consider both
sentences to be acceptable. However, the ability to make
a systematically correct distinction between sentences
which differ only in clause-order does imply an under¬
standing of the directional element of the connectives'
meaning. Moreover, it is probably much more reasonable
to ask for relative judgments than to ask for absolute
judgments, since a request for a relative judgment does
not imply that there is a clear-cut distinction between
acceptable and unacceptable sentences. In this connection,
it is interesting to note that, in Epstein's and
Emerson's tasks, not even the oldest children were giving
responses which were 100% correct. Epstein comments that
the children accepted a wider range of sentences than
adults would, but she does not actually provide any adult
data to support this claim. It may be that adults are
also reluctant to draw a sharp dividing line between
acceptable and unacceptable uses of the causal connectives.
(See sections 6.4.1, 6.7.1 and 6.8.)
(b) Synonymy tasks
These tasks involve asking the child to judge whether
or not two sentences (which differ with respect to the
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causal connective used or with respect to the position
of the causal connective) are synonymous. Flores d'Arcais
(1978b) presented 7- to 10-year-old Italian children and
7- to 12-year-old Dutch children with pairs of sentences
which differed only in the connective used. For each
sentence-pair, one sentence was acceptable and the other
was unacceptable, so the two sentences were always non-
4
synonymous. First, the child was presented with the
acceptable sentence. Then, he was presented with the
unacceptable sentence and was asked whether he could use
it to tell another child about the event described in the
first sentence. Flores d'Arcais found that only about 50%
of the 7-year-olds' responses consisted of judgments
that the two sentences were non-equivalent in meaning.
Performance on the task improved considerably between the
ages of 7 and 10 years. However, some of the problems
which were encountered in relation to the acceptability
tasks which called for absolute judgments also arise in
relation to this synonymy task. First, the testing
procedure is likely to have directed the child's
attention towards the content of the clauses, rather than
towards the connectives, since the child was asked
whether the two sentences could both be used to tell a
friend about a particular event. If the child was
basing his response on the content of the clauses, then
he would judge the sentences to be equivalent, since
the content of the clauses was the same for both
sentences. Second, a general tendency to acquiese may
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also have encouraged the child to judge the sentences to
be equivalent.
In Emerson and Gekoski's (1980) synonymy task, half
of the sentence pairs were synonymous and half were non-
synonymous. Within the synonymous category, half of the
items consisted of an X because Y sentence and a Because
Y, X sentence, and half consisted of an X if Y sentence
and an If Y, X sentence. Within the non-synonymous
category, half of the items consisted of an X because Y
sentence and an X then Y sentence, and half consisted of
an X if Y sentence and an X so Y sentence. For each item,
the child was asked to select a picture sequence to match
one of the sentences, and then this picture selection task
was repeated for the other sentence in the pair. Finally,
the child was asked: "Do these sentences mean the same
thing?". Emerson and Gekoski found that performance was
better on the synonymous items than on the non-synonymous
items. This might be attributable to a tendency to
acquiesce. The youngest subjects (mean = 6;10) performed
at a random level, and there was a significant
improvement in performance between the middle age group
(mean = 8;0) and the oldest age group (mean = 9;11).
However, even the oldest group was not performing at
ceiling level.
The results of the synonymy tasks suggest that the
ability to make judgments about the synonymy of pairs
of causal sentences develops relatively late. However,
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it is likely that this is one of the final stages in the
development of children's knowledge of the causal
connectives. The linguistic and cognitive demands
involved in comparing two complex sentences are probably
much greater than those involved in the comprehension and
production of individual causal sentences in normal
discourse.
2.1,3 Memory tasks
These tasks are based on the assumption that the
errors which a child makes in imitating, recognizing, or
recalling causal sentences can provide information about
the child's knowledge of the causal connectives.
Emerson and Gekoski (1980) used an imitation task
in which subjects were asked to repeat because sentences
immediately after the experimenter had read each sentence.
Errors were more frequent in the youngest group (mean age
= 6;10) than in the older groups, but even the youngest
group performed at an above-chance level. Most of the
errors made by the youngest group involved either
omitting the connective or substituting one connective
for another. Emerson and Gekoski interpret this as
evidence that the youngest children were not always
attending to the specific connective used. However, these
omission and substitution errors account for only 13%
of the youngest group's responses.
Emerson and Gekoski also used a recognition task
in which the child was presented with a target sentence,
and was then required to judge whether or not each
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sentence in a larger set of sentences was exactly the
same as the target. The rationale behind this task was
that if the child had understood the meaning of the
original sentence, he would tend to show false recognitions
of sentences which preserved this meaning. For example,
if the original sentence was of the form Y because X,
then the child would be expected to show a false
recognition of a sentence of the form Because X,Y which
had the same content. The results indicated that the
youngest children (the 6- to 7-year-olds) were tending to
judge any sentence which contained the same two clauses
as the target sentence as "same", irrespective of the
connective and of the clause order. For instance, a
sentence with the form Y then X would be judged to be the
same as the target sentence, Y because X. In contrast,
the older children (especially the 10-year-olds) tended
to restrict their judgments of "same" to those sentences
which preserved the original meaning. Emerson and Gekoski
argue that the youngest children's poor performance was
due to a failure to understand that the connective
indicates a specific relation, and not to memory
limitations. Their reason for making this claim is that
the youngest children's performance was much better on
control sentences which differed from the target sentence
both with respect to the content of the subordinate
clause and with respect to either the connective used or
the clause order. In other words, the children were less
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likely to judge Y then Z as being the same as Y because X
than they were to judge Y then X as being the same as
Y because X. However, Emerson and Gekoski's control
sentences merely serve as a check that the children are
capable of remembering the subordinate clause. The fact
that the youngest children can remember the content of
the subordinate clause does not necessarily mean that their
poor performance on the other sentences cannot be
attributed to memory limitations. It is presumably easier
to recognise gross differences between sentences, such as
those produced by changing whole clauses, than to
recognize the more subtle differences which are produced
by changing a connective or the order of the clauses.
Epstein (1972) asked her subjects to recall each
sentence after they had judged its acceptability. She
found that performance was particularly poor for so
sentences because the children showed a strong tendency
to replace so with because. Epstein argues that since
these substitutions did not consistently result in the
production of acceptable sentences, they simply represent
substitutions of preferred forms rather than attempts to
recode the sentence's underlying meaning. Similarly, in
discussing this study, Johnson and Chapman (1980)
conclude that the recall task is not a reliable guide to
the child's understanding of the meaning of the sentence.
However, the fact that Epstein's subjects were being
exposed to a mixture of acceptable and unacceptable
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sentences may have interfered with their interpretation
of the sentences and with their ability to recode the
sentence's meaning.
Flores d'Arcais (1978a) used a recall task involving
only acceptable sentences. Sets of five sentences were
presented to 6- to 9-year-old Italian children, and recall
of each sentence was prompted by referring to a word in the
sentence (e.g. "Now repeat the sentence about the dog.").
The youngest children tended to recall subordinate
constructions (which contained the equivalents of because
and in order to) as coordinate constructions (which
contained the equivalent of and). However, the children
usually reproduced both the B because A sentences and the
A in order to B sentences as A and B, rather than as
B and A. This implies that they had some understanding
of the directional relation between A and B, but this
understanding might have been based either on knowledge of
the connectives' meaning or on knowledge about the most
probable relation between the two events. It is not
possible to decide between these two alternatives, since
Flores d'Arcais does not give details of the content of
the stimulus sentences.
Both in the case of recognition taks and in the case
of recall tasks, positive results provide more conclusive
evidence about the child's knowledge of the causal
connectives' meaning than negative results do, since poor
performance can usually be attributed either to a lack
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of knowledge of the connectives or to a memory deficit.
For instance, the fact that the youngest children in
Flores d'Arcais' recall task tended to recall because and
in order to as and does not necessarily mean that they
thought these connectives all had the same meaning. The
task of remembering five sentences is likely to have imposed
severe demands on the child's memory and this may have led
the child to make errors which do not reflect his actual
knowledge of the connectives' meaning. On the other hand,
children's performance on a memory task can sometimes
provide evidence that they do understand the connectives'
meaning, as when the older subjects in Emerson and Gekoski's
recognition task produced false recognitions of sentences
with the same meaning as the target sentence while
rejecting those sentences which differed from the target
sentence in meaning.
2.1.4 Comprehension experiments
(a) Temporal order tasks
As was pointed out in section 1.5, because and so
can convey information about temporal order as well as
about causal direction. A number of studies have
investigated children's knowledge of the directional
element of the meaning of because and so by testing their
knowledge of the temporal order function of these
connectives. In other words, these studies have required
the child to show that he knows that the clause which
immediately follows because refers to the event which
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happened first, whereas the clause which immediately
follows so refers to the event which happened second.
If a child succeeds on a temporal order task, then
we can conclude that he does understand the temporal order
function of the causal connectives and therefore that he
knows that their meaning includes a directional element.
On the other hand, failure on a temporal order task is
open to several alternative interpretations.
One possibility would be that the child lacks any
knowledge of the directional element, and that for him
because and so denote unordered, undifferentiated relations.
The child may know that these connectives have something
to do with causality, but he does not know that they are
used to signal the direction of the relation. This is the
Piagetian interpretation of the way young children
understand the causal connectives.
A second possible interpretation would be that the
child assumes that the order-of-mention corresponds to
the order-of-occurrence of the events. This would lead
him to treat both because and so as if they meant "and
then". Therefore, in a temporal order task, he would pass
the jso items but fail the because items (when because
occurred in sentence-medial position), since the order-
of-mention corresponds to the order-of-occurrence for so
sentences but not for because sentences. This inter¬
pretation is more compatible with Werner and Kaplan's
theoretical approach than with Piaget's. Werner and
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Kaplan (1963) argue that the order expressed in early
linguistic expressions corresponds to the order in which
the child perceives the events which he is describing.
Similarly, Clark (1971) proposes that young children may
find X before Y sentences easier to understand than Y after
X sentences because the order-of-mention coincides with
the order-of-occurrence for the before sentences but not
for the after sentences. Some authors (Corrigan, 1975;
Bebout, Segalowitz and White, 1980) have suggested that
young children's understanding of the causal connectives
is based on the assumption that the events are mentioned
in chronological order. On the other hand, other authors
(e.g. Emerson, 1979; Johnson and Chapman, 1980) have
argued that the order-of-mention strategy is task-specific,
and that the children do not actually regard because as
being equivalent to and then, but simply lack the knowledge
that because signals the direction of the relation.
Most researchers in this area have adopted one of
these two interpretations of the child's failure on a
temporal order task. However, a third interpretation is
also possible. The child may know that the meaning of
because and ^o contains a directional element, but his
knowledge of this directional element may be based on the
causal connectives' function of signalling causal direction
rather than on their function of signalling temporal
order. This is the interpretation which will be defended
in this thesis.
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Keeping these three alternative interpretations in
mind, we shall now consider the findings of some
comprehension experiments which have employed temporal
order tasks. Sullivan (1972) presented 4- to 10-year-olds
with a causal sentence and two pictures depicting the two
elements mentioned in the sentence. She then asked the
children to "point to the picture that comes first".
Sullivan failed to find any clear trends in her results.
However, it is worthwhile considering her study in some
detail, since it serves to highlight some of the
methodological problems which are likely to be encountered
when a temporal order task is used to investigate
children's knowledge of the causal connectives. One of
the problems with Sullivan's study is that the instruction
which she gave to her subjects ("point to the picture that
comes first") is highly ambiguous. Sullivan's intention
was to ask the subjects to identify the picture depicting
the event which happened first. However, it would be just
as reasonable to interpret "the picture that comes first"
as referring to the picture depicting the event which was
mentioned first, or as referring to the picture which
occupied the higher of the two positions on the table.
A further problem arises from the fact that Sullivan
presented unacceptable sentences as well as acceptable
sentences. For an unacceptable sentence, such as Because
the boy broke his leg, he fell off his bicycle, it is not
clear whether the subject is expected to identify the
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event which happened first by using the syntactic cues
(which suggest that the boy broke his leg first) or by
using his knowledge of the plausibility of the two
alternative sequences (which would probably suggest that
the boy fell off his bicycle first). A third problem with
Sullivan's study is concerned with the fact that some of
the sentences expressed an arbitrary relationship such as:
(2.5) Because the boy is wearing a blue sweater, he is
carrying some blocks.
In such cases, it makes very little sense to ask which
picture comes first. Most of the other temporal order tasks
have avoided this problem by only using items which refer
to events which can readily be arranged in a temporal
sequence. However, this constitutes a restriction of the
scope of temporal order tasks, since the causal connectives
are used to express relations not only between such events,
but also between states, ideas and judgments which cannot
meaningfully be arranged in a temporal sequence.
Epstein (1972) used a temporal sequencing task in
which 6- to 11-year-olds were presented with a causal
sentence and two pictures depicting the events mentioned
in the sentence, and were asked two questions: "What
happened first?" and "Then what happened?". Unlike the
instruction used by Sullivan, these questions refer
unambiguously to the order of occurrence of the events.
However, like Sullivan, Epstein used both acceptable and
unacceptable sentences, so for unacceptable sentences there
50
were two possible responses: one based on the syntactic
cuesi and the other based on semantic plausibility.
Epstein was aware of this ambiguity, so, at the beginning
of the test, she trained the children to base their
responses on semantic plausibility. For example, Epstein
would teach the children that if the sentence was:
(2.6) He got a cookie because he was happy,
then the correct response to "What happened first?" would
be "he got a cookie". The results indicated that the
tendency to base responses on semantic plausibility
decreased with age, while the tendency to base responses
on syntactic cues increased with age. Epstein interprets
the younger children's failure to attend to the syntactic
structure as evidence that they do not yet understand the
order relations involved in the linguistic expression of
causality. This is a curious conclusion in view of the
fact that the training procedure actually encouraged the
children to ignore the syntactic cues where these
conflicted with semantic plausibility.
Epstein's task involved four types of sentence
structure:
X and Y, X so Y, Y because X and Because X, Y.
Performance was significantly worse for the Y because X
sentences than for any of the other types of sentence, and
Epstein attributes this to the fact that the Y because X
sentences are the only sentences for which the order-of-
mention does not coincide with the order-of-occurrence
of the events.
Emerson (1979) used two temporal order tasks: the
picture sequence task (PST) and the first/last task (FLT).
In the PST, the child was presented with a causal sentence
and two static picture-strips each depicting both of the
events referred to by the sentence. The two picture-
strips in a given pair differed only with respect to the
order in which the events were depicted. The child's task
was to choose the picture-strip which "goes with the
sentence". In the FLT, the child was presented with a
causal sentence and two pictures each of which depicted
one of the events mentioned in the sentence. The child
was asked to "put the pictures in order to show what
happened first and what happened last". Both tasks were
presented to a group of 6- to 11-year-olds, and the same
sentences were used for both tasks. All the sentences
were acceptable, and they all contained because. Half of
the sentences were of the form Y because X, and half
were of the form Because X,Y. Within each of these types,
half of the sentences were non-reversible and half were
reversible. For non-reversible sentences, one ordering
of the events is plausible and the other ordering is
implausible, whereas, for reversible sentences, both
event-orders are plausible. Therefore, for non-reversible
sentences, the semantic plausibility can act as a cue
to the event-order, whereas, for reversible sentences,
the connective used and the position of the connective
are the only cues to the event-order. Emerson argues
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that the only conclusive evidence that the child fully
understands because is successful performance on
reversible Y because X items, since these are the only
items for which it is not possible to respond correctly
by relying either on semantic plausibility cues or on an
order-of-mention strategy. On this basis, Emerson concludes
that reliable responding on the PST occurred for the two
older age groups (mean ages = 8;2 and 10;2) but not for
the youngest group (mean = 6;2). On the FLT, not even the
oldest group achieved reliable responding.
The results of both the PST and the FLT provided
some evidence in support of the hypothesis that the
children were using an order-of-mention strategy, in that
performance was better for Because X, Y items than for
Y because X items. However, this effect was stronger for
the FLT than for the PST, and Emerson interprets this as
evidence that the order-of-mention strategy is, to a
certain extent, task dependent. For this reason, Emerson
argues that it is risky to assess comprehension on the
basis of a single task. Similarly, she argues that studies
which assess comprehension solely on the basis of
performance on non-reversible sentences are likely to
over-estimate the child's knowledge of the meaning of
because, since they allow the child to make use of semantic
plausibility cues. Although Emerson is aware that allowing
the child to make use of certain cues or strategies can
result in his ability being over-estimated, she does not
53
seem to be aware of the converse argument. Using a task
which requires the child to make use of knowledge which
differs from the knowledge which guides his comprehension
and production of because in normal discourse may result
in his ability being under-estimated. In particular,
Emerson uses the child's failure on tasks requiring
knowledge of the causal connectives' function of indicating
temporal order as evidence that the child has no knowledge
of the directionality of the causal connectives.
Another type of task which requires the child to
base his responses on knowledge about the temporal order
of events is the enactment task. Bebout, Segalowitz and
White (1980) asked 5- to 10-year-olds to act out causal
sentences using objects. The sentences were all reversible,
and the only verb used was move (e.g., The pencil moved so
the car moved). Three types of sentence construction were
used: X so Y, Y because X, and Because X, Y. Performance
on the Y because X items was above chance-level only for
the 9- to 10-year-olds, whereas performance on the other
items was almost perfect even for the youngest subjects.
Thus, the results suggest that the younger children may
have been using an order-of-mention strategy.
Similar results were obtained by Flores d'Arcais
(1978a) when he used an enactment task with 3- to 9-year-
old Italian and Dutch children. Again, the younger
children seemed to be using an order-of-mention strategy.
In summary, the results of the temporal order tasks
indicate that children do not understand the temporal order
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function of the causal connectives until the age of about
7 or 8 at the earliest. There is also evidence to support
the hypothesis that the younger children make use of an
order-of-mention strategy. It is not totally clear
whether these children actually believe that because (in
sentence-medial position) is equivalent to and then or
whether they are merely using the order-of-mention
strategy as a means of organizing their responses in
particular types of experimental tasks. Emerson's finding
that the order-of-mention effect was stronger for the
FLT than for the PST suggests that the latter
interpretation is more appropriate. Further evidence in
support of this interpretation will be presented in
Chapter 4. However, Emerson's claim that the children who
use an order-of-mention strategy lack any knowledge of
the directional element of the causal connectives'
meaning will be challenged on the grounds that such
knowledge may be based on causal direction rather than on
temporal order.
(b) Causal direction tasks
In this section, we shall consider some experiments
which appear to test the child's knowledge of the causal
connectives' function as indicators of causal direction.
Epstein (1972) used a Why-response task which involved
presenting 6- to 11-year-olds with a causal sentence
and then asking a "Did I tell you why ...?" question
about each clause. For example, the experimenter would
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say: The boy was happy because he got a cookie, and would
then ask: Did I tell you why he got a cookie? and Did I
tell you why he was happy? Epstein found that the 6- to
7-year-olds and the 8- to 9-year-olds showed a strong
tendency to answer "yes" to both questions in a pair. She
interprets this as evidence in support of Piaget's claim
that, for the young child, the elements in a causal
relation are simply related by juxtaposition rather than
being related in terms of some type of order or direction.
However, the young children's performance may be
attributable to a tendency to acquiesce. In particular,
the children may believe that an adult would not ask an
unanswerable Why? question, and therefore that they must
have been given the information which would be required
to answer the question. Another problem with Epstein's
method arises from the fact that she used unacceptable
sentences as well as acceptable sentences and that she
trained the children to base their responses on the
semantic plausibility cues. For example, for an
unacceptable sentence such as:
(2.7)*The boy got a cookie because he was happy,
the children would be encouraged to respond "yes" to:
(2.8) Did I tell you why he was happy?
Yet, "yes" would also be the "correct" response to this
question for the corresponding acceptable sentence:
(2.9) The boy was happy because he got a cookie.
Thus, the experimenter created a confused and confusing
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context in which it might appear that "anything goes".
This may have encouraged the children to conclude that
a because sentence can provide an answer to any Why?
question which is based on one of the sentence's clauses.
Roth (1980) administered a sentence completion task
to 3- to 11-year-olds.5 For each item, the child was
presented with a sentence fragment of the form Y because...
and also with two pictures. One of these pictures depicted
an event which was temporally prior to Y and which would
be likely to cause Y. The other picture depicted an event
which was also temporally prior to Y but which was causally
irrelevant. The child was asked to "finish each story with
the best ending for that story". Roth found that the
children in all the age groups consistently completed the
sentence by referring to the causally related event, and
that references to the event which was only temporally
related to Y were extremely rare. Also, responses which
involved references to a consequence rather than a cause
of Y were very infrequent. Roth argues that this
constitutes evidence that the children understood that
because specifies the direction of the causal relation
and that it introduces a cause rather than a consequence.
However, the evidence is not very strong, since the
children were not presented with a picture depicting a
consequence and so would have had to invent a consequence,
whereas they were presented with a "ready-made" cause.
Corrigan (1975) also used a sentence-completion task.
She presented 3- to 7-year-olds with a simple sentence
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followed by an incomplete sentence ending with because
and asked them to finish "the story". The simple sentence
corresponded to the appropriate completion of the sentence
fragment:
(2.10) The boy threw a stone. The window broke because ...
As in her acceptability task, Corrigan included sentences
expressing three types of relation (physical, affective
and logical), and she found that the children's
performance varied according to the type of relation.
For instance, the affective items were passed by 909'
of the 4-year-olds, and the physical items were passed by
90% of the 5-year-olds, whereas, on the logical items,
only 55% of the 7-year-olds passed. Corrigan argues that
success on the logical items can only occur when the child
has reached Piaget's concrete operations stage, and she
interprets her results as providing support for this
argument. However, a methodological problem arises with
respect to Corrigan's logical items. The example which
Corrigan provides of a logical item is:
(2.11) The cat meowed at the girl. The cat is alive
because ...
In order to respond correctly, the child has to realise
that he is being asked to justify the judgment that the
cat is alive rather than to explain the fact that the cat
is alive. In other words, he is being asked for an
explanation in the deductive mode rather than the
empirical mode. (See section 1.4.) However, the
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sentence fragment is not marked linguistically as being
in the deductive mode. It can be regarded as an elliptical
version of a sentence fragment like:
(2.12) We know that the cat is alive because ... .
Since the linguistic marking has been omitted in Corrigan's
example, it is difficult to see how the child could have
been expected to realise that he was being asked for a
deductive explanation. The situation is further confused
by the fact that, in Corrigan's acceptability task (which
was administered to the same subjects), the chiLd was
expected to judge the following sentence as unacceptable:
(2.13) Kathy was angry with Paul because she kicked him.
There is no principled way of disallowing a deductive mode
interpretation of this sentence while requiring a
deductive mode interpretation of (2.11).
If we disregard the evidence from these problematic
logical items, then Corrigan's findings indicate that
5-year-olds have some understanding of because and that
even 4-year-olds perform very well when because is being
used to express affective relations. However, like Roth's
task, Corrigan's task is open to the criticism that the
structure of the task is likely to have encouraged the
children to refer to the cause in their completion of the
sentence. Corrigan did include some control items for
which the first sentence referred to an event which was
unrelated to the event referred to in the sentence fragment.
(e.q. Karen's toy broke. It is raining outside because...).
59
The fact that, on these items, very few of the children
used the first sentence to complete the sentence fragment
indicates that the children were not simply following a
strategy of using the first sentence to complete the
second sentence without taking account of the semantic
relation between the sentences. Nevertheless, like Roth's
results, Corrigan's results only demonstrate that the
children know that it is better to follow because with a
reference to a cause than with a reference to a causally
irrelevant event. The hypothesis that young children know
that because should be followed by a reference to a cause
rather than an effect remains to be tested.
2.1.5 Production experiments
Several studies have aimed to elicit uses of the
causal connectives from children. Sullivan (1972) asked
4- to 10-year-olds to tell stories about pairs of pictures,
which depicted events which were either causally related
or arbitrarily related. At the beginning of the session,
the experimenter demonstrated the task by presenting an
example picture-pair and producing a Because X, Y sentence
which referred to the events depicted by the pictures.
Then, she asked the child: "Can you tell me a story like
that? Make sure that you tell a story about both of the
pictures together." Before each test item, the experimenter
gave the child the instruction: "Tell me a story about
these two pictures.". Sullivan found that the frequency of
use of the causal connectives was low at all the age
levels studied. However, this result tells us only that
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Sullivan's elicitation technique was not successful. It
does not allow us to conclude that the children were
incapable of using causal connectives.
Katz and Brent (1968) investigated children's
production of causal connectives by encouraging them to
engage in free conversation and also by asking them to
tell stories about sets of pictures. They found that the
6- to 7-year-olds and the 11- to 12-year-olds used because
equally frequently, and that most of the uses involved
psychological relations. The 6- to 7-year-olds did not
produce any cause-effect inversions. Katz and Brent note
that some of the 11- to 12-year-olds produced utterances
which bore a superficial resemblance to inversions, but
which could reasonably be interpreted as elliptical
expressions in the deductive mode.
Kuhn and Phelps (1976) presented 5- to 8-year-olds
with single pictures depicting causal sequences, and asked
the children to "say a sentence with because that tells
about this picture". The children were also asked to "say
a sentence with because" without the support of a visual
stimulus. Only 2 (out of 68) children failed to produce any
correct because sentences, and there were only 8 instances
of cause-effect inversions. It is difficult to calculate
the proportion of the total uses of because which these
inversions represent (since the data are not sufficiently
detailed), but even at the most conservative estimate, the
inversion rate could not be more than about 4%. Thus,
like Katz and Brent's results, these results indicate that
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the children were able to use because appropriately.
This implies that they have some knowledge of the
directional element of the meaning of because. Indeed,
Kuhn and Phelps' results suggest that children as young
as 5 years possess such knowledge.
2.1.6 Observational studies of children's spontaneous
production.
Several studies have charted the ages at which
children begin to use the causal connectives and at which
children appear to start trying to express causal
relations in their spontaneous speech.
Limber (1973) collected spontaneous speech data from
twelve English speaking children, and found that the
children began to use because and so between the ages of
2;6 and 3;0. Before that stage, the children either
juxtaposed the clauses or linked them with and.
Clancy, Jacobsen and Silva (1976) studied the
spontaneous speech of English-speaking, Italian-speaking,
Turkish-speaking and German-speaking children with the
aim of investigating when the notions underlying
coordinate and subordinate constructions are acquired.
Clancy et al assumed that the child may be expressing such
notions as coordination, temporal sequence or causality
even when he does not mark them with an appropriate
connective. Therefore, they used a rich interpretation
method (based on the content and context of the child's
utterances) to infer the notions which the child was
trying to express. On this basis, they concluded that,
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for all of the four languages studied, some expressions
of the notion of causlity had occurred by the age of 2;10.
Bloom, Lahey, Hood, Lifter and Fiess (1980) carried
out a study which incorporated the aims of both Limber's
study and Clancy et al.'s study, and which yielded similar
findings. Bloom et al. made a longitudinal study of the
spontaneous speech of four English-speaking children
between the ages of 2;0 and 3;2. All the children had
begun using because by the age of 2;10. One of the
children began using ^o before because, while the other
three children used because first. Bloom et al. estimated
that the children began to express causal relations
between the ages of 2;2 and 2;7. Two of the children
began expressing causal relations at about the same time
as they began using causal connectives, whereas the other
two children used and to express causal relations before
they began using causal connectives. Bloom et al. also
present some evidence which suggests that before the age
of 3;2, the children were systematically using because to
express causal relations, and that some of them were
systematically using so to express causal relations.
Of course, the fact that very young children use
causal connectives to express causal relations does not
necessarily mean that they are taking account of the
direction of the causal relation in their use of the
connectives. Hood (1977)^ assessed the occurrence of
cause-effect inversions in young children's spontaneous
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speech. She carried out a longitudinal study of eight
children between the ages of 2;0 and 3;5. (Four of these
children were the children studied by Bloom et al. (1980).)
Out of a total of 2,220 causally interpretable statements,
618 (28%) contained because and 310 (14%) contained so.
Therefore, 42% of the causal relations were explicitly
marked by a causal connective. When Hood examined the 928
uses of the causal connectives, she found that there were
only 63 inversions. In other words, only 7% of the
children's uses of the causal connectives were inverted.
Most of the inversions involved because, but, even for
because, the inversion rate was only 9%. Also, most of
these because inversions were produced by one particular
child, but, even for this child, the because inversions
constituted only 16% of his total uses of because.
Therefore, Hood's findings indicate that, even at the age
of about 2% or 3 years, children systematically follow
because with a cause rather than an effect. This implies
that they do have some understanding of the directional
element of the causal connectives' meaning.
Hood's study also produced some other interesting
findings. She found that when the children were expressing
causal relations, some of them used mainly the "cause
effect" order, some used mainly the "effect cause"
order, and some made approximately equal use of the two
orders. These clause order preferences were evident even
before the causal connectives first appeared. When the
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children did start using causal connectives, there was
a tendency for each child to begin by using the
connective which was consistent with his preferred clause
order. For example, the children who used mainly the
"effect cause" order began using because before so.
Hood also found that most of the causal relations
which the children expressed were psychological rather
than physical, but she points out that this is no reason
for regarding the expressions as unsystematic. Piaget
(1930) regards psychological relations as a primitive
form of causality. However, the linguistic demands
imposed by expressions of psychological causality are no
less than those imposed by expressions of physical
causality. In addition, Hood notes that most of the
children's causal statements referred to intentions or
were requests for action, and that they often referred to
negative situations (such as the non occurrence of an
event). There was also a strong tendency for the causal
utterances to refer to ongoing or immediately future
events or states, rather than to past events or events in
the more distant future.
Thus, Hood's evidence suggests that early expressions
of causality may be restricted in their semantic content,
but that, within this limited realm, even 2^ to 3-year-
olds demonstrate an ability to make a systematically
correct distinction between cause and effect when they
use causal connectives in their spontaneous speech.
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2.2 Children's understanding of causality.
2.2.1 The precausality debate
Piaget (1929, 1930) claims that children do not have
a true understanding of causality until about the age of
7 or 8 years, and that before this age children's
thinking about causal phenomena is precausal. Piaget
(1930:267) defines precausality as "the confusion of
relations of a psychological or biological type in general
with relations of a mechanical type". According to
Piaget, the young child's view of causality is subjective
rather than objective. The child does not distinguish
between himself and the universe, and so he does not
distinguish between motivation and physical causality.
He views the physical world in the same way as he views
the social world, and he believes that they can both be
explained in terms of psychological motivation. Piaget
identifies nine types of precausal relation, and he says
that they all "appeal either to motives or to intentions,
either to occult emanations or to mystical manufactures".
Piagets claims about precausality have their roots in his
writings on children's understanding of the causal
connectives (see section 2.1.1) where he argued that
children tend to convert physical and logical relations
into psychological relations. However, the main evidence
which Piaget uses to support his argument about the
precausal nature of early thought comes from a series of
experiments in which he asked children to explain a range
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of phenomena, such as : dreams, the origin of the sun and
moon, the weather, the nature of air, the movement of the
clouds, the floating of boats, and the workings of a
steam-engine. As one would expect, young children do not
give explanations of these phenomena which are correct
from the point of view of modern scientific knowledge.
However, Piaget's thesis is not simply that the young
child's explanations are incorrect, but that they provide
evidence for the precausal nature of early thought.
This claim has been challenged by a number of authors
(e.g. Deutsche, 1937; Huang, 1943; Berzonsky, 1971; Roth,
1980) who have argued that early thought is not character¬
istically precausal, but that young children may resort to
precausal types of explanation when they are asked to
explain unfamiliar phenomena or phenomena with opaque
causal mechanisms. In more favourable circumstances, the
children will give physical types of explanations of
physical phenomena. For instance, Huang (1943) found that
when he presented 4- to 10-year-olds with simple
demonstrations in which a physical law was violated, most
of the explanations were of a physical character. Many of
these explanations were scientifically incorrect in that
they appealed to simple principles, like pushing or
blocking, rather than to the principles used in physics,
such as surface tension or centrifugal force. However, as
Huang points out, these "naive physical explanations" have
much in common with the explanations used by the adult
layman.
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In defending Piaget's thesis, Laurendeau and Pinard
(1962) make two main points about the evidence presented
by Piaget's critics. First, they argue that this evidence
is based on an over-narrow interpretation of Piaget's
term "precausal thought". In a sense, this criticism is
justified in that Piaget's critics probably tend to class
most explanations which overtly appeal to physical forces
and not to psychological forces as naturalistic. For
Piaget, on the other hand, an explanation can be classed
as showing the characteristics of precausal thought even
if it does not explicitly refer to psychological causes.
For instance, here is one of Piaget's examples of a
precausal explanation of the origin of wind and breath:
"M0N(7): Blow. What happens when you blow? _
Air. - Where does it come from? - From outside.
- Is there air in the room? - No. - Inside you?
- No. - In your mouth? - Yes. - Where does it
come from? - From outside. - How did it come?
-
.. - How did it get inside you? - Through the
mouth." (1930:54).
The following quotation provides am illustration of
Piaget's interpretation of such explanations:
"But it should be emphasised once more that
this drawing in of wind by breathing is
more in the nature of participation than of
attraction. In other words, the child does
not imagine that we are mere receptacles for
the outside air. We make air ourselves. Not
only do Roy, Taq, and the rest attribute a
human origin to the air out of doors, but
all our children stress the point that we
can make air ourselves whenever we want to ...
We have here participation between two
autonomous wills, and not mechanical action
of one on the other. If we take the
children's ideas as a whole, it will be
easy enough to find the right mental context
for their statements." (1930:55).
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It would be just as reasonable to argue that Piaget is
over-interpreting the children's explanations as to argue
that Piaget's critics are working with too narrow a
definition of "precausal thought"!
Laurendeau and Pinard's second point is related to
the final sentence of the above quotation from Piaget.
They note that there is a fundamental difference between
the method of analysis used by Piaget and that used by
most of his critics. Piaget used a global method which
consists of "the global evaluation of all the child's
answers to a group of problems, all aiming at the
determination of the presence or absence of a certain type
of primitive thinking." (Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962:31).
In contrast, Piaget's critics usually employed a much more
analytical technique which involves computing the frequency
of precausal responses given for each item. Laurendeau and
Pinard argue that the analytical technique is less valid
than the global technique, since it fails to take account
of the children's justifications of their responses and
since it fails to provide an overall picture of the child's
performance on the test. However, the global technique
could also be criticised because of its impressionistic
nature. The global technique certainly enabled Piaget to
produce a fascinating and coherent account of the
development of causality, but it has probably resulted in
the extent and significance of precausal thought being
over-emphasised.
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2«2«2 The notion of "plausible cause".
One of the types of precausal relation which Piaget
identifies is that of phenomenistic causality in which "two
facts given together in perception, and such that no
relation subsists between them except that of contiguity
in time and space, are regarded as being connected by a
relation of causality" (1930:259). Piaget sums up the
characteristics of phenomenistic causality by claiming
that, for the young child: "Anything may produce anything".
This claim has not gone unchallenged, and a number of
studies have provided evidence which suggests that the
young child does have a notion of "plausible cause". For
example, Huang, Yang and Yao (1945) investigated the
influence of cause-effect similarity on 4- to 9-year-olds'
causal inferences. The children were presented with a
demonstration in which a piece of litmus paper changed
colour when it was moved from one beaker of liquid to
another. In one condition (the "colour similar" condition),
each beaker was placed on a piece of cardboard which was
the same colour as the colour which the litmus paper
changed to when placed in that beaker. In another
condition (the "colour dissimilar" condition), the two
pieces of cardboard varied in size but not in colour, and
the colour did not correspond to either of the colours of
the litmus paper. Huang et al. found that 82% of the
subjects in the colour similar condition attributed the
litmus paper's colour change to the effect of the cardboard,
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whereas only 9% of the subjects in the colour dissimilar
condition did so. Therefore, Huang et al. conclude that
similarity is a powerful factor in determining causal
attributions.
Shultz and Ravinsky (1977) draw a similar conclusion.
They found that 6- to 12-year-olds were more likely to
attribute an effect to a similar cause than to a dissimilar
cause. For example, when three lights came on, the
children were more likely to conclude that a triple switch
had been pressed than to conclude that a single switch
had been pressed. However, Shultz and Ravinsky found that
similarity was not the only principle which affected the
children's judgments. When the similarity principle
conflicted with the principle of covariation or temporal
contiguity, the children tended to abandon the similarity
principle, and this tendency increased with age.
In a review of studies of children's use of causal
inference principles, Sedlak and Kurtz (1981) conclude
that even preschool children are able to make use of the
principles of temporal precedence, covariation, contiguity,
and similarity. In other words, a plausible cause, for
the young child, is defined as being prior to the effect,
as covarying systematically with the effect, as being
contiguous with the effect in place and time, and as being
similar to the effect.
The evidence presented in section 2.2.1 suggests
that the young child's notion of plausible cause also
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includes the knowledge that physical phenomena have
physical rather than psychological causes. Further
evidence relevant to this issue is provided by the
elicited production studies to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER 3 : ELICITED PRODUCTION STUDIES
3.1 Introduction
Most of the studies which were discussed in Chapter
2 can be criticised on the grounds that they may be
imposing demands on the child which are extraneous to the
demands which he faces when he is comprehending and
producing causal connectives in normal discourse. One
notable exception to this is Hood's study. In her
observational study of the spontaneous speech of 2- to
3-year-olds, Hood found that cause-effect inversions were
extremely rare. On the other hand, she noted that most of
the children's uses of the causal connectives involved
psychological relations rather than physical or logical
relations. Therefore, Hood suggests that one possible
explanation for the discrepancy between her results and
the results of most of the other studies (which suggest
that children do not understand the directional element of
the causal connectives* meaning until the age of about 7
or 8) would be that the ability to use and understand the
causal connectives appropriately is initially restricted
to expressions with psychological content. This is an
interesting hypothesis. However, it cannot be tested
adequately by using an observational method such as the
one used by Hood, since the fact that the children did not
express many physical or logical relations does not
necessarily mean that they oould not do so.
One way of testing Hood's proposed explanation, would
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be to encourage young children to talk about non-
psychological phenomena (as well as psychological
phenomena) and then assess their use of causal expressions.
This is the approach adopted in the studies reported in
this chapter. These studies made use of a loosely-
structured interview technique to elicit explanations and
justifications of several types of phenomenon from nursery
school children. The elicited production method represents
a compromise between the experimental and observational
approaches, in that it enables the researcher to exercise
some control over the content of the child's utterances
without making the task very constrained.
The results of the elicited production studies will
be used to address three main questions:
(1) To what extent do the children produce cause-effect
inversions?
(2) Does the inversion rate vary according to the type
of phenomenon which is being explained?
(3) Do the children give appropriate explanations for the
different types of phenomenon?
Conflicting predictions regarding these three
questions can be derived from the existing literature.
Hood's findings would lead one to predict that cause-
effect inversions will be rare. However, Hood also
suggests that this prediction might be restricted to
psychological relations. Her proposed explanation for the
discrepancy between her results and those of the other
studies would predict that when young children are
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required to express physical or logical relations, they
will tend either to produce inversions or to "psychologize"
by inappropriately converting the physical or logical
relations into psychological relations. Thus, Hood's
explanation could predict either that the inversion rate
will vary according to the type of phenomenon (and that
it will be higher for non-psychological than for
psychological phenomena), or that the children will not
give appropriate explanations but will tend to
psychologize.
Piaget's theory would predict that the frequency of
inversions will be approximately equal to the frequency
of correct uses of the causal connectives. The results of
those experiments which have employed either metalinguistic
tasks or comprehension tasks based on temporal order would
also lead one to make this prediction. Like Hood, Piaget
predicts that children will be able to deal with
psychological relations before they can deal with physical
or logical relations. However, he probably would not
predict that children as young as those studied here would
systematically use the causal connectives appropriately
even when the content was psychological. Therefore,
Piaget's theory would not necessarily predict variations
in the inversion rate according to the type of phenomenon.
On the other hand, Piaget's theory does yield a clear
prediction as far as the third question is concerned.
Piaget regards the tendency to psychologize as one of the
characteristics of precausal thought, and so he predicts
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that young children's explanations of physical and logical
phenomena will frequently be inappropriate. However, some
other researchers, such as Deutsche (1937) and Huang
(1943) (see section 2.2.1), would predict that the
children's explanations would be appropriate (at least
when they were explaining physical or psychological
phenomena).
Given the variety of expectations about nursery school
children's capacity in this area, it is clearly important
to explore it further.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 General
In total, seven elicited production studies were
carried out, and all the subjects received all the tasks,
in the same order. However, only three of the studies
will be reported here. These three studies differed with
respect to the type of phenomenon which the child was
asked to explain. One study involved explaining a physical
phenomenon, one a psychological phenomenon, and one a
logical or rule-based phenomenon. (Two of the other
studies involved justifications of linguistic judgments,
one involved explaining a motor skill, and a fourth
involved answering questions about a story containing
implicit causal relations). All the subjects received the
tasks in the order: physical, psychological, logical.
There was always an interval of several weeks between
tasks.
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All the subjects were attending the Psychology
Department Nursery. There were eight subjects in each of
two age groups: 3- to 4-year-olds and 4- to 5-year-olds.
The details of the subjects' ages at the time of each
experiment are presented in Table 2. The younger group
consisted of two girls and six boys, and the older group
consisted of four girls and four boys. Each subject was
tested individually. The sessions were video-taped, and
then transcribed. The procedures used in each of the
three experiments are summarised below, but further details
are given in Appendix 1.
Table 2 - Mean age and age range of subjects in elicited
production studies.
3- to 4-year-olds 4- to 5-year-olds
Mean Range Mean Range
Experiment 1 3;5 3;2to3;10 4;8 4;6 to 4;11
Experiment 2 3;6 3|3 to 3)11 4;9 4;7 to 4;11
Experiment 3 3;8 3;4 to 4;0 4;11 4;9 to 5;1
3.2.2 Procedure for Experiment 1 : Ker Plunk (physical)
The "physical" experiment made use of the materials
from a commercially-produced game, Ker Plunk. These
consist of a vertical plastic tube down which marbles can
be dropped, and a set of plastic sticks which can be
inserted horizontally in such a way that they partially
block the cavity and prevent the marbles from falling.
(See Appendix 2.) In the first phase of the experiment,
the experimenter demonstrated the relations of physical
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causality associated with the apparatus. First, the tube
was presented without any sticks in, and some marbles were
dropped into the tube. Then, the sticks were inserted,
and the marbles were dropped onto the sticks. Next, some
sticks which were not supporting any marbles were removed.
Finally some sticks which were supporting marbles were
removed and the marbles fell. Throughout the demonstration,
the child was encouraged to offer suggestions, predictions,
descriptions and explanations. At certain points, the
child was also encouraged to take part in inserting the
marbles and in inserting or removing the sticks. In the
second phase of the experiment, a large toy panda called
Choo-Choo was introduced, and the child was asked to tell
him how to play with the toy.
3.2.3 Procedure for Experiment 2 : Facial expressions
(psychological).
In the "psychological" experiment, the child's task
was to explain why a character was experiencing a
particular emotion. The materials consisted of two
cardboard cut-out dolls (a boy and a girl), and two sets
of four schematic faces showing different facial
expressions: happy, sad, cross and scared. (See Appendix
2.) These faces could be attached to the dolls, and
could be interchanged. The girls were shown only the girl
doll, and the boys were shown only the boy doll. At the
beginning of the session, the experimenter attached each
face to the doll in turn, and named the facial expressions
for the child. Once the child had been introduced to the
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materials, the experimenter put one of the faces on the
doll, named the facial expression, and asked the child
to tell a little story about the doll. If necessary, the
experimenter asked more directive questions, such as
"Why is Jack sad?". The procedure was repeated until all
four facial expressions had been presented (in a random
order).1
3.2.4 Procedure for Experiment 3 : Game with rules
(logical).
The "logical" experiment involved a board game with
arbitrary rules, in which two players threw a coloured
die and raced toy mice over coloured stepping-stones to
a piece of cheese. (See Appendix 2.) There were three
colours on the diet red, yellow and green. These colour
corresponded to the colours of the stepping-stones. The
experimenter began by introducing the child to the material
and stating the rules of the game:
(1) The colour on the die has to be the same as the
colour of the stepping-stone for you to put your
mouse on the stepping-stone.
(2) The mice must stay on the stepping-stones. They must
not go into the water.
(3) The mice must jump onto all the stepping stones.
They must not miss out any stepping-stones.
Then, the experimenter played the game twice with the
subject, correcting any mistakes the subject made and
re-stating the relevant rules. After this training phase
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the toy panda used in the Ker Plunk experiment was
produced again, and the child was asked to tell Choo-Choo
how to play the game. Finally, the child was asked to
play the game with Choo-Choo and to tell him if he made a
mistake. The experimenter made the moves for Choo-Choo
and ensured that Choo-Choo made several mistakes in each
game. If the child detected a mistake, the experimenter
asked her to tell Choo-Choo why he was wrong and to
correct him.
3.3 Analysis of results
The first stage in analyzing the results involved
dividing the transcripts into propositions, and making lists
of the pairs of adjacent propositions between which a
relation could potentially hold. Propositions were
included in the list irrespective of whether the potential
relation was causal or not, and irrespective of whether
the clauses were linked by a connective or juxtaposed. The
connectives which did occur in the original transcripts
were omitted when the lists were constructed. Propositions
which had been expressed by the experimenter were included
where there was a potential relation between the
proposition expressed by the experimenter and a proposition
expressed by the child. For example, if the experimenter
said "Vvhy is Jack sad?", and the child then said "Because
he's hurt his leg", then the following pair of propositions
would be included in the list:
Jack is sad -9 Jack has hurt his leg.
As this example illustrates, tense markers were not
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eliminated from the propositions.
Then, the lists of propositions and the original
transcripts were laid aside for a week. This was done in
an attempt to eliminate the effect of the connectives on
2
the subsequent coding.
After a week had passed, each pair of propositions
was coded according to the type of relation which seemed
to hold between the two propositions. The coding
categories are listed and defined in Table 3. In many
cases, the most convenient way of defining a category is
in terms of the connective which would be used to express
the relation. However, there is not a one-to-one
correspondence between the connectives and the relations.
Sometimes, there was more than one potential relation
between the two propositions. In such cases, the convention
of always selecting the "most complex" relation was
adopted. For example, if it was not clear whether a
relation was conjunctive or temporal, it was coded as
temporal; or, if it was not clear whether a relation was
causal or temporal, it was coded as causal. Therefore, it
is probable that some of the relations which are coded as
causal were not intended to be causal.
Two further analyses were carried out on the relations
which had been assigned to the causal category. Firstly,
the causal relations were coded for directionality. If
the first proposition to be expressed referred to the cause,
the relation was coded as "C E". If the first
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There is no plausible relation between
the propositions.
Both propositions have the same
content.
There is some common topic between
the propositions, ("and").
One proposition is an alternative to
the other ("or").
An expectation is being countered
("but", "although").
The second proposition provides an
example or illustration of the
generalization expressed by the
first proposition.
There is a sequential relation
between the events/states referred
to by the propositions, ("then",
"first").
The two propositions refer to events/
states which happened at the same
time ("while").
One proposition expresses a means of
achieving the event/state referred
to by the other proposition, ("by",
responses to "How?").
B2
intentional The second proposition expresses the
aim or purpose behind the action
referred to in the first proposition
("to").
) causal There is a relation of physical or
psychological causality or of
logical deduction between the events/
states/concepts referred to by the
propositions.
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proposition referred to the effect, the relation was
coded as "E -4 C". If both directions seemed equally
possible, the relation was coded as "ambiguous".
Secondly, the relations were coded as physical,
psychological or logical. (See section 1.3.)
Once all the codings had been made, the original
transcripts were examined in conjunction with the coded
lists of propositions. In this way, it was possible to
explore the relationship between the use of the
connectives and the type of relation between the
propositions. In particular, for the relations in the
causal category, it was possible to assess the frequency
of cause-effect inversions. An inversion was said to
occur if there was a clash between the causal direction
coding and the causal direction specified by the
connective. Therefore, any of the following pairings
would be counted as an inversion:
c 4 E + because (sentence-medial)
c 4 E + if (sentence-medial)
c E + when (sentence-medial)
E C + so (sentence-medial)
E 4 C + that's why
E c + because (sentence-initial)
E -> c + if (sentence-initial)
E c + when (sentence-initial).
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Those utterances which would be acceptable if they were
regarded as elliptical deductive expressions (e.g., She is
cross because she has got big eyebrows) were counted as
inversions. In addition, those relations which had been
coded as ambiguous in directionality were assumed to be
inversions. Therefore, if anything, this method of analysis
will tend to over-estimate the frequency of inversions.
The responses in the intentional category were also
categorized as inverted or non-inverted. However, the
method of detecting inversions was rather different from
that used for the causal category. To determine whether or
not an intentional response was inverted, it was necessary
to examine the relationship between the connective and the
syntactic structure of the second clause. For example, if
the connective was because and the second clause contained
the modal form would (as in, I pulled out the sticks because
the marbles would fall), then this was counted as an
inversion. On the other hand, if the connective had been so,
then the utterance would have been non-inverted.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Success in eliciting causal expressions
Before addressing the main issues, it will be useful
to consider the extent to which the children expressed
causal relations and the extent to which they used the
causal connectives. For this purpose, the intentional
responses will be counted as "causal". As Table 4 indicates,
approximately half of the relations fall into the causal
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category. Of course, this may be an over-estimate, given
the procedure which was used for deciding between
alternative codings. Nevertheless, these results do suggest
that the tasks provided reasonably natural contexts for
the production of causal expressions. The low frequency of
causal relations for the younger group in the Facial
Expressions experiment is probably due to the fact that
the task required a relatively high level of imagination
and inventiveness. In many cases, the younger children gave
"don't know" responses.
Table 5 provides a general picture of the children's
use of the causal connectives, and it reveals that
because was used much more frequently than any of the
other connectives. These results indicate that the tasks
were relatively successful in eliciting causal connectives.
Table 4. Relations in causal category as frequencies (f)
and as percentages (%) of total number of relations.
(Causal includes intentional.)
3 to 4 years 4 to 5 years Total
f % f 2 f 2
Ker Plunk 96 53% 173 54% 269 53%
Facial
Expressions 31 76% 102 47% 133 52%
Game with
Rules 95 60% 185 70% 280 66%
Total 222 58% 460 57% 682 58%
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As can be seen from comparing Tables 4 and 5, there
is not an exact correspondence between the causal
relations and the causal connectives. The relations which
were coded as causal were not always marked by a causal
connective. In Table 6 the causal relations are categorized
according to whether they were explicitly marked (by a
causal connective), implicitly marked (by a connective
such as and which implies a causal relation), juxtaposed
(where there is no connective) or "other" (where there is
a connective which neither expresses nor implies a causal
relation). The results indicate that, for both age groups
and for all the tasks,the majority of the causal relations
were explicitly marked as causal by the use of a causal
connective. The results also provide some evidence for
the existence of the phenomenon of juxtaposition. However,
in the absence of comparable adult data, it is difficult
to evaluate the significance of the juxtaposition
percentages. It is also important to remember that the
coding procedure used here will tend to over-estimate the
frequency of juxtaposition.
It is interesting to compare the C 4 E relations
with the E C relations regarding the occurrence of
explicit marking and of juxtaposition. The results
presented in Table 7 indicate that the percentage of
relations which were explicitly marked was always higher












































































































Table 6. Percentage of causal relations which are
explicitly marked (E)t implicitly marked (I)> juxtaposed
(J) or "other" (0).
3 to 4 years 4 to 5 years Total
E I J 0 E 1 J 0 E I J O
Ker Plunk 66% 11% 22% 1% 79% 12% 9% 0% 74% 12% 13% 1%
Facial
Expressions 65% 13% 22% 0% 58% 11% 31% 0% 59% 11% 29% 0%
Game with
Rules 52% ■ 3% 44% 1% 65% 7% 26% 1% 61% 6% 32% 1%
Total 59% 8% 32% 1% 69% 10% 21% 0% 66% 9% 24% 1%
Table 7. Comparison between C -» E and E 4 C wi th respect to
the percentage of relations which are explicitly marked or
juxtaposed.
Explicitly marked. Juxtaposed
C •» E E 4 C C ■» E E -» C
3 to 4 years
Ker Plunk 53% 79% 29% 15%
Facial Expressions 58% 71% 17% 28%
Game with Rules 40% 77% 53% 23%
Total 46% 77% 41% 20%
4 to 5 years
Ker Plunk 50% 92% 18% 4%
Facial Expressions 30% 80% 48% 18%
Game with Rules 55% 79% 33% 18%
Total 48% 85% 32% 12%
Grand Total 48% 83% 35% 14%
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Conversely, the occurrence of juxtaposition was usually
greater for the C 4 E relations than for the E 4 C
relations. (The only exception to this was for the younger
group's performance in the Facial Expressions experiment.)
In a sense, these differences between the C E and E C
relations are also likely to be due to the coding procedure,
in that C 4 E relations are often ambiguous between a
causal and a temporal interpretation, whereas E 4 C
relations are less ambiguous. Therefore, some of the
C 4 £ relations which were not explicitly marked may
actually be temporal relations which have been "over-
interpreted" by the coding procedure. However, this
difference in ambiguity may reflect a more fundamental
difference between C 4 E and E 4 C relations. The C 4 E
order may be the natural order for giving a description,
whereas the E 4 C order may be the natural order for giving
an explanation. If this were the case, then one would
expect that causal direction information would be
expressed more explicitly when the order is E 4 C than
when it is C 4 E. (This point will be developed further
in section 4.1.2.) Whatever the explanation of the
difference between the two types of relation, the
relatively high level of explicit marking for the E 4 C
relations is of interest in itself, as evidence that
young children can and frequently do make causal relations
explicit rather than simply juxtaposing causally related
statements. Juxtapositions do occur, but, as Piaget
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himself points out, juxtapositions are not totally absent
even from adults' speech.
3.4,2 Frequency of inversions
As Table 8 shows, the results fail to support
Piaget's prediction that young children will tend to
produce just as many inversions as correct uses of the
causal connectives. The inversion rates are all considerably
lower than 50%. (The 30% inversion rate for the 3- to 4-
year-olds in the Facial Expressions experiment should be
interpreted with caution, since the corpus was so small.)
Table 8. Occurrence of inversions: expressed as



















Total 14/132 11% 12/317 4% 26/449 6%
Like Hood's results, these results suggest that the young
child does have some basis for understanding the
directional component of the causal connectives' meaning.
3.4.3 Relation between inversion rate and content.
When the inversion rates for the three experiments
are compared (see Table 8), there is no evidence that the
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inversion rate varies according to the type of phenomenon
being explained. Of course, this does not necessarily
mean that the nature of the phenomenon never has any effect
on the child's performance. What it does mean, though, is
that the young child's ability to use causal connectives
appropriately is not restricted to one content area (that
of psychological phenomena) as Hood suggested it might be.
3.4.4 Appropriateness of explanations
If the children's explanations are appropriate, then
there should be a close match between the nature of the
phenomenon being explained and the type of relations
expressed. More specifically, in the Ker Plunk experiment
most of the utterances should express relations of physical
causality, in the Facial Expressions experiment they should
express relations of psychological causality, and in the
Game with Rules experiment they should express logical
relations. If, on the other hand, the young child has a
strong tendency to psychologize, expressions of
psychological relations should predominate for all three
types of phenomenon. The results presented in Table 9
provide evidence that, on the whole, the children's
explanations were appropriate to the type of phenomenon.
(Only relations which were explicitly marked as causal
were included in this analysis.) The largest percentage
for each row and for each column in Table 9 has been under¬
lined. In every case, the underlined percentage occurs in
the cell where the type of phenomenon matches the type of
relation.
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Table 9. Types of causal relation (Physical/Psychological/
Logical); expressed as frequencies and as percentages of
the total number of explicitly marked causal relations for
a given age group in a given experiment.
Physical
3 to 4 years
Ker Plunk 47 75%
Facial Expressions 0 0%
Game with Rules 0 0%
Psychological Logical
13 21% 3 5%
19 95% 1 5%
3 6% 46 94%
4 to 5 years
Ker Plunk 92 67% 29 21% 16 12%
Facial Expressions 2 3% 55 93% 2 3%
Game with Rules 2 2% 24 20% 95 78%
On the other hand, the results also indicate that the
children sometimes used psychological relations in the
experiments involving physical and logical phenomena. At
first sight, this may suggest that the children were
psychologizing. However, a closer examination of the actual
utterances reveals that this is an over-simplification.
For example, in the Ker Plunk experiment, when the child
expressed a psychological relation, he was often explaining
his own actions rather than explaining physical events.
Therefore, the expression of psychological relations was
entirely appropriate. Moreover, the relations which were
coded as "psychological" were not always purely
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psychological. The child's action was often part of a
sequence of physical causality, and the child's
explanation of such an action usually implied an under¬
lying knowledge of the physical relations. Here is an
example of an utterance in which the expression of a
psychological relation is appropriate and implies an
underlying relation of physical causality:
Experimenter: Tell Choo-Choo why we're putting the sticks
in, will you?
Angus (4;6): Yes. Because we don't want them (the
marbles) to make a loud clatter.3
There were only four clear instances of psychologizing
in the Ker Plunk experiment. The following example
illustrates this inappropriate use of psychological
relations:
Simon (4;7): They (the marbles) didn't go through.
Experimenter: Ah. I wonder why not.
Simon: 'Cos they didn't want to.
The situation is similar for the Game with Rules
experiment. Sometimes, the child expressed a
psychological relation when he was explaining an action,
as in:
Angus: I just dropped it out, so I'll have another go.
(The die had fallen out of the cup while Angus was
shaking it.)
Also, the child sometimes invoked notions of "fairness"
and "naughtiness", as in:
Experimenter: Am I allowed to move it to the red? Yes?
Andrew(4;11): No.
Experimenter: No? why not?
Andrew: 'Cos that isn't fair because he gets first
to the cheese.
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In such cases, it is not clear whether the relation should
be coded as psychological or logical. These indeterminate
examples were all assigned to the psychological category.
There were no clear examples of psychologizing in the Game
with Rules experiment.
Therefore, the results of these three experiments do
not provide evidence of a strong tendency to psychologize.
Rather, the results indicate that the children usually
did give explanations which were appropriate (at least in
general terms) to the phenomenon they were asked to explain.
3.5 Discussion
These elicited production studies give a promising
picture of the young child's ability to give well-formed
and appropriate explanations. As in Hood's study of
spontaneous speech, there were very few cause-effect
inversions. The present studies extend Hood's findings by
showing that the low inversion rate occurs not only when
children are explaining psychological phenomena, but also
when they are explaining physical or logical phenomena.
Furthermore, the children demonstrated an ability to vary
the type of relation which they expressed to take account
of the type of phenomenon. This picture of the child's
ability stands in sharp contrast to the picture presented
by Piaget's work and by the comprehension experiments
which were reviewed in the previous chapter.
The finding that the inversion rate was not affected
by the type of phenomenal demonstrates the importance of
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drawing a distinction between what children oan talk about
and what they usually do talk about. Although young
children may tend to talk mostly about psychological
relations, they can be encouraged to talk about physical
and logical relations.
The present study made use of phenomena with which
the young child would probably be familiar. For instance,
although most of the children had not actually encountered
the Ker Plunk toy before, the physical events which were
made to occur in the Ker Plunk experiment (e.g. removing
support, falling) were presumably familiar. It seems
likely that performance would be poorer for unfamiliar
phenomena than for familiar phenomena. Therefore, if, on
the whole, children are less familiar with physical and
logical phenomena than with psychological phenomena, then
they may tend to perform less well when they are explaining
non-psychological phenomena than when they are explaining
psychological phenomena. For this reason, a certain amount
of caution is required when interpreting the present finding
that the type of phenomenon did not affect the inversion
rate. This finding indicates that the type of phenomenon
does not always have an effect on the well-formedness of
the child's utterances, but not that the type of
phenomenon never affects the level of performance.
Also, in the present study, the physical and logical
phenomena were presented in the context of motives and
purposes. For example, in the Ker Plunk experiment, the
96
child was told that the experimenter did not want the
marbles to fall down and make a loud noise. Similarly,
in the Game with Rules experiment, the arbitrary rules
were presented in the context of a purpose which the child
could readily appreciate: the purpose of winning the
game. In other words, these tasks were what Donaldson
(1978) terms "embedded tasks". It is possible that if
less embedded tasks were used, the children would have
more difficulty with the physical and logical phenomena
than with the psychological phenomena.
It would be interesting to investigate the effect of
the familiarity of the phenomenon and of the "embeddedness"
of the task on the children's ability to produce non-
inverted causal utterances in each of the three content
categories. However, this was not done in the present
study, since it would have conflicted with the general aim
of providing natural contexts for the elicitation of
explanations and causal expressions.
The finding that the children did not show a strong
tendency to psychologize may also be partly attributable
to the familiarity of the phenomena. Studies of
children's understanding of physical causality (Huang,
1943; Berzonsky, 1971) have shown that children tend to
psychologize when they are asked to explain an unfamiliar
phenomenon or when the phenomenon cannot readily be - .
explained in physical terms. On the other hand, the same
children will give physical explanations when the
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phenomenon is more familiar or when a demonstration of
the phenomenon provides them with a means of constructing
a reasonable physical explanation. These results,
together with the results of the present studies, suggest
that psychologizing is something which children turn to
only as a last resort. In more favourable circumstances,
young children do reveal an ability to match the type of
explanation to the type of phenomenon. They do show
some understanding of what constitutes a plausible
explanation for a given phenomenon. In the next chapter,
it will be argued that this understanding underlies the
child's ability to produce non-inverted causal sentences.
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CHAPTER 4 ; THE EMPIRICAL MODE
4.1 Introduction
4,1.1 A puzzling discrepancy
The results of the elicited production studies and of
Hood's study indicate that children understand the
directional element of the causal connectives' meaning well
before the age of 5. On the other hand, the results of
most of the comprehension experiments reported in the
literature seem to suggest that the directional element is
not understood until the age of about 7 or 8. This
discrepancy calls for an explanation. The experiment which
will be reported in this chapter was designed to test one
hypothesis about what the explanation might be.
Most of the previous comprehension experiments have
been based on the assumption that answering the question:
"At what age do children understand the directional
element of because and so?"
is equivalent to answering the question:
"At what age do children know that because is followed by
a reference to the event which happened first, whereas so
is followed by a reference to the event which happened
next?"
In this chapter, we shall challenge the assumption that
these two questions are equivalent, and we shall put
forward the hypothesis that the child's understanding of
the directional element is initially based on causal
direction rather than temporal order. (See section 4.1.4).
Therefore, it is important to consider a third question:
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"At what age do children know that because is followed by
a reference to the cause, whereas so is followed by a
reference to the effect?"
4.1.2 Linguistic analysis of sentences in the empirical
mode. (See section 1.5).
Since most of the previous experiments have been
based on the empirical mode, the present experiment was
also based on the empirical mode. In the empirical mode,
an event/state, Y, is explained in terms of a temporally
prior event/state, X, which is a physical or psychological
cause of Y. Sentences having one of the following forms
are acceptable:
(4.1) Y because X.
(4.2) X so Y.
(4.3) Because X, Y.,
while sentences having one of the following forms are
unacceptable:
(4.4) »X because Y
(4.5) *Y so X
(4.6) »Because Y,X
Thus, the meaning of because and so includes a directional
element which can be captured by saying that because must
be followed by X* whereas so must be followed by Y.
Since X is both the cause of Y and temporally prior to
Y, the directional element could, in principle, be
described either in terms of causal direction or in terms
of temporal order. In other words, we could say either
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that because is followed by a reference to the cause or
that because is followed by a reference to the first event.
However, the causal direction description is more powerful
in that it also allows us to capture the distinction
between causal and temporal connectives. For example, we
could say that because is followed by a reference to the
cause, and that after is followed by a reference to the
first event. Rules of implication could then be used to
take account of the interdependence of causal direction
and temporal order. In this analysis, causal direction is
more basic than temporal order as far as the meaning of
the causal connectives is concerned.
Although the sentences Y because X, X so Y and Because
X, Y are all equivalent in their truth-conditions, they
differ from one another in other respects. For the so
sentence and the because-initial sentence, the order-of-
mention coincides with the order-of-occurrence of the
events, whereas for the because-medial sentence these two
orders do not coincide. However, because-initial sentences
are relatively rare in spoken discourse. Therefore, for
most of the sentences which young children encounter, the
order-of-mention coincides with the order-of-occurrence
for so sentences but not for because sentences.
The sentences Y because X and X so Y also differ with
respect to their thematic structure. Linguists frequently
draw a distinction between the theme and the rheme. The
theme is the expression which the speaker uses to identify
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what he is talking about, and the rheme is the expression
which contains the information which the speaker wishes to
communicate (Lyons, 1977). In English sentences, the
theme usually precedes the rheme. Traditionally, the
theme-rheme distinction has been applied to phrases within
a simple sentence. However, the scope of the distinction
can be extended so as to apply to clauses within a complex
sentence. In this way, the thematic structure of because
and so sentences could be analysed as:
THEME RHEME
(4.7) The window broke because a ball hit it.
THEME RHEME
(4.8) A ball hit the window so the~window broke.
In (4.7), the theme corresponds to the expression
which is used to state what is being explained, and the
rheme corresponds to the explanation. In (4.8), this
pattern is reversed: the clause which provides the
explanation comes first. This difference in thematic
structure is related to a difference in the functions
which the utterances corresponding to (4.7) and (4.8) are
likely to serve. If the speaker's aim is to explain the
event referred to by the window broke, then he will
probably make the window broke the theme and produce an
utterance corresponding to (4.7). If, on the other hand,
his aim is to describe a sequence of events, then he will
probably make the first event the theme so that the order-
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of-mention reflects the chronological order of the events.
Therefore, he will produce an utterance corresponding to
(4.8). Although this utterance will contain information
about causal direction, the speaker's primary aim is not
to express a causal relation, but to describe what
happened.
Thus, it can be argued that while the natural order for
a description is 'first event - second event', the natural
order for an explanation is 'what is being explained -
explanation' and therefore 'second event - first event'.
It may be that Y because X sentences constitute a more
powerful means of expressing causal relations than X so Y
sentences do, precisely because of the mismatch between the
order-of-mention and the order-of-occurrence in because
sentences. If the unmarked clause order is the one which
corresponds to the chronological order of the events,
then, when a hearer encounters the opposite clause order,
he is likely to assume that the speaker had a special
reason for choosing the marked version and to ask himself
what that reason might be. In this way, the use of a
Y because X sentence may draw the hearer's attention to
the fact that the speaker intends to express a causal
relation. This, in turn, will make the causal link more
salient in the because sentence than in the corresponding
so sentence.
4.1.3 A temporal order task.
To illustrate the basis of the predictions for the
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present experiment, we shall now look more closely at
Emerson's (1979) picture-sequence task. However, the
arguments advanced in this chapter apply to temporal order
tasks in general, rather than to Emerson's task alone.
In Emerson's picture-sequence task (PST), the child
was presented with two static picture-strips, each
depicting a sequence of events. The two picture-strips
differed only with respect to the order of the events.
After describing each picture-strip, the experimenter
read out a sentence which referred to the events in the
pictures, and asked the child to choose the picture-strip
which "goes with the sentence".
All the sentences used in this experiment contained
because. Half of the sentences had the form Y because X
and half had the form Because X,Y. If the children were
using an order-of-mention strategy, then their responses
would be correct for the because-initial items but
incorrect for the because-medial items.
Emerson also included a comparison between reversible
and non-reversible sentences. For non-reversible sentences,
one event-order is plausible and the other is implausible,
whereas, for reversible sentences, the two event-orders
are equally plausible. On the basis of an analogy with
research on children's comprehension of the passive (e.g.
Bever, 1970), Emerson argues that children may make use
of the semantic cues to event-order which are provided
by the content of the non-reversible sentences. This
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would enable the children to give correct responses to
non-reversible items even if they did not understand the
meaning of the connective. On the other hand, for
reversible sentences, the connective is the only cue to
event-order, so the children would not be able to give
consistently correct responses to reversible items unless
they understood the meaning of the connective. Therefore,
Emerson predicted that performance would be better on
non-reversible items than on reversible items.
Emerson found that performance was significantly
better for because-initial sentences than for because-
medial sentences, and she interprets this as evidence
that the children were using an order-of-mention strategy.
Although performance was better for non-reversible
sentences than for reversible sentences, the difference
was not statistically significant. (It was significant
in Emerson's other task, the first/last task.)
Emerson argues that the best estimate of the age at
which children understand because is obtained by
considering only their performance on the reversible
because-medial items, since the children cannot succeed
on these items by relying on an order-of-mention
strategy or semantic probability cues. She found that the
children in the youngest age group (5;8 to 6;7) did not
give reliably correct responses to these critical items,
but that the children in the 7;6 to 8;6 group did.
Therefore, the results indicate that until the age of
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about 7% years, children lack the knowledge that the
event which is referred to immediately after because
actually occurred first. However, Emerson does not
restrict herself to drawing conclusions about the child's
knowledge of the temporal order element. She also claims
that:
"After about age 5, the development of because
appears to be the development of some ...
meaning component that we might call ORDER
(X,Y), that assigns X, the cause or first-
occurring event, to the clause immediately
following because in the sentence, and assigns
Y, the effect and second-occurring event, to
the other event named in the remaining clause.
The child does not appear to attach this
meaning component ORDER (X,Y) to because until
about age 7 or 8." (p.300.)
On the basis of a task designed to assess understanding
of the temporal order element of because, Emerson draws a
conclusion which applies not only to temporal order but
also to causal direction. It is the validity of this
more general conclusion which is at issue. There are two
main reasons for challenging this conclusion. First, the
way in which the conclusion has been arrived at is
invalid. Second, the results of the elicited production
studies indicate that preschool children do understand
the directional element of the meaning of because.
4.1.4 The causal direction hypothesis.
The main hypothesis tested by the experiment reported
in this chapter is that:
106
The child's knowledge of the directional element of the
causal connectives ' meaning is initially based on the connectives '
primary function of indicating causal direction. Knowledge of
the causal connectives ' secondary function of indicating
temporal order develops later.
This hypothesis will be referred to as the "causal
direction" hypothesis* It predicts that children will
perform better on a task which allows them to make use of
knowledge about causal direction than on a task which
requires knowledge about temporal order. Therefore, the
present experiment (Experiment 4) was designed to compare
performance on these two types of task: the Causal task
and the Temporal task.
The proposal that the child may know that because is
followed by a reference to the cause and yet not know
that because is followed by a reference to the first event
may seem rather paradoxical. Given that a cause precedes
its effect (within the context of the empirical mode), it
follows that if because introduces the cause, then
because must also introduce the first event. However,
this does not necessarily mean that knowing that because
introduces the cause is equivalent to knowing that it
introduces the first event. For example, the child might
know that because introduces the cause and that causes
precede their effects, and yet fail to make the inference




The items used in Experiment 4 varied in terms of
content and reversibility. Previous studies would lead
one to predict that performance would be better for
sentences with psychological content than for sentences
with physical content, and that performance would be
better for non-reversible sentences than for reversible
sentences.
Also, performance on Y because X sentences was
2
compared with performance on X so Y sentences. Previous
studies using temporal order tasks had found that the
children tended to adopt an order-of-mention strategy.
Therefore, it was predicted that in the Temporal task
performance would be better for so sentences than for
because sentences, since the order-of-mention coincides
with the order-of-occurrence for ^o sentences but not for
because sentences. On the other hand, if, in the Causal
task the child's performance is guided by knowledge of
the causal direction element of the connectives' meaning,
then he would not find so sentences easier than because
sentences. Indeed, it could be argued that he would find
because sentences easier since they are consistent with the
natural order for giving an explanation. (See section
4.1.2) Therefore, it was predicted that in the Causal
task performance on because sentences would be either equal
to or better than performance on so sentences.
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4.2 Method for Experiment 4
4.2.1 Subjects
There were 32 subjects in each of three age groups.
In Group 1, the ages ranged from 4;11 to 5}11, and the
mean age was 5;4. The age range for Group 2 was from 8;0
to 8}11, and the mean age was 8;6. For Group 3, the ages
ranged from 10;3 to 11;2, with a mean of 10;9. Groups 1
and 2 each consisted of 18 boys and 14 girls. Group 3
consisted of 12 boys and 20 girls. All the children were
pupils at the same local authority primary school (Granton
Primary). An adult control group was also included. This
consisted of 12 psychology undergraduates.
4.2.2 Design
The variable of type of task (Causal/Temporal) was
treated as a between-subjects variable. Within each age
group, half of the subjects received the Causal task and
half received the Temporal task. The Causal and Temporal
groups were matched for mean age, and, as far as
possible, for age range.





Most previous experiments have been based on causal
sequences consisting of only two events. However, this
makes it difficult to construct a task which does not
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require the child to demonstrate knowledge of the
temporal order element of the connectives' meaning. In
the present experiment, each item was based on a causal
sequence which consisted of three events: A 4 B 4 C.
All the stimulus sentences began with a reference to event
B. In the Causal condition, the child's task was to
complete a sentence fragment which had one of the
following forms:
(4.9) B because ...
(4.10) B so ...
Therefore, the child was being asked to choose between
the cause (A) and the effect (C) of a given event. The
Temporal task was based on Emerson's picture sequence
task. The child was presented with a sentence which had
one of the following forms:
(4.11) B because A
(4.12) B so C
The child's task was to select a picture strip to
match the sentence. For because sentences, the child
had to choose between a picture strip depicting event A
followed by event B (A -»■ B) and one depicting event B
followed by event A (B A). For so sentences, he had
to choose between B 4 C and C 4 B. Therefore, in the
Temporal task, the two alternative responses differed
with respect to the order in which the events were
depicted, whereas, in the Causal task, the two
alternative responses differed with respect to the
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semantic content of the clauses.
The same set of eight causal sequences was used for
both tasks. (See Appendix 3.) Four of the sequences
involved physical causality, and four involved
psychological causality. Within each of these subsets,
half of the sequences were reversible and half were non¬
reversible. Therefore, there were two examples of each





The two relations within a given sequence were either
both Physical or both Psychological. A sequence was
included in the Reversible category only if the entire
sequence made sense when "run backwards". In other words,
both A B C and C w B -t A had to give rise to plausible
interpretations. Furthermore, a sequence was included
in the Reversible category only if the reversal did not
alter the type of causal relation. For example, if the
relation in A 4 B was physical, then the relation in
B A would also have to be physical.
Each causal sequence was used to construct one
because item arid one _so item. Therefore, the total set
of stimulus sentences consisted of sixteen items. (See
Appendix 3.) This set was divided into two parallel sets
which each contained one sentence based on each of the
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causal sequences. For each of the four categories of
sequence, there was one because sentence and one so
sentence in each subset. The sequences which were paired
with because sentences in one subset were paired with so
sentences in the other subset. All the subjects received
both subsets, but the two subsets were presented in
different sessions. The order of presentation of the
subsets was counter-balanced for each group of subjects.
The order of presentation of the causal sequences was
constant both across subjects and between sessions. This
fixed order was constructed in such a way that the effects
of certain response strategies, such as alternating between
the top and bottom pictures, would be evenly distributed
across the various types of item.
4.2,3 Materials
The causal sequences were acted out using two hand-
puppets and were recorded on video-tape (black and white).
Each sequence was acted out in two orders: A -» B ■* C and
3
C 4 B A. The video-tape was edited, and two sets of
video-taped sequences were produced. One of these sets
was used for the Causal task and the other was used for
the Temporal task. In the Causal set, each sequence was
shown only in its standard order (A B -» C), and each
sequence occurred twice in succession on the video-tape.
In the Temporal set, each sequence occurred twice in
succession: once in its standard order (A -» B C) and
once in its reversed order (C + B -» A). For half of the
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sequences, the standard order was shown first and for the
other half the reversed order was shown first. At the
beginning of both sets, there were two sequences of
events which were not causally related. These were used
as a basis for practice items.
For each task, a set of static pictures was also
constructed. This was done by making black-and-white line
drawings of the events. For each sequence in the Causal
task, there were two picture cards. One of these depicted
event A and the other depicted event C. For each sequence
in the Temporal task, four picture-strips were constructed,
by sticking picture cards together in pairs. These
picture-strips corresponded to the following event
sequences:
A ■* B, B A, B-fC and C •} B. (See Appendix 4. )
4.2.4 Procedure
Each child was tested individually in an empty
classroom. The child and experimenter sat side-by-side
in front of some portable video equipment. At the
beginning of the first session, the child was shown
drawings of the two puppets, Coco and Daisy. Then the
child was asked to "watch the television", and he saw a
short section of video-tape in which the puppets
introduced themselves.
For each item in the Causal task, the sequence was
presented on the video-screen. Then, the experimenter
read out the incomplete sentence, and placed the two
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picture cards on the table in front of the child. The
pictures were arranged vertically on the table, and the
position of the correct picture was counter-balanced
across items. The child was asked to describe each
picture ("What's happening in this picture?"), and the
experimenter expanded on or corrected these descriptions
where necessary. Next, the experimenter said: "I want
you to watch the television and then give me the picture
that makes the story right." The child was shown the
sequence again, and the experimenter repeated the
incomplete sentence. Usually, the child completed the
sentence without prompting, and picked up the
corresponding picture. If he did not do so, then he
was asked to "choose the picture that will make the story
right ... And tell me about it.". Finally, the
experimenter tried to elicit the whole sentence from the
child ("Now, can you say it all by yourself?"). If
necessary, the experimenter prompted the child with the
first few words of the sentence. In the first session,
the child received two practice items before the eight
test items. These practice items were used to train the
child on the sentence completion and picture selection
procedures. They involved completing sentence fragments
which ended with and.
For each item in the Temporal task, the experimenter
placed one of the picture-strips on the table in front
of the child, and asked the child to describe it. Once
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the strip had been correctly described, the experimenter
said "Now let's see it on the television", and the
sequence corresponding to the strip was shown. Then, the
experimenter removed the picture strip and replaced it
with the strip depicting the opposite event order. After
this strip had been correctly described, the corresponding
video-taped sequence was presented. Then, both picture
strips were placed on the table, one above the other. The
experimenter read out the sentence twice in succession,
and asked the child "Which strip of pictures goes with
what I said?". The position of the correct picture-strip
and the order of presentation of the two versions of the
sequences were counter-balanced acrotss items. At the
beginning of the first session, the child received two
practice items. One of the sentences consisted of two
clauses linked by and then, and the other sentence
consisted of two clauses linked by but first. These items
were used to train the child to select the strip which
corresponded to the order-of-occurrence of the events
rather than the strip which corresponded to the order-of-
mention. It was hoped that this would reduce the
4
ambiguity of the phrase "goes with".
The main reason for using video-taped sequences was
that it seemed likely that the causal relations could be
encoded more powerfully in a dynamic representation than
in a static representation. In particular, the continuity
of causal sequences can be preserved when video-taped
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sequences are used. In the Causal task, the video-taped
sequences play a particularly important role. Unless the
child is given some contextual information, both of the
potential responses to the reversible items would have to
be regarded as equally correct. This contextual information
is provided by the video-taped sequences. In the Temporal
task, all the information which is required in order to
make the correct response is contained in the sentence,
so the video-taped sequences play a less crucial role
than in the Causal task. Nevertheless, the video-tapes
were used in the Temporal task so that it would be as
similar as possible to the Causal task. For the non¬
reversible items in the Temporal task, the reversed video¬
taped sequences were, of course, rather bizarre. However,
if the child had been shown only the normal sequences, he
could simply have selected the picture-strip which
matched the video-taped sequence without considering the
sentence at all.
The adult subjects were tested in groups, rather than
individually, and they wrote down their responses, rather
than responding orally. They received both subsets of
items in a single session. Apart from these
modifications, the procedure used with the adult subjects
was the same as that used with the children.
4.2.5 Scoring
Each subject was given one point for each item which
he responded to correctly. In the Causal task, the
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scoring was based on the choice of picture and the
sentence completion, rather than on the subject's
production of the complete sentence.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 The Causal direction hypothesis
The causal direction hypothesis predicts that
performance will be better on the Causal task than on the
Temporal task. Table 10 shows the number of subjects who
passed each task. In order to pass, a subject had to
give the correct response to at least 12 out of the 16
items. (From the Binomial distribution, the probability
of this outcome occurring by chance is less than 0»05.)
The significance of the differences between the two tasks
was then tested using a chi-square test. The results
indicate that performance was significantly better on the
Causal task than on the Temporal task, for all age groups
except the adults, who were performing at ceiling level
on both tasks. As Table 11 shows, a similar pattern of
results is obtained when the comparison is based on the
mean number of correct responses for each group.
The absolute level of performance in the Causal task
is also noteworthy. Almost half of the 5-year-olds and
almost all the older children passed the Causal task.
Similarly, the mean score for all the age groups is
considerably higher than the score (of 8) which one
would expect if the children were simply responding at
chance level. These findings imply that even 5-year-olds
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Table 10. Number of subjects passing each task (i.e.




5 years 7 0 p<0.01
8 years 14 2 p<0.001
10 years 15 5 p<0.001
Adults 6 6 N.S.
(The maximum possible per cell is 6 for the adults and
16 for all the other age groups. The significance levels
are based on chi-square or Fisher's exact probability tests.)
Table 11. Mean number of correct responses for each group.
Task
Age Causal Temporal
5 years 12.12 7.38 p<0.001
8 years 13.12 8.19 p<0.001
10 years 14.81 10.94 p<0.01
Adults 16.00 16.OO N.S.
(The maximum possible per cell is 16, The significance
levels are based on 1-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests.)
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have some knowledge of the directional element of the
connectives' meaning.
Tables 12 and 13 compare performance on the Causal
task with performance on the Temporal task for each of the
connectives. The causal direction hypothesis receives
support from the results for the because items and from
the results for the 5-year-olds' performance on the so
items. On the other hand, the 8- and 10-year-olds'
performance on the so items was better in the Temporal
task than in the Causal task. However, the high level of
performance for so items in the Temporal task is
probably an artefact of the subjects' use of an order-
of-mention strategy. (See section 4.3.2.)
4.3.2 'Because'and 'so'
It was predicted that, in the Temporal task, the
children would adopt an order-of-mention strategy, and
so would perform better on ^o items than on because items.
As Table 14 shows, the results for the 8-year-olds and
10-year-olds confirm this prediction. A more direct
test of the hypothesis that the children were following
an order-of-mention strategy was carried out by examining
the response profiles of the individual subjects. A
subject was judged to have been following the order-of-
mention strategy if at least 12 (out of 16) of his
responses were consistent with that strategy. As Table
15 shows, more than half of the 8-year-olds and 10-year-
olds were assigned to the order-of-mention strategy for
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Table 12. Comparison of Causal and Temporal tasks: mean
number of correct responses to 'because' items.
(The significance levels are obtained from Mann-Whitney U
tests (1-tailed). Maximum possible per cell = 8.)
Causal task Temporal task
5 years 6.69 3.50 p<0.001
8 years 7.75 1.69 p^O.OOl
10 years 7.75 2.94 p<0.001
Table 13. Comparison of Causal and Temporal tasks; mean
number of correct responses to 'so' items.
(The significance levels are obtained from Mann-Whitney
U tests (1-tailed). An asterisk indicates that the difference
is in the opposite direction from that predicted by the
causal direction hypothesis. Maximum possible per cell = 8.)
Causal task Temporal task
5 years 5.44 3.88 p<0.05
8 years 5.38 6.50 p<0.025*
10 years 7.06 8.00 p<0.01*
Table 14. Comparison of mean scores on 'because' and 'so'
in Temporal task.
(The significance levels are obtained from Wilcoxon's
matched-pairs signed-ranks tests (l-.tailed). Maximum possible
per cell = 8.)
Because So
5 years 3.50 3.88 N.S.
8 years 1.69 6.50 p<0.005
10 years 2.94 8,00 p<0.005
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the Temporal task. In contrast, none of the 8-year-olds
or 10-year-olds who received the Causal task could be
assigned to the order-of-mention strategy. This indicates
that the order-of-mention strategy is a task-specific
strategy.
Table 15. Number of subjects assigned to order-of-
mention strategy.
(Subjects whose responses were consistent with order-of-
mention strategy for at least 12 out of the 16 items).
Temporal task Causal task
5 years 5 1
8 years 10 0
10 years 11 0
It was predicted that, in the Causal task, performance
on because items would be equal to or better than
performance on so items. The results presented in Table
16 indicate that the children did indeed perform better
on because than on jso. Further evidence that children can
deal with because sentences better than so sentences
comes from the results of asking the children to produce
the whole sentence after they had completed each
sentence fragment. Sometimes, when a child tried to say
the whole sentence, he changed the connective which had
been present in the original sentence fragment. In these
cases, ^o was replaced by because more frequently than
because was replaced by so. (See Table 17.) This suggests
that the children had a preference for producing because
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sentences rather than so sentences.
Table 16. Comparison of mean scores on 'because' and
'so' in Causal task.
(The significance levels are obtained from Wilcoxon's
matched-pairs signed-ranks tests (l-.tailed). Maximum
possible per cell = 8.)
Because So
5 years 6.69 5.44 p<0.05
8 years 7.75 5.38 p<0.005
10 years 7.75 7.06 p<0.05
Table 17. Mean number of connective changes of each type
in Causal task.^
(The significance levels are obtained from Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks tests (2-tailed). Maximum
possible per cell = 8.)
Because -» So So -» Because
5 years 0.50 2.64 p<0.01
8 years 0.86 1.64 N.S.
10 years 0.12 0.56 N.S.
4.3.3 Age comparisons
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance revealed
that there were significant age effects both in the Causal
task (p<0.001) and in the Temporal task (p<0.01). Mann-
Whitney U tests (2-tailed) indicated that the 10-year-olds
performed significantly better than the 8-year-olds (p<0.02
for the Causal task and p<0.05 for the Temporal task), but
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that the differences between the 8-year-olds and the 5-year-
olds were not significant.
Further Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs were carried out to test
the effect of age for each connective separately. Significant
age effects were obtained for the because items in the
Causal task (p<0.01), for the so items in the Causal task
(p<0.01), and for the so items in the Temporal task (p<0.001),
but not for the because items in the Temporal task. In the
Causal task, the 8-year-olds performed significantly better
than the 5-year-olds on because items, and the 10-year-olds
performed significantly better than the 8-year-olds on ^o
items. (See Table 18.) In the Temporal task, significant
improvements in performance on so items occurred both
between 5 and 8 years and between 8 and 10 years. (See Table
19.) These increases are partly attributable to an increase
with age in the number of subjects using an order-of-
mehtion strategy. (See Table 15.) Some of the younger
subjects either did not appear to be following any consistent
strategy or used other strategies such as always selecting
the lower picture.
Table 18. Comparisons between age groups in Causal task
with respect to mean number of correct responses. (Mann-






Table 19. Comparisons between age groups in Temporal
task with respect to mean number of correct responses.
(Mann-whitney U tests, 2-tailed.)
Because So
5 years 3.50-^ 3.88v^^ p<
-N.S. 0.002
8 years 1.69 6.50 p <
N.S. j>0.05
10 years 2.94 8.00
4.3.4 Content and reversibility
As Table 20 shows, the results failed to confirm
the prediction that performance would be better for
psychological items than for physical items.
It was predicted that performance would be better
for non-reversible items than for reversible items. The
results presented in Table 21 show that in the Causal
task there was a significant effect in the predicted
direction for the 8-year-olds and for the 10-year-olds.
However, none of the other differences was significant.
Table 20. Comparison of Physical and Psychological iterns






5 years 5.94 6.19 N.S.
8 years 6.31 6.81 N.S.
10 years 7.44 7.38 N.S.
Temporal task
5 years 3.50 3.88 N.S.
8 years 4.12 4.06 N.S.
10 years 5.31 5.62 N.S.
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Table 21. Comparison of Reversible and Non-reversible
items with respect to mean number of correct responses.
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests, 1-tailed.)
Reversible Non-reversible
Causal task
5 years 5.88 6.25 N.S.
8 years 6.25 6.88 p<0.05
10 years 7.06 7.75 p<0.01
Temporal task
5 years 3.94 3.44 N.S.
8 years 4.25 3.94 N.S.
10 years 5.62 5.31 N.S.
4.4 Discussion
The results of the physical/psychological comparison
do not lend any support to Piaget's claim that relations
of psychological causality are understood before relations
of physical causality. On the other hand, they are
totally consistent with the results of the elicited
production studies. (See Chapter 3.) Therefore, we can
reject the strong claim that young children cannot express
and understand relations of physical causality adequately.
However, we cannot reject the weaker claim that young
children's ability to express and understand relations of
psychological causality exceeds their ability to express
and understand relations of physical causality, since our
studies were deliberately designed to include only
phenomena with which the child would probably be familiar.
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The results for the Temporal task fail to support
the hypothesis that non-reversible sentences are easier
than reversible sentences. This is consistent with the
results of Emerson's PST. In her first/last task (FLT),
Emerson did find a reversibility effect. Emerson explains
the lack of a reversibility effect in the PST by arguing
that the child may be better able to deal with reversible
sentences when the two alternative sequences are
presented to him (as in the PST) than when he has to create
the alternatives for himself (as in the FLT). However,
this explanation is not applicable to the present findings.
With the possible exception of the 10-year-old group, it
was not the case that the children were managing to deal
with the reversible sentences as well as with the non¬
reversible sentences, but rather that they were failing
toe.deal with either type of sentence adequately. An
inspection of the response profiles of the individual
subjects reveals that, even in the oldest age group, none
of the subjects performed markedly better on the non¬
reversible items than on the reversible items. In the
oldest age group, all the children could either be
categorized as following the order-of-mention strategy
or as passing the task. A similar, although less consistent,
pattern can be observed for the 8-year-old group. This
suggests that the most serious problem which the children
faced in dealing with the Temporal task was that of
resisting the order-of-mention strategy. It may be that
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the tendency to follow an order-of-mention strategy was
so strong that it masked any tendency to make use of
semantic plausibility.
It might be argued that the lack of a reversibility
effect is attributable to the particular sentences which
were used in the present study. However, the fact that
there was a significant reversibility effect for two of
the age groups in the Causal task argues against such an
explanation.
The findings for the Causal task support Emerson's
hypothesis that non-reversible sentences are easier than
reversible sentences. However, they do not support her
claim that using performance on non-reversible sentences
to assess the child's knowledge of the connectives'
meaning leads to an over-estimation of the child's ability.
Such a claim would be valid in relation to the Temporal
task, but not in relation to the Causal task. In the
Causal condition, the child's task is to choose between a
cause and an effect, and the only clue as to which he
should choose for a given item is provided by the connective.
Therefore, in order to succeed on the task, the child must
take account of the meaning of the connective. It is
difficult to conceive of a strategy which could produce
correct responses for non-reversible sentences but not for
reversible sentences irrespective of the connective irsed.
Therefore, correct responses to non-reversible items in
the Causal task do imply that the child has some knowledge
of the connectives' meaning. The fact that performance
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was better for non-reversible items than for reversible
items suggests that pragmatic cues can help the child to
demonstrate his knowledge. However, this is not the same
as saying that pragmatic cues can help the child to pass
the task when he lacks the relevant semantic knowledge.
For tasks like the Temporal task, including pragmatic cues
may produce false positives. In contrast, for tasks like
the Causal task, eliminating pragmatic cues may produce
false negatives.
In the Causal task, the information about which
event is the cause and which is the effect is provided by
the video-taped sequence. For non-reversible items, this
information could be reinforced by the child's knowledge
of pragmatic plausibility. If, on the basis of his world
knowledge, the child knows that event A is more likely to
be the cause than the effect of event B, and if the video¬
taped sequence depicts the event sequence A B 4 C, then
the child has two reasons for selecting A as the cause of
B. On the other hand, for reversible items, the child
has to rely on the information provided by the video¬
taped sequence. He has only one reason for selecting A as
the cause of B. Therefore, it may be easier for the child
to decide which event is the cause and which the effect
when the item is non-reversible than when it is reversible.
However, it is important to note that knowing which event
is the cause and which is the effect is a necessary but
not a sufficient pre-condition of success on the task.
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Knowing that A is the cause will not help the child
unless he also knows whether a given item requires him to
respond by referring to the cause or by referring to the
effect. And, in order to know that, he must understand and
take account of the meaning of the connective.
The causal direction hypothesis is strongly supported
by the finding that performance on the Causal task was
significantly better than performance on the Temporal task.
Therefore, we can conclude that children have an under¬
standing of the directional element of the causal
connectives' meaning which is based on causal direction
rather than on temporal order. This would explain why
children can use the causal connectives appropriately in
their spontaneous speech and in the elicited production
studies long before they can pass a comprehension task
based on temporal order. In their spontaneous speech and
in the elicited production studies, the children can make
use of their knowledge about causal direction, whereas,
in a temporal order task, they are required to base their
responses on the information which the causal connectives
can convey about temporal order.
The fact that young children fail temporal order tasks
involving the causal connectives does not necessarily mean
that they lack an understanding of temporal order of that
they do not know that a cause precedes its effect. It may
only mean that young children do not know that the causal
aonneat-ives can provide information about temporal order.
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Therefore, they do not realise that the causal connectives
have any relevance for the way they respond in a temporal
order task.
Several studies of children's understanding of causal
sequences have provided evidence that young children do
indeed know that a cause is temporally prior to its effect
(Shultz and Mendelson, 1975: Kun, 1978; Bullock and Gelman,
1979). Bullock and Gelman used a "jack-in-the-box" task
which involved dropping a ball down one runway into the
box before the jack jumped, and then dropping a ball down
the other runway after the jack jumped. They found that
children as young as 3 years consistently selected the
prior event as the cause of the jack jumping, despite the
fact that the events were novel and despite the fact that
there were no pragmatic constraints making the prior
event a more plausible cause than the subsequent event.
The claim that the young child knows that because
is followed by a reference to a cause whereas ^o is
followed by a reference to an effect implies that the
young child has some understanding as to what constitutes
a plausible cause for a given effect. Some evidence that
the young child does have a notion of "plausible cause"
is provided by the finding that the children in the
elicited production studies showed a strong tendency to
match the type of explanation to the type of phenomenon.
(See Chapter 3.) Similar evidence is provided by some of
the studies of children's understanding of causality.
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(See section 2.2.2.) In the present experiment, the Causal
task presents the child with a restricted context, and so
the need for knowledge about the plausibility of a cause
relative to a particular effect is reduced. Nevertheless,
the fact that the children performed better on non¬
reversible items than on reversible items does suggest
that they had some knowledge of cause-effect plausibility.
Although the notion of plausibility is closely
related to the notion of sentence reversibility^, it is
important to draw a distinction between these two notions.
The notion of plausibility is much more general than the
notion of reversibility. To say that a sentence (B because
A) is reversible with respect to causal direction or event
order is to say that there are no pragmatic constraints
which render A B any more or any less probable than
B A. In other words, reversibility is a function of
the relative plausibilities of two opposing orders or
directions. In many experimental tasks, the child is
being asked to distinguish between these two orders, so
it is easy to see how his performance could be influenced
by the degree of reversibility. However, when the child is
producing language spontaneously, his task is not simply
to choose between two opposing orders or directions.
Instead, he usually has to construct or complete the
causal relation for himself. For instance, when he is
answering a Why? question, he is given the effect, but
has to supply an appropriate cause. In such cases, the
131
alternatives from which the child makes his choice form
a less clearly defined and much larger set than in the
experimental task where there are only two alternatives.
Therefore, in order to supply a plausible cause, the child
must not only ensure that he chooses a cause rather than
an effect, but also that the particular cause is
appropriate to the particular effect.
The finding that, in the Causal task, performance was
better for because items than for so items supports the
argument that Y because X sentences constitute a more
powerful means of expressing causal relations than X so Y
sentences. (See section 4.1.2.) This, in turn, lends
further support to the causal direction hypothesis, since
it suggests that the child is being influenced by the way
in which because and so function as indicators of causal
direction.
At first sight, it may seem that there is no reason
for giving more weight to the finding that performance
was better on because than on so in the Causal task than
to the apparently contradictory finding that performance
was better on so than on because in the Temporal task.
However, the connective effect in the Temporal task can
be explained as a by-product of the order-of-mention
strategy.
There are two main ways of viewing the order-of-
mention strategy. It could be viewed as a description of
the way the child deals with the experimental task.
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Alternatively, it could be viewed as a description of the
child's knowledge of the meaning of because and so. This
would be equivalent to saying that the child thought that
both because and ^o should be followed by a reference to a
subsequent event. The fact that the children did not
follow the order-of-mention strategy in the Causal task
argues against this second interpretation. It is important
to remember that whereas the Temporal task requires the
child to make use of knowledge about temporal order, the
Causal task merely allows the child to make use of
knowledge about causal direction. Therefore, if the
child really believed that because was used to introduce
a temporally subsequent event, then his responses in the
Causal task should have reflected this belief. The fact
that they did not suggests that the order-of-mention
strategy is specific to certain types of experimental
task, and therefore that it would be unwise to draw
conclusions about the relative difficulty of because
and s>o on the basis of such tasks.
It might of course be argued that the connective
effect in the Causal task is also due to the effects of
some strategy. However, it is difficult to imagine what
such a strategy would be. The most likely candidate
would be the strategy of always basing one's response
on the first event shown in the video-taped sequence.
Although this is a possible strategy, there are several
factors which make it unlikely that the children were
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following it. First, Kun (1978) found that when 4- to
8-year-olds were asked a nonsense question about the
middle event in a 3-event sequence, there was no evidence
of any response bias. When the children were asked a Why?
question, they showed a strong tendency to select an
antecedent event, vhereas when they were asked What
happened next? they showed a strong tendency to select
a consequent event. (In Kun's study the children were
simply required to point to the appropriate picture. They
did not have to give a verbal response.) Second, Clark
(1973) found that when young children were describing
event sequences they showed a strong tendency to describe
the events in their chronological order. The strategy
of always basing one's response on the first event would
have to counteract this natural tendency to describe
events in their natural order. It seems more likely that
the child would relinquish this natural order because he
knew that because must be followed by a cause than
because of some low level strategy. Third, the data
obtained in the Causal task do not offer much support to
the hypothesis that the children were following a "first
event" strategy. Such a strategy would result in the
subjects scoring 'O' for the so items and '8' for the
because items. However, no subject, in any of the age
groups, scored less than 3 (out of 8) for the so items.
Those subjects who did not "pass" on the so items seemed
to be responding at random, rather than following a
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"first event" strategy.
Therefore, the results of the Causal task do
indicate that children understand because better than so.
This conclusion is also supported by the finding that,
in the Causal task, the only significant improvement with
age for performance on because items occurred between 5
and 8 years, whereas for so items it occurred between 8
and 10 years. Moreover, the age effect for the because
items seems to represent a slight increase in the
consistency of the responses, rather than a dramatic
increase in understanding, in that all except one of the
5-year-olds were scoring well above chance on the because
items. On the other hand, for the so items, 9 (out of
16) of the 5-year-olds and 8 of the 8-year-olds scored
less than 6 (out of 8), compared with only 2 of the
10-year-olds. This suggests that the age effect for so
does reflect a considerable increase in understanding.
In summary, the results of Experiment 4 indicate
that children understand the directional element of the
causal connectives' meaning in terms of causal direction
before they understand that the causal connectives can
also convey information about temporal order. The results
also suggest that children understand the meaning of
because better than the meaning of ^o. However, in view
of the fact that the linguistic structure of because
and ^o sentences varies according to the mode of
explanation, we should be cautious about drawing a
definite conclusion regarding the relative difficulty of
because and so until we have also studied the other modes
of explanation.
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CHAPTER 5 ; THE INTENTIONAL MODE
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Explanations in the intentional mode
Most of the studies on the development of the
causal connectives which are reported in the literature
have dealt exclusively with the empirical mode. In Chapter
4, we saw that young children are much more competent at
dealing with because and so in the empirical mode than the
results of most previous experiments have suggested. We
shall now turn to the question of whether young children's
ability extends to the intentional mode or whether it is
initially restricted to the empirical mode.
In the intentional mode, an action is explained in
terms of the agent's aim or intention. The action is
viewed as a goal-directed and purposive element of
behaviour. Therefore, an intentional explanation includes
a reference to an event or state which occurs (or is
expected to occur) afteT. the action which is being
explained. In this sense, intentional explanations are
"forward-looking", whereas empirical explanations are
"backward-looking" (in that they explain an event/state in
terms of a temporally prior event/state).
When a speaker gives an intentional explanation, he
asserts that a psychological relation holds between the
action and the intention. At the same time, he presupposes
that the action is likely to achieve the intended result.
The relation between the action and the result may be
causal, as in:
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(5.1) John wound up the toy car because he wanted it to go.
In some cases, though, the action does not actually -cause
the event/state which the agent intends to bring about.
Instead, the action enables the agent to attain his goal
by satisfying a certain pre-condition. An example of an
intentional explanation which presupposes a conditional
rather than a causal relation would be:
(5.2) Mary took out her crayons because she wanted to do
some colouring in.
The action (of taking out her crayons) enables Mary to
satisfy the condition that in order to colour in, it is
necessary to have an appropriate instrument. Both the
causal and the conditional relations may be either physical
(as in the above examples) or psychological, as in:
(5.3) John put a mouse in Mary's bed because he wanted to
frighten her.
(Psychological + Causal).
(5.4) Mary put on a pretty dress because she was going to
a party.
(Psychological + Conditional).
For all four types of intentional explanation, three
main components can be identified: the reason for the
action, the action, and the (actual or predicted) result
of the action.'1' There is a very close relationship
between the reason and the result. On the basis of a
sequence consisting of an action and its result, it is
possible to infer that the reason for the action was the
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agent's desire to achieve the result. Conversely, if the
result has not actually been observed, an intentional
explanation of the action will incorporate a prediction
about the probable result. Both the inference and the
prediction draw on knowledge of the relation between the
action and the result. Despite the interdependence of the
reason-action relation and the action-result relation,
the speaker must maintain a distinction between the two
relations when he is producing causal sentences, since the
distinction has certain linguistic consequences.
5.1.2 Linguistic analysis of sentences in intentional mode
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) present an analysis
of the relationship between perceived intentions and
perceived causes. Their analysis can be adapted to provide
a means of representing the main proposition which is
expressed in an intentional explanation:
(5.5) CAUSE (INTEND (Agent, Y), X).
In (5.5), CAUSE and INTEND are 2-place predicates, X is
the action which is being explained and Y is the result of
that action. However, this analysis does not actually
capture the relation between X and Y. Searle (1981) proposes
that an intention may be broken down into a belief
component and a desire component. We might combine this
proposal with the analysis given in (5.5) by replacing
"INTEND (Agent, Y)" with the conjunction of (5.6) and (5.7):
(5.6) DESIRE (Agent, Y)
(5.7) BELIEVE (Agent, (CAUSE (X,Y))).
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This would yield:
(5.8) CAUSE ((DESIRE (Agent, Y) j\ BELIEVE (Agent, (CAUSE
(X, Y))) ), X).
The proposition which (5.8) represents could be described
informally by saying that an action (X) is caused by the
agent's desire to achieve an event/state (Y) combined with
the agent's belief that doing X would cause Y to happen
or occur. An example of an intentional explanation which
makes all the elements of this analysis explicit would be:
(5.9) John wound up the toy car because he wanted it to go
and he believed that winding it up would make it go.
This analysis clarifies the way in which the intentional
mode is parasitic on the empirical mode. An empirical
explanation, such as:
(5.10) The toy car went because John wound it up
expresses a proposition of the form:
(5.11) CAUSE (X,Y)
In the corresponding intentional explanation, this
proposition functions as the second argument of the BELIEVE
predicate. However, if the intentional explanation pre¬
supposes a conditional rather than a causal relation, the
second argument of the BELIEVE predicate would have to be
modified to:
(5.12) ALLOW (X,Y)
Thus, the intentional mode is more obviously dependent on
the empirical mode when the underlying relation is causal
than when it is conditional.
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An intentional explanation need not be as explicit
as example (5.9). The following sentences illustrate the
main types of construction which can be used in giving
intentional explanations:
(5.13) John wound up the toy car to make it go.
(5.14) John wound up the toy car because he wanted it to go.
(5.15) Mary took out her crayons because she was going to
do some colouring in.
(5.16) John wanted the toy car to go so he wound it up
(5.17) Mary was going to do some colouring in so she took
out her crayons.
(5.18) John wound up the toy car so (that) it would go.
(5.19) Mary took out her crayons so (that) she could do
some colouring in.
In all these types of sentence, the verb which is used to
refer to the result of the action (go/do) occurs in its
non-finite form. This non-finite form may either be part
of an infinitive construction (as in (5.13)), or part of a
modal construction (as in (5.18) and (5.19)), or part of a
phrase which refers to the agent's desire or aim (as in
(5.14) to (5.17)). All of these patterns contrast with the
types of construction which can be used to give an empirical
explanation:
(5.20) The toy car went because John wound it up.
(5.21) John wound up the toy car so it went.
In the empirical mode, a finite verb form (went) is used to
refer to the result of the action. Empirical sentences are
used to express the relation between an action and the
result of the action, whereas intentional sentences are
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used to express the relation between an action and the
reason for the action (when the reason corresponds to the
agent's intention to achieve a particular result). The
distinction between these two types of relation is marked
linguistically in the way just outlined. The linguistic
distinction is illustrated by the unacceptability of
sentences such as:
(5.22)*John wound up the toy car because it went.
In the empirical mode, because is used to introduce
a cause, whereas so is used to introduce an effect. A
similar distinction between because and _so holds in the
intentional mode. In (5.14) and (5.15), because is followed
by a reference to an intention which could be regarded as
the cause of the action referred to by the first clause.
In (5.16) and (5.17), so is followed by a reference to an
action which could be regarded as the effect of the
intention referred to by the first clause. As in the
empirical mode, it is the because sentence rather than the
so sentence which conforms to the natural order for an
explanation (what is being explained explanation).
However, in the intentional mode, so may be used in
the sense of "in order that" or "so that" (as in (5.18)
and (5.19)) as well as in the sense of "therefore" (as in
(5.16) and (5.17)). We shall refer to the "in order that"
use of so, which is specific to the intentional mode, as
2
"so(i)". Either because or sO(i) may be used to
introduce a reason for an action, and the use of either of
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these connectives will yield a sentence which conforms to
the natural order for an explanation. (See examples (5.14)
and (5.18), and (5.15) and (5.19).) The difference between
because and jSO(i) sentences lies in the way in which the
reason is expressed. In a because sentence, the reason is
expressed by using a phrase which refers to the agent's
desire or aim (wanted to, was going to), whereas in a
so(i) sentence, the reason is expressed by using a modal
construction (would... , could.,. ) which refers to the
predicted result of the action. Thus, the two types of
sentence differ with respect to which of the elements of
(5.8) are asserted explicitly and which are presupposed.
There does seem to be some relation between the cause/
condition distinction, introduced in section 5.1.1, and
the linguistic structure of sentences in the intentional
mode. For example, constructions involving because and
going to cannot be used when the underlying relation is
causal, and constructions involving so ... would cannot be
used when the underlying relation is conditional:
(5.23)*John wound up the toy car because it was going to go.
(5.24)*Mary took out her crayons so she would do some
colouring in.
5.1.3 Temporal order in the intentional mode
In discussing the empirical mode, it is relatively
unproblematic to say that causes precede their effects and
therefore that because is followed by a reference to the
event which happened first, whereas so is followed by a
reference to the event which happened next. On the other
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hand, in the intentional mode, the relationship between
causal direction and temporal order is much more complex.
In the intentional mode, the cause of an action is the
agent's intention to achieve a particular result. In one
sense, the intention is temporally prior to the action,
in that the intention is usually formed before the action
is carried out. However, the intention is also "forward
looking" in that it incorporates a prediction about the
probable outcome of the action. Therefore, the intention
and the action do not form a simple temporal sequence in
which the intention comes first. Rather, the intention
both precedes the action and "looks ahead of" the action.
Because of this complex relationship between causal
direction and temporal order in the intentional mode, it
is not helpful to say that because is followed by a
reference to the event which happened first.
5.1.4 Exploring children's ability to deal with the
intentional mode.
The account presented in the preceding sections suggests
that the task of dealing with intentional explanations
would be likely to impose a number of demands on the child.
First, it is cognitively demanding in that a distinction
has to be maintained between the reason-action relation
and the action-result relation, and yet these two
relations are interdependent. Second, it is linguistically
demanding in that the child has to show that he has
maintained the distinction between the two types of
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relation by using a linguistic construction which is
appropriate to the intentional mode. If the child confuses
the type of construction appropriate to the empirical mode
with the type of construction appropriate to the
intentional mode, then he will be likely to produce cause-
effect inversions, such as:
(5.25)*John wound up the toy car because it went.
Also, when he is attempting to give intentional
explanations, he will tend to produce utterances like:
(5.26) John wound up the toy car so it went
which are well-formed but which express an action-result
relation rather than an action-reason relation. A further
linguistic demand is that the child has to distinguish
among because constructions, so constructions and so(i)
constructions, within the intentional mode. Failure to
do so would result in the production of inversions, such
as:
(5.27)*John wanted the toy car to go because he wound it up.
(5.28)*John wound up the toy car so he wanted it to go.
(5.29)*John wound up the toy car because it would go.
In short, if the child is confused either about the
distinction between a reason and a result or about the
meaning of the causal connectives, then a task involving
intentional explanations should give him plenty of
opportunities to reveal his confusion by producing cause-
effect inversions!
Experiment 5 was designed to investigate 5-year-olds'
and 8-year-olds' ability to give intentional explanations.
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The task used in this experiment involved presenting
the child with picture-pairs and telling short stories
about them. Each picture-pair depicted an action and a
result, and the child's task was to explain the action.
Since neither the pictures nor the story made the agent's
intention explicit, the child was required to infer the
nature of the intention on the basis of the information
provided about the result, and on the basis of his
knowledge about the action-result relation. Therefore,
this particular task demanded a considerable degree of
cognitive flexibility on the part of the child. He had to
infer the reason for the action on the basis of the result
of the action, yet, at the same time, he had to maintain a
distinction between the reason and the result. The
techniques used in eliciting the explanations were to ask
the child Why...? questions about the actions (e.g. Why
did John wind up the car?), and (in a later session) to ask
the child to complete sentence fragments which referred to
the action and which ended in because or ^o (e.g. John
wound up the car because ... ; John wound up the car so ...
Thus, in this particular experiment, the child was required
to distinguish between because and so(±) constructions, but
he did not have to deal with so in the sense of "therefore"
The results of Experiment 5 will be used to address
three main issues, which are framed as questions rather
than as hypotheses, since we are venturing into, an area whi
is largely unexplored. These issues are:
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(1) Is there a developmental progression in the ability
to give intentional explanations?
(2) When children express intentional explanations, do
they show a preference for a particular linguistic
construction, and, if so, is there a developmental
change in this preference?
(3) To what extent do children produce cause-effect
inversions when attempting to give intentional
explanations? Does this vary according to any of the
following:
(a) the age of the children?
(b) whether the presupposed relation is causal or
conditional?
(c) whether the presupposed relation is physical or
psychological?
(d) whether the connective is because or so?
5.2 Method (Experiment 5).
5.2.1 Subjects
A total of 48 subjects took part in the experiment.
There were 24 subjects in each of two age groups. The mean
age for the younger group was 5;10, and the age range was
from 5;4 to 6;3. For the older group, the mean age was
8;2 and the ages ranged from 7}9 to 8;6. Each group
contained approximately equal numbers of boys and girls.
All the subjects received the Questions task, and most of
the subjects also received the sentence completion task.
However, for the younger group, the two tasks were separated
by the summer vacation, and 4 of the original subjects were
not available to take part in the sentence completion task.
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Therefore, for the sentence completion task, the younger
group consisted of 20 subjects with a mean age of 6;1 and
an age range from 5;8 to 6}6. In order to equate the two
groups for size, the data for 4 of the older subjects were
omitted from the analysis of the sentence completion task.
The mean age of the older group in the sentence completion
task was 8;3, and the age range was from 7;9 to 8;6(as in
the Questions task). All the subjects were pupils at a
Local Authority primary school, Musselburgh Burgh.
5.2.2 Design
Apart from the exceptions mentioned in the previous
section, all the subjects received two tasks: the
Questions task and the Sentence Completion task. The
Questions task was always administered before the Sentence
Completion task. This was done because the Questions task
was more openr-ended than the Sentence Completion task, and
it was important to find out which linguistic construction
the child preferred to use before he was influenced by the
constraints imposed by the Sentence Completion task.
For each item in both tasks, the child was presented
with two pictures and was told a story. One of the
pictures (the top picture) depicted an action and the
other picture (the lower picture) depicted a result of the
action. The agent's intention was not explicitly
mentioned in the story. In the Questions task, the subject
was required to answer a Why? question about the action
depicted in the top picture. In the Sentence Completion
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task, the subject was asked to complete a sentence
fragment which described the action depicted in the top
picture and which ended in because or so. This design
would probably encourage the production of intentional
rather than empirical explanations, since there was no
picture depicting a prior causal event. On the other hand,
the design would not bias the subjects towards giving non-
inverted rather than inverted responses. Both a non-
inverted and an inverted response would be likely to be
based on the event depicted in the lower picture. However,
in order to demonstrate that he intended to express a
reason (the inferred intention) rather than a result, the
subject would have to use a linguistic construction
appropriate to the intentional mode. In other words, this
design means that the child's ability to distinguish
between reasons and results is being assessed on the basis
of the form rather than the content of the child's
utterances.
The design of the Questions task used with the younger
age group was slightly different from that used with the
older age group. For the younger age group, the Questions
task was administered over two sessions (on different
days). In each session, the subject was presented with
twelve stories and picture-pairs, and after each story
he was asked a question about the action depicted in the
top picture. For half of the items this question was a
Why? question (e.g. Why did John wind up the car?) and
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for the other half, it was a Then what . .. ? question (e.g.
John wound up the car, didn't he? ... Then what happened?).
The same stories and pictures were presented in both
sessions. Two sets of questions were constructed such that
each story was paired with a Why? question in one set and
with a Then what ...? question in the other set. Each
subject received one set of questions in the first session
and the other set in the second session. The order of the
two sets of questions was counter-balanced across subjects.
The Then what...? questions were included in an attempt
to elicit descriptions of the event depicted in the lower
picture. By comparing a child's responses to these
questions with his responses to the corresponding Why?
questions, it should be possible to determine whether or
not the child is making some distinction between giving a
reason and describing a subsequent event, even if he does
not employ exactly the same linguistic forms as adults
would. However, a preliminary analysis of the results
obtained for the younger age group indicated that the
children usually did use the same forms as adults. Also,
since the children did not always use exactly the same
verb in answering the Why...? question as in answering
the Then what...? question, it was difficult to make a
systematic comparison between the two sets of responses.
For these reasons, the design was modified for the older
age group. They received the Questions task in a single
session. They were asked a Why? question about each of
the twelve stories which had been used with the younger
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children. In addition, they were presented with four new
stories and were asked a Then what..♦? question about
each of these. These four distractor items were inter¬
spersed throughout the test items.
In a subsequent session, all the subjects received the
Sentence Completion task. For the younger group, this was
the third session and it took place several months after
the first two sessions. For the older group, this was the
second session and it took place a few days after the
first session. For both age groups, the Sentence
Completion task was administered in a single session. It
consisted of sixteen items (twelve test items and four
distrabtors) which were based on the same set of stories
and pictures as the items in the Questions task used with
the older group. For the distractor items, the sentence
fragments ended with and then (e.g. Mary turned on the
tap and then...). For half of the test items presented
to a given subject, the sentence fragment ended with
because, and for the other half it ended with so. Two
sets of items were constructed such that each story was
paired with a because fragment in one set and with a _so
fragment in the other set. Half of the subjects in each
age group received one set and half received the other
set.
Despite the differences between the designs used with
the two age groups, the test items were the same for both
groups. These items were based on twelve stories, each of
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which was illustrated with two pictures. There were





(There was also one distractor item based on each of these
categories, except for the younger group in the Questions
task.) The same stories and pictures were used for both
tasks. In the Questions task, the subjects were asked
twelve Why? questions, and, in the Sentence Completion
task, they were asked to complete six because sentences
and six _so sentences. The order of presentation of the
stories was constant across subjects and across sessions.
The order was random, except for the constraint that two
consecutive stories could not be from exactly the same
category.
5.2.3 Materials
The stimulus materials for each item consisted of a
story, two pictures and a question or sentence fragment.
The general aim in constructing the stories was to make
them as natural as possible. Therefore, they included
some extra details which were not directly relevant to the
task. Each story included a specific reference to the
action and the result which were to form the basis of the
item, but the agent's intention was not explicitly
mentioned. The stories are presented in Appendix 5.
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For each story, there was a picture depicting the
action and a picture depicting the result. The pictures
were coloured drawings, and the two pictures for a given
story were arranged vertically on a single page. The
top picture always depicted the action, and the lower
picture always depicted the result. The pages were arranged
in a loose-leaf binder. The pictures are shown in Appendix
5.
Appendix 5 also includes the questions and sentence
fragments.The Why? questions were all formed by asking
Why? about the action depicted in the top picture. Each
Then what...? question was preceded by a statement
describing the action and by a tag question (e.g. John
wound up the car, didn't he?). For the cause items, the
question was: Then what happened?, and for the condition
items, it was: Then what did he (she) do?
5.2.4 Procedure
Each child was tested individually in a separate room.
The sessions were audio-tape recorded, and were transcribed
later. In addition, the experimenter took notes on the
child's responses during the testing session.
The picture book was placed in front of the child,
and the child was asked to look at the pictures while the
experimenter told the story. After each story in the
Questions task, the experimenter asked the child a Why?
or Then what? question based on the action depicted in the
top picture. Before the younger children received their
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second session, they were told that they would be looking
at the same pictures and hearing the same stories again,
but that the questions would be "a little bit different".
Similarly, before the sentence completion task was
presented, the older children were told that the pictures
and stories would be the same but that "then we'll do
something a little bit different from what we did last
time". All the children received a practice item for the
sentence completion task. For this practice item, the
subject was asked to look at a picture (in a commercially
produced book) while the experimenter told him a story
about it. Then, the experimenter read out a sentence
fragment (Tom put his fishing net into the water and he
caught...), and said to the subject:
"Oh, I stopped too soon, didn't I?... I want
you to help me. When I stop too soon, please
will you say the last bit for me?... O.K.
Listen again, and then when I stop, you finish
it off."
The experimenter repeated the sentence fragment, and,
after the subject had provided a completion, the
experimenter asked him to say the complete sentence. ("Now,
could you say that all by yourself, please?"). If
necessary, the experimenter prompted the child with one
or more words from the beginning of the sentence. This
basic procedure was repeated for each item, except that
the subjects usually provided the completion as soon as
the experimenter finished the sentence fragment so




In order to obtain some data on adults' use of
intentional explanations, a set of questionnaires was
administered to 40 undergraduate students. Each
questionnaire contained twelve items which corresponded to
the test items presented to the children, and the stories
on which the items were based. There were three types of
questionnaire, and each student completed only one of
these. In Questionnaire I, the twelve items were the Why?
questions which had been presented to the children.
Twenty students completed this questionnaire. Questionnaire
Ila consisted of one of the sets of sentence completion
items, and Questionnaire lib consisted of the other set.
Each of these questionnaires was completed by ten students.
The questionnaires are reproduced in Appendix 6.
5.3 Analysis of results
The data for each child consisted of three types of
response: responses to Why? questions, sentence completions,
and attempts to produce the complete sentences. These
responses were coded using six categories:
A. Inversions : A response was assigned to this category
if there was a clash between the direction of the causal
relation specified by the connective and the direction of
the causal relation indicated by the content of the
clauses. If because was followed by a reference to an
effect or result which was not appropriately marked as
being in the intentional mode, then the response was
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classed as an inversion. Similarly, if so was followed by
a reference to a cause or reason which was not marked as
being an aim or intention, then the response was classed
as an inversion. Responses in which the type of linguistic
construction appropriate to a because sentence in the
intentional mode was confused with the type of linguistic
construction appropriate to a so(i) sentence in the
intentional mode were also included in the inversions
category. Here are some examples of responses which were
classed as inversions:
(5.30) E - Why did John wind up the car?
S - 'Cos it went away.
(5.31) E - Mary put some money into the machine so ...
S - She wanted a bar of chocolate.
(5.32) E - Mary took out her crayons because ...
S - She could draw a picture.
(5.33) E - Mary put on a pretty dress so ...
S - She was going to go to a party after lunch.
B. Possible inversions/tense errors: The status of the
responses in this category is ambiguous. These are responses
in which so was used along with a present tense modal, will
or can, as in:
(5.34) E - Why did John water the bulbs?
S - So they'll grow.
Such responses could be interpreted either as evidence
that the child could not distinguish appropriately between
reasons and results, or as evidence that he had not
mastered the tense rules but was attempting to give an
intentional explanation (so they would grow).
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C. Non-intentional explanations : The responses in this
category were appropriate as explanations but they were
not in the intentional mode. This category includes
appropriate empirical explanations. It also includes
responses which consisted of for followed by a noun-phrase.
The following are examples of responses in the non-
intentional category:
(5.35) E - Mary put on a pretty dress because ...
S - 'Cos it was someone's birthday.
(5.36) E - Mary put on a silly nose so ...
S - She scared Tom.
(5.37) E - Why did John buy a bunch of flowers?
S - For his Gran.
D. Intentional explanations : In order to be included in
this category, a response had to constitute an explanation
of the action in terms of the agent's intention to achieve
a particular effect. In addition, the response had to
employ a linguistic construction which was appropriate to
the intentional mode. The responses in this category were
sub-categorised according to the type of linguistic
construction which they employed. There were five such
categories:
(1) Infinitive: e.g., John wound up the toy car to make
it go.
(2) Because ♦♦. wanted to ... : e.g., John wound up the
toy car because he wanted it to go.
(3) Because ... was going to ..♦ : e.g., Mary took out her
crayons because she was going to do
some colouring in.
(4) So... would ... : e.g., John wound up the toy car so
(that) it would go.
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(5) So ... could ... ; e.g., Mary took out her crayons so
(that) she could colour in.
E. Rule-based explanations: The responses in this category
explained the action by referring to a rule, regularity or
convention. They usually involved the use of if or when
and present tense verb forms, as in the following example:
(5.38) E - Why did John wash his hands?
S - 'Cos when you eat, if you don't wash your hands
you get germs in your food.
F. Temporal expressions: The responses in this category
referred to events or states which were subsequent to the
actions, but they did not involve the use of causal
connectives. Here are some examples of such responses:
(5.39) Mary put on a silly nose and showed John it.
(5.40) John washed his hands and then went down to his tea.
(5.41) Mary took out her crayons then she went and coloured
in.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 The ability to give intentional explanations.
Table 22 shows the frequency and percentage of
responses assigned to each of the main categories. The
results indicate that the children showed a strong tendency
to produce intentional explanations. For both age groups
and for all the tasks, most of the responses were in the
intentional category. It is important to note that the
intentional category only includes non-inverted intentional
responses. Therefore, the children were not only attempting
to produce intentional explanations. They were also
succeeding in producing a large percentage of well-formed
intentional explanations.
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The percentages of intentional responses for the
adult group were 97% for the Questions task (Questionnaire
I) and 95% for the Sentence Completion task (Questionnaires
Ila and lib). Thus, the adults' tendency to produce
intentional explanations was slightly stronger than the
children's.
The fact that the 5-year-olds produced fewer
intentional responses than the 8-year-olds in the Sentence
Completion and Whole Sentence tasks may indicate that the
younger children are less able to produce intentional
explanations without the support of Why? questions than the
older children are. On the other hand, since the time
interval between the Questions task and the Sentence
Completion task was much shorter for the older group than
for the younger group, it is possible that, in the Sentence
Completion task, the older children were simply being
influenced by the way they had responsed in the Questions
task. In any case, the results for the Questions task
indicate that, under favourable conditions, even 5-year-
olds can demonstrate a considerable ability to give
intentional explanations.
5.4.2 Preferred linguistic constructions
As the results presented in Table 23 show, the
linguistic construction which was used most frequently in
the Questions task was the infinitive construction. For the
Sentence Completion task, the responses were distributed
much more evenly among the various linguistic constructions.
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Sentence Completion178.544924.62526.1322.113618.090.5 Whole Sentence157.614120.813.35020.30427.41.
This indicates that the children were taking account of
the constraints of the task. Although they preferred
using the infinitive, they could be encouraged to use the
other constructions. The Whole Sentence task imposes fewer
constraints than the Sentence Completion task but more
constraints than the Questions task. It is interesting to
note that the percentage of infinitive construction
responses for the Whole Sentence task is greater than for
the Sentence Completion task but less than for the
Questions task. When the constraints of the task were
relaxed, the children tended to return to using their
preferred construction.
A similar pattern emerges from the adult data, as
Table 24 indicates. The infinitive construction was
preferred in the Questions task, but not in the Sentence
Completion task. The fact that none of the adults'
responses to the Sentence Completion task used the
infinitive construction, whereas some of the children's
responses did, is probably due to an increase with age
in the ability to take account of the constraints of the
task. However, some caution is required in drawing such
a conclusion. The adult subjects came from a more highly
selected sample than the children did, in that the adults
were all university undergraduates. Also, the fact that
the adults received a written version of the task may have
helped them to attend to the particular connective which
was used in each sentence fragment.
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In view of the finding that performance was better
for because than for so sentences in the causal task based
on the empirical mode, it is important to compare because
and so sentences in the intentional mode. In the Questions
task, when the subjects had a free choice as to the
linguistic construction they used, did they show a
preference for either because or so? As the results
presented in Table 25 indicate, there were no significant
differences between the number of subjects preferring
because and the number preferring so.
5.4.3 Occurrence of inversions
The results which were presented in Table 22 indicate
that inversions account for only a very small percentage
of the children's responses, whereas non-inverted
intentional responses account for the majority of the
children's responses. However, the results in Table 23 show
that many of these intentional responses involve the use
of the infinitive construction. It is difficult to see how
the child could produce cause-effect inversions while using
an infinitive construction. Therefore, it is only when the
child is using because or sr> constructions that his ability
to avoid inversions is really put to the test. Table 26
presents the results of a comparison between the mean
number of inversions and the mean number of intentional
responses using because or so constructions. For both age
groups and for all the tasks, there were more intentional
responses using because or ^o than there were inversions.
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Table 25. Comparison between number of subjects
preferring "because" and number preferring
"so" in giving intentional explanations in
Questions task. (Sign test).
Prefer "because" Prefer "so" No
Preference
5-years 5 12 7 N.S.
8-years 8 11 5 N.S.
Adults 10 5 5 N.S.
Table 26. Comparison between mean number of inversions and
mean number of intentional responses using



























This result was obtained despite the fact that the
inverted category includes the Possible inversions/Tense
errors, and despite the fact that some of the inversions
may have resulted from attempts to produce non-
intentional rather than intentional explanations whereas
the non-inverted responses all come from the intentional
category.3
Although the inversion rate is low for both age
groups, the results in Table 26 suggest that it is even
lower for the 8-year-olds than for the 5-year-olds. A
Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the age effect was
statistically significant for the Questions task and the
Sentence Completion task, but not for the Whole Sentence
task. (See Table 27.) The lack of a significant age
effect for the Whole Sentence task may be partly
attributable to the fact that many of the 5-year-olds'
responses to this task were in the temporal category. (See
Table 22.)
Table 28 shows how the inversions and possible
inversions were distributed among the four categories of
item. There is a slight trend towards the frequency of
inversions being greater for Cause items than for
Condition items. However, this can only be suggestive
since the total number of inversions is so small.
In Table 29, because and _so items (in the Sentence
completion and Whole sentence tasks) are compared with
respect to the mean number of inversions. Wilcoxon
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Table 27. Comparison between age groups with respect to
mean number of inversions. (Mann-Whitney U
test, 1-tailed.)
5-year-olds 8-year-olds
Questions 0.75 0.21 p<0.05
Sentence
Completion 1.40 0.65 p<0.02
Whole sentence 0.40 0.20 N.S.
Table 28. Frequency of inversions (and possible inversions)
for each category of item.
Physical Psychological Physical Psychological
Cause Cause Condition Condition
Ques tions
5-year-olds 11 3 0 4
8-year-olds 1 1 0 3
Sentence
Completion
5-year-olds 7 11 6 4
8-year-olds 3 4 2 4
Whole
Sentence
5-year-olds 3 4 0 1
8-year-olds 1 1 0 2




matched-pairs signed-ranks tests indicated that none of
the differences was significant. A similar result was
obtained for the Questions task (on the basis of a Sign
test).
Table 29. Comparison between "because" and "so" items (in
Sentence completion and Whole sentence tasks)
with respect to mean number of inversions.
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests,
2-tailed. Maximum possible per cell = 6.)
Because So
Sentence completion
5 years 0.85 0.55 N.S.
8 years 0.30 0.35 N.S.
Whole Sentence
5 years 0.25 0.15 N.S.
8 years 0.15 0.005 N.S.
5.5 Discussion
In their explanations of actions in terms of
intentions, the subjects in this experiment demonstrated
considerable linguistic and cognitive abilities. Both the
5-year-olds and the 8-year-olds were able to infer the
agent's intention on the basis of knowledge about the action
and the result. This finding is congruent with Stein and
Trabasso's finding (1982) that children of these ages can
make inferences about motives on the basis of various types
of information contained in stories. The children in the
present study also showed an ability to distinguish between
the reason for an action and the result of an action,
despite the fact that they had to infer the reason on the
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basis of their knowledge of the result. This is strong
evidence that the children are capable of a considerable
degree of cognitive flexibility. It is also evidence
that the children's understanding of psychological
causality has a systematic basis. They are not confused
about what is a reason and what is a result. Thus, their
reasoning about psychological causality is not as
immature as Piaget implies it is.
The children were also able to mark the distinction
between a reason and a result linguistically. Although the
children (like the adults) preferred to use the infinitive
construction to mark their explanations as being in the
intentional mode, they also demonstrated an ability to
use because and so constructions appropriately, in that
they produced significantly more non-inverted intentional
responses than inverted responses when they were using
because and ^o constructions. This finding lends further
support to the argument that the child's use and under¬
standing of the causal connectives is guided by knowledge
other than the knowledge that because is followed by a
reference to the first event whereas ^o is followed by a
reference to the second event. This knowledge about
temporal order would not be particularly useful for
dealing with sentences in the intentional mode, since
there is a complex relationship between causal direction
and temporal order in the intentional mode. The child's
knowledge can be more appropriately characterised in
terms of causal direction.
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In Chapter 4, it was argued that the child knows
that because is followed by a cause, and that he has a
notion of "plausible cause". The present findings suggest
that the child knows that an agent's desire or aim to
achieve a particular result constitutes a plausible cause
for an action. Further, they suggest that the child knows
that, in the intentional mode, either because or so(i) can
be used to introduce the reason for an action, but that if
because is used, the explanation has to focus on the
agent's aim or desire, whereas if so(i) is used, the
explanation has to focus on the predicted result of the
action.
The results of Experiment 4 suggested that children
know that because introduces a cause before they know that
so introduces an effect. However, the results of
Experiment 5 provide no evidence of a similar asymmetry
between because and .so(i). The children did not show a
preference for using because constructions rather than
_so(i) constructions. (In fact, they tended to use so (j)
slightly more than because, but the effect was not
significant). Nor did they produce more inversions for
so(i) sentences than for because sentences. The distinction
between because and so(i) in the intentional mode seems
rather more subtle than the distinction between because
and s^o in the empirical mode. Therefore, the finding that
children can deal with so(i) in the intentional mode at an
earlier age than they can deal with _so in the empirical
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mode may seem rather surprising. However, the finding may
be attributable to the fact that so(i) sentences, like
because sentences, conform to the natural order for an
explanation. (See section 4.1.2.) In contrast, when so
is used in the sense of "therefore", the natural order
for an explanation is violated. It may be that children
begin by learning the "more natural" uses of the causal
connectives.
In this chapter, we have seen how our picture of
the child's knowledge of the causal connectives' meaning
can be enriched when we consider intentional explanations
as well as empirical explanations. In the next chapter,
we shall attempt to elaborate further on this picture by
investigating explanations in the deductive mode.
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CHAPTER 6 : THE DEDUCTIVE MODE
6.1 Introduction
6,1,1 Explanations in the deductive mode
In the deductive mode, a judgment or conclusion is
explained or justified in terms of some form of evidence.
The evidence may be observable, or it may take the form of
a rule or of a "given" fact. The role of the causal
connectives in deductive sentences is to make explicit the
links in the deductive process, rather than the causal
relations between events. However, a deductive
explanation may draw on the speaker's knowledge of the
types of causal relations between events which are made
explicit in empirical explanations. For example, the
deductive explanation expressed by the sentence:
(6.1) We can tell that John has a broken leg because it
is in plaster
presupposes the physical relation which is made explicit
in the sentence:
(6.2) John's leg is in plaster because it is broken.
Similarly, the deductive sentence:
(6.3) We can tell that Mary is sad because she is crying
presupposes the psychological relation expressed by:
(6.4) Mary is crying because she is sad.
Thus, deductive explanations may have physical content
(as in (6.1)) or psychological content (as in (6.3)).
Alternatively, they may have logical content, as in:
(6.5) We can tell that half nine is not four because four
and four make eight.
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Most of the previous research on children's under¬
standing of the causal connectives has either been based
solely on the empirical mode or has compared empirical
sentences to deductive sentences with logical content.
This has resulted in our picture of the child's knowledge
of the connectives' meaning being not simply incomplete
but distorted, since there is a complex relationship between
the linguistic structure of deductive sentences and that of
empirical sentences.
6.1.2 Linguistic analysis of sentences in the deductive
mode.
As the following sentences illustrate, in the deductive
mode, because is used to introduce the evidence on which a
conclusion is based, whereas so is used to introduce the
conclusion:
(6.6) We can tell that John has a broken leg because it is
in plaster.
(6.7) John's leg is in plaster so we can tell that he has
a broken leg.
If the evidence is regarded as the "cause" of the
conclusion, then the deductive and empirical uses of the
connectives appear to be rather similar. In both cases,
because introduces a cause, whereas so introduces an effect.
However, the situation is complicated by the fact that the
clause which is used to refer to the cause of a conclusion
in a deductive sentence may be used to refer to an effect
in an empirical sentence, such as:
(6.8) John's leg is in plaster because it is broken.
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Thus, the fact that John's leg is in plaster may be
regarded either as the effect of John's leg being broken
or as evidence for the conclusion that John's leg is
broken. However, these alternatives are not really
mutually exclusive, since a deductive sentence (such as
(6.6)) presupposes the relation which would be expressed
by the corresponding empirical sentence ((6.8)). When the
deductive sentence has logical content, there is no need
to draw a distinction between the relation which is
expressed and the relation which is presupposed. The only
relation involved is the logical or deductive relation.
When the content of a because or so sentence is non-
logical, it is not possible to determine the truth-value
of the sentence unless one knows whether the sentence is
to be interpreted in terms of the empirical or the
deductive mode. For example, while it is true that "John's
leg being in plaster" could be the cause of the conclusion
that "John's leg is broken", it would probably be false to
say that "John's leg being in plaster is the cause of
John's leg being broken".
The examples which we have considered so far suggest
that empirical sentences can be distinguished from
deductive sentences on the basis of their linguistic form.
The deductive sentences contain the phrase we can tell
that, whereas the empirical sentences do not. However, the
following sentences could also be used to give deductive
explanations:
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(6.9) John has a broken leg because it is in plaster.
(6.10) John's leg is in plaster so he has a broken leg.
These sentences can be regarded as elliptical versions of
sentences (6,6) and (6.7), Sentences like (6.6) and (6.7)
are explicitly deductive in that they contain a phrase
(we can tell that) which indicates that a conclusion is
being expressed. There are a number of ways of making a
sentence explicitly deductive, and some of these are
illustrated by the following sentences:
(6.11) We know that John has a broken leg because it is in
plaster.
(6.12) I think John has a broken leg because it is in plaster.
(6.13) John must have a broken leg because it is in plaster.
(6.14) John's leg is in plaster so it might be broken.
(6.15) John's leg is in plaster so perhaps it's broken.
Each of these sentences contains a phrase which refers to
the speaker's propositional attitude towards the conclusion:
a phrase which expresses the speaker's degree of commitment
to the truth of the conclusion. Such phrases (know that,
think, must, might, perhaps, etc.) will be termed
"deductive markers". When a deductive marker is not
present, as in sentences (6.9) and (6.10), the form of
the sentence does not enable us to decide whether the
sentence should be interpreted in terms of the empirical
mode or in terms of the deductive mode. In other words,
such sentences are potentially ambiguous.
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Furthermore, even a sentence (such as (6.6)) which
contains a deductive marker is potentially ambiguous. The
two alternative readings of sentence (6.6) can be
informally represented ass
(6.16) Cwe can tell that i~John has a broken legjJ - because
- Qit is in plaster^] .
(6.17) We can tell that fC John has a broken leg3 - because
- Cit is in plasterJJ.
The reading in (6.16) corresponds to the deductive use of
because, whereas the reading in (6.17) corresponds to the
empirical use of because. With this particular content,
only the deductive reading yields an acceptable sentence.
However, the plausibility of the empirical reading becomes
apparent when the content of the final clause is altered
to give:
(6.18) We can tell that CEjohn has a broken leg] -
because - fche fell off his bike]] .
On the other hand, sentences (such as (6.7)) which contain
so and a deductive marker (rather than because and a
deductive marker) seem to be unambiguously in the
deductive mode.
Sentences (6.6), (6.9) and (6.10) have been described
as "-potentially ambiguou^1 in order to leave open the
question of whether or not speakers and hearers are
actually aware of the ambiguities. There are a number of
"disambiguating factors" which might serve to reduce
awareness of the ambiguities, or which might help the
hearer to decide which of the alternative readings is
more plausible if he is aware of an ambiguity.
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One type of disambiguating factor consists of the
information which the linguistic and non-linguistic context
provides about the speaker's probable aims. For example,
in the context of a discussion about what the present state
of the weather is, a deductive reading of the following
sentence would seem more plausible than an empirical
reading;
(6.19) It is windy because the branches are moving.
On the other hand, if the same sentence was produced in the
context of a discussion about the physical laws underlying
meteorological phenomena, then the hearer might be more
likely to adopt the empirical reading (and to conclude that
the speaker did not understand the phenomenon he was trying
to explain). A second possible type of disambiguating
factor is the form of the causal sentence such as whether
or not it contains a deductive marker. A third type of
disambiguating factor is related to the content of the
causal sentence. For example, a hearer may be more likely
to interpret sentence (6.20) in terms of the deductive
mode than in terms of the empirical mode:
(6.20) John has a broken leg because it is in plaster.
On the other hand, he may prefer an interpretation based on
the empirical mode for the sentence;
(6.21) John has a broken leg because he fell off his bike.
This would suggest that the hearer is working on the
assumption that the speaker will usually produce sentences
which are true and well-formed. On the basis of this
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assumption, the hearer would then use his world knowledge
to select an interpretation which yields an acceptable
rather than an unacceptable sentence.
It seems likely that these three types of
disambiguating factor will interact with one another in a
complex way. Sometimes they may reinforce one another,
and sometimes they may be in competition with one another.
However, for present purposes, the most important point
is that some type of disambiguation is frequently required.
Causal sentences have to be interpreted in terms of a
particular explanatory mode, yet the distinction between
the deductive mode and the empirical mode is not always
clear-cut.
6.1.3 Inversions and the empirical/deductive distinction
The potential ambiguity of because and so sentences
presents a problem for the type of linguistic analysis
which has guided most of the previous experimental work
on children's understanding of the causal connectives.
The assumption has been that inversions can be defined
(and detected) on the basis of the superficial form and
content of the sentences. An inversion is said to have
occurred if because is followed by a reference to an
effect, or if so is followed by a reference to a cause
(where "cause" and "effect" are interpreted in terms of
the empirical mode). Therefore, sentences such as the
following would be classed as inversions:
(6.22) John has a broken leg because it is in plaster.
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(6.23) John's leg is in plaster so he has a broken leg.
However, if these sentences were interpreted in terms of
the deductive mode (as the linguistic analysis outlined
in section 6.1.2 suggests they could be), then they would
be regarded as elliptical versions of (6.24) and (6.25),
and therefore as acceptable:
(6.24) We can tell that John has a broken leg because
it is in plaster.
(6.25) John's leg is in plaster so we can tell that he
has a broken leg.
Piaget (1926, 1928) does show some appreciation of
this problem, when he notes that children's inversions
sometimes give the appearance that they are producing
justifications rather than explanations.* However, Piaget
immediately dismisses the problem by saying that the child
is not actually trying to give justifications, but is
simply expressing the first relation which occurs to him
irrespective of its nature. Piaget gives four main reasons
for this claim, and they are all related to his more
general claim that the young child's thinking is egocentric.
First, he argues that the young child, because of his
egocentrism, simply does not see any need to justify his
judgments. If something is obvious to him, then he assumes
that it will be obvious to everyone else. Second, he
claims that, before the age of about 7 or 8, the child's
tendency to psychologize leads him to confuse relations
of physical causality with logical relations, and to view
them both as psychological relations. Third, he claims
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that the young child's thinking lacks direction, and
therefore that the young child is incapable of
distinguishing between causes and consequences. Piaget
argues that justification cannot have an "autonomous
existence" until the child is able to distinguish between
causes and consequences, and among physical, psychological
and logical relations. Fourth, Piaget found, in his
sentence completion experiments, that children were less
good at completing the sentences which required a
justification (e.g. Half 9 is not 4 because ...) than they
were at completing the sentences which required an
empirical explanation (e.g., I shan't go to school
tomorrow because ... ).
Piaget's position can be challenged on a number of
grounds. In the first place, there is an element of
circularity in his argument. He argues that the child's
tendency to produce inversions is evidence that the child
cannot differentiate between causes and consequences and
therefore that justification cannot have an autonomous
existence. This, in turn, means that the child's
inversions cannot be accounted for by saying that the
child was aiming to give a justification when the
experimenter was expecting an explanation. A second
reason for challenging Piaget's position is that the
evidence reported in this thesis argues against the
claim that young children tend to psychologize and to
confuse causes with effects. Finally, Piaget's finding
that performance was poor on sentence completion items
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requiring justifications should be interpreted with
caution. The sentences which required a justification
were also the sentences which had logical content, so it
is possible that the children's poor performance was due
to an inability to deal with logical content rather than
to an inability (or reluctance) to give justifications.
For these reasons, it is important to give further
consideration to children's ability to deal with deductive
explanations and also to the question of the interpretation
of inversions. The fact that the truth-value of because
and so sentences is dependent on the mode of explanation and
that the empirical/deductive distinction is not always
clear-cut may pose problems for the child who is trying to
grasp the meaning of the causal connectives. He may find
it difficult to draw a distinction between the two modes,
or he may not realise that because and so are used in
different ways in the different modes. Those of us who are
trying to understand the child's knowledge of the
connectives' meaning will also encounter problems if we do
not consider the relationship between the explanatory mode
and the way the connectives are used and understood, for
we will be in danger of mis-representing the nature of the
child's task. Therefore, it is important to investigate
the way children and adults deal with causal sentences in
the deductive mode, both in order to obtain a better
picture of the nature of the child's task and in order to
assess the child's success in coping with that task.
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6.1.4 Temporal order in the deductive mode
In Chapter 5, it was argued that intentional sentences
would pose problems for a linguistic analysis which
emphasises the causal connectives' role as indicators of
temporal order. A similar argument can be advanced regarding
deductive sentences. For a deductive sentence, "temporal
order" could be taken as referring either to the order of
the stages in the deductive process or to the order of the
events/states which provide the subject-matter for the
deduction. If we assume that the order of the stages in the
deductive process is 'evidence 4 conclusion', then we could
say that because is followed by a reference to the first
stage whereas so is followed by a reference to the second
stage. However, this obscures the fact that it is the
logical priority rather than the temporal priority of the
evidence which is important in the deductive mode. Indeed,
the assumption that the deductive process operates from
evidence to conclusion could be challenged on the grounds
that a person may sometimes start with the conclusion and
then look around for some supporting evidence. It
therefore seems more appropriate to say that because
introduces the evidence whereas sxj introduces the
conclusion, irrespective of the temporal order of the
stages in the deductive process.
Further complexities arise when we consider the
temporal order of the events/states which provide the
subject-matter for the deduction. The evidence can be used
to make an inference about a prior, a future, or a
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simultaneous event/state. Here are some examples of
sentences which fall into each of these categories:
Prior:
(6.26) There's a puddle on the floor so we can tell that
Mary spilt the milk.
(6.27) We can tell that Mary spilt the milk because there's
a puddle on the floor.
Fu ture:
(6.28) The bridge is collapsing so the car will fall into
the river.
(6.29) The car will fall into the river because the bridge
is collapsing.
Simultaneous:
(6.30) John's leg is in plaster so we can tell that he has
a broken leg.
(6.31) We can tell that John has a broken leg because it
is in plaster.
As these examples show, the rule that because is followed
by a reference to the first event/state and ^o is followed
by a reference to the second event/state only holds for the
"future" category. This rule is irrelevant to the
"simultaneous" category, and is in conflict with the way
2
in which the connectives are used in the "prior" category.
While it is evident that the temporal order of the
underlying events/states cannot be used to give an adequate
account of the semantics of deductive sentences, it would
be interesting nevertheless to investigate whether the
underlying temporal order has any effect on performance.
In the present experiments, investigation of this issue
will be restricted to a comparison between deductions about
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prior events/states and deductions about simultaneous
events/states. If the children are relying on an order-of-
mention strategy, then they should exhibit a random
pattern of responding to the simultaneous items. In
contrast, for prior items, they should show a systematic
response pattern consisting of correct responses to
deductive because items and empirical so items and incorrect
responses to deductive so items and empirical because items.
(The order-of-mention coincides with the temporal order of
the events/states for deductive because and empirical s^o
sentences, but not for deductive so and empirical because
sentences.)
6,1.5 Assessing knowledge of the deductive mode
The main aims of the two experiments reported in this
chapter were to assess the extent to which children can
distinguish between the empirical and deductive modes,
and to investigate children's ability to use the causal
connectives in a way appropriate to the deductive mode.
Adult control groups were included in both experiments
since the linguistic analysis outlined in section 6.1.2
suggests that the distinction between the modes may not
be clear-cut even for adults.
Experiment 6, the Deductive/Empirical experiment,
assessed the subjects' ability to distinguish between the
modes on the basis of linguistic cues provided by the
experimenter. The subjects in one condition (the Questions
condition) were asked to answer Why..♦? and How do you
know...? questions, and the subjects in a second
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condition (the Sentence Completion condition) were asked
to complete sentence fragments of the form B because .♦.
and of the form We can tell that B because . ♦. . If the
subjects consistently responded to the Why...?/B because.,
items by referring to the cause of the event/state
mentioned in the item, and to the How do you know.,,?/We
can tell that B because ... items by referring to the
evidence for the conclusion mentioned in the item, then
this would indicate that they were able to distinguish
between the empirical and deductive modes.
In Experiment 7,the Deductive Marking experiment,
a context was set up which would be likely to encourage
the subjects to produce deductive explanations so that
their use of deductive markers and of the causal
connectives could be investigated. If the subjects used
deductive markers to show that they were talking about
conclusions rather than events, then this would indicate
that they were able to distinguish between the empirical
and deductive modes. If the subjects consistently used so
to introduce a conclusion and because to introduce the
evidence for a conclusion, then this would indicate that
they knew how to use the causal connectives in the
deductive mode. Such a finding, when combined with the
findings of Experiment 4, would also suggest that the
subjects were able to distinguish between the empirical
and deductive modes, since the connectives are used
differently in the two modes. Thus, Experiment 7
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investigated the extent to which the subjects would show
an understanding of the deductive/empirical distinction
through their use of language when they were cued into the
deductive mode by the context.
Experiment 6 ; The Deductive/Empirical Experiment.
6.2 Hypotheses for Experiment 6.
The main hypothesis was that the ability to distinguish
between the deductive and empirical modes on the basis of
linguistic cues would increase with age. However, it was
aLso predicted that, even for adults, the deductive/
empLrical distinction would not be totally clear-cut.
The effect of temporal order was investigated by
comparing "simultaneous" items with "prior" items. If the
subjects were following an order-of-mention strategy, then
it would be expected that they would respond randomly to
the simultaneous items, while for the prior items they
would give correct responses to the deductive items and
incorrect responses to the empirical items. On the other
hand, the findings and arguments which have been presented
in this thesis so far would lead one to expect that the
temporal order factor would not affect performance.
To investigate the effect of content, sentences with
physical content were compared with sentences with
psychological content. (There were no items with logical
content in this experiment since it is not possible to have
empirical sentences with logical content.) Previous
research would lead one to expect that performance might
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be better on psychological items than on physical items.
On the other hand, the findings reported in this thesis
would lead one to expect that performance would not vary
according to the type of content.
Since the sentence fragments used in the Sentence
Completion task are potentially ambiguous whereas the
questions used in the Questions task are not, it was
predicted that the subjects would be better at
distinguishing between the deductive and empirical modes
in the Questions task than in the Sentence Completion task.
6.3 Method
6.3.1 Subjects
There were 32 children in each of three age groups:
5-year-olds, 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds. The mean ages
and age ranges for each of these groups were as follows:
5;6 (5;0 to 6;0), 8;3 (7;9 to 8;8), and 10;5 (10;0 to
10;11). Each age group contained an approximately equal
number of boys and girls. All the children were pupils at
the same Local Authority primary school (Trinity Primary).
There were 56 adult subjects who were all under¬
graduates. Sixteen of these subjects completed a
questionnaire which asked them to judge the acceptability
of sentences. The remainder of the adult subjects received
written versions of the tasks presented to the children.
6.3.2 Design
Half of the subjects in each age group received the
Questions task and half received the Sentence Completion
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task. The items for both tasks were based on the same set
of 16 sequences. Each sequence consists of three elements:
A -> B C, where A is the cause of B and C corresponds to
the evidence for the occurrence of B. One deductive item
and one empirical item were derived from each sequence.
In the Questions task, the deductive items were of the
form How do you know B?, and the empirical items were of the
form Why B?. In the Sentence Completion task, the
deductive items were of the form We can tell that B
because ... , and the empirical items were of the form
B because ... . For both tasks, the predicted response
was (because)C for the deductive items and (because)A
for the empirical items. The deductive/empirical variable
was a within-subjects variable. Each child received 32
items, of which 16 were deductive and 16 were empirical.
The temporal order and content variables were also
within-subjects. For half of the items which each subject
received, the relation between B and C was simultaneous,
and for the other half it was sequential (and inferences
about prior event/states were required). Within each of
these categories, half of the items involved physical
relations between A and B and between B and C, and half
involved psychological relations between A and B and
between B and C.
The total set of 32 items was divided into two
parallel subsets. Each subset contained one item based
on each of the 16 sequences. If the deductive item based
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on a given sequence was assigned to subset A, then the
empirical item based on that sequence would be assigned to
subset B and vice versa. Within each subset, half of the
items in each of the temporal order and content categories
were deductive and half were empirical. (See Appendix 7.)
The children received two sessions, with one subset being
presented in the first session and the other in the second
session. The order of presentation of the subsets was
counter-balanced within each age group and within each type
of task. The adult subjects received only one subset of
items. Half of the adults in each task condition received
subset A and the other half received subset B. All the
children and adults received the items within each subset
in the same random order. This order was also the same for
both subsets, apart from the fact that the items which
were deductive in one subset were empirical in the other
subset.
The acceptability judgment questionnaire consisted
of 16 items. (See Appendix 8.) For each item, there were
four sentences with the following forms:
B because A.
B because C.
We can tell that B because C.
We can tell that B because A.
The content of the items was the same as the content of
the items presented to the children. The subject's task
was to rank the four sentences according to their
acceptability. The order of presentation of the four types
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of sentence was varied randomly across items, but was the
same for all the subjects.
6.3.3 Procedure
For each item (in both tasks), the child was presented
with two coloured pictures corresponding to elements A and
C of the sequence. The pictures were placed side-by-side
on the table in front of the child. The picture
corresponding to A was always on the left of the picture
corresponding to C. The experimenter gave a brief
description of each picture, and pointed to each picture
as she described it. Picture A was always described before
Picture C. (The pictures and descriptions are presented in
Appendix 7.)
In the Questions task, the experimenter asked a tag
question about B, and then asked the critical question
which was of the form Why B? for deductive items and How
do you know B? for empirical items. For example, in one
item, the child was shown a picture of John falling off
his bike (A) and a picture of John with his leg in plaster
(C). The tag question about B was:
(6.32) John has a broken leg, hasn't he?
and this was followed by either:
(6.33) Why does John have a broken leg?
or:
(6.34) How do you know John has a broken leg?
Thus, the pictures and descriptions provided information
only about elements A and C. This procedure was adopted
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in order to create a context in which B would have to be
inferred, and therefore in which deductive questions would
seem reasonably natural. However, it seems odd to ask a
Why? question about a particular event/state when the
occurrence of that event/state is not "given". Therefore,
the tag question was included in case the child had not
actually made the predicted inference.
At the beginning of the first session for the Sentence
Completion task, the child was given one practice item to
introduce him to the requirements of the sentence completion
technique. This item was based on a pair of pictures from
the Intentional experiment, and the sentence fragment
ended with and. For each test item, after the experimenter
had presented and described the two pictures, she read out
a sentence fragment and asked the child to complete it.
For empirical items, the sentence fragment was of the
form B because ..♦, and for deductive items it was of the
form We can tell that B because ... . For example, the
sentence fragments corresponding to the questions in (6.33)
and (6.34) were:
(6.35) John has a broken leg because ... , and:
(6.36) We can tell that John has a broken lea because ... .
After the child had completed the sentence, he was asked
to say the whole sentence by himself.
All the children were tested individually in a small
room in their school. The child was seated beside the
experimenter in front of a table. Each child received the
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two sessions on different days. At the beginning of the
second session, the child was told that the pictures would
be "a little bit" different. The sessions were recorded on
audio-tape and the children's basic responses were also
recorded manually.
The adult subjects received written versions of the
tasks. They were presented with written descriptions of
the pictures which had been shown to the children, and
with written versions of the questions or sentence
fragments. (See Appendix 8.) All the adults had also
completed a questionnaire based on the Intentional experi¬
ment. The assignment of subjects to the Questions and
Sentence Completion conditions was the same for both
experiments. Both questionnaires were presented to the
subjects in a single booklet, and the Intentional question¬
naire always preceded the Deductive/Empirical questionnaire
in the booklet.
The adults who completed the acceptability judgment
questionnaire did not complete any of the other question¬
naires. They were presented with the written descriptions
of the pictures which the children had been shown, and
they were also given a brief description of the Sentence
Completion task. Then, for each item, they were asked to
rank the four sentences for acceptability using a scale
which ranged from 1 ("most acceptable"/"sounds best") to
4 ("least acceptable"/"sounds worst"). Equal ranks could
be assigned to sentences which the subject thought were
equally acceptable. The subjects were also asked to mark
(with an asterisk) any sentence which they thought was
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totally unacceptable. (See Appendix 8.) The four
sentences which were based on the item used to illustrate
the other tasks were as follows:
(6.37) John has a broken leg because he fell off his bike.
(6.38) John has a broken leg because his leg is in plaster.
(6.39) We can tell that John has a broken leg because his
leg is in plaster.
(6.40) We can tell that John has a broken leg because he
fell off his bike.
6.4 Results.
6.4.1 Adults' treatment of the deductive/empirical
distinction.
Table 30 shows the percentage of the adults' responses
to the Questions and Sentence Completion task which were
consistent with the predicted distinction between the
deductive and empirical modes. These results indicate that,
on the whole, the adults did draw a clear distinction
between the two modes. The largest number of "errors"
occurred for the deductive items in the Questions task.
However, out of the 24 errors on these items, 15 were
"double" responses in which the subject referred to both
element A and element C. For example, in response to How
do you know the pillow burst?, one subject wrote:
Because Mary hit John with it and now there are feathers
everywhere.
It may indeed be reasonable to say that a deduction about
B draws on knowledge of the relation between A and B as
well as on knowledge of the relation between B and C.
Therefore, these double responses serve as an important
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indication that the deductive/empirical distinction is not
totally clear-cut. Nevertheless, the fact that even for
the deductive questions 85% of the responses did refer to
element C alone is strong evidence that adults are capable
of making the deductive/empirical distinction in response
to linguistic cues.
Table 30. Percentage of adults' responses which were
consistent with the deductive/empirical
distinction in Experiment 6. (The percentages
are calculated on the basis of the total number
of responses per cell.)
Empirical Deductive Total
items items
Questions 97.50% 85.00?; 91.25%
Sentence
completion 91.25% 92.50% 91.88%
In the acceptability judgment questionnaire, another
group of adults was asked to judge the relative and
absolute acceptability of four types of sentence:
(i) B because A sentences, which correspond to "correct"
completions of empirical items. These will be referred to
as "E+" sentences.
(ii) We can tell that B because C sentences, which
correspond to "correct" completions of deductive items.
These will be referred to as "D+" sentences.
(iii) B because C sentences, which correspond to "incorrect"
completions of empirical items. These will be referred to
as "E-" sentences.
(iv) We can tell that B because A sentences, which
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correspond to "incorrect" completions of deductive items.
These will be referred to as "D-" sentences.
A measure of the relative acceptability of each
sentence type was obtained by summing the ranks assigned
to all the items of a given type across all the subjects.
As Table 31 shows, the results are consistent with the
results of the Questions and Sentence Completion tasks, in
that the E+ and D+ sentences were judged to be more
acceptable than the E- and D- sentences. (Low ranks
correspond to high acceptability.)
Table 31. Results of acceptability judgment questionnaire
based on Experiment 6. Sum of ranks (across
all subjects and all items); and number of
judgments of "totally unacceptable" (as
frequencies and as percentages of total number
of responses to each sentence type).
Sentence type
B because A (E+)
B because C (E-)
We can tell that B
because C (D+)













Table 31 also shows the frequency with which instances
of each sentence type were judged to be "totally
unacceptable". The pattern of these absolute judgments is
consistent with the pattern obtained from the judgments
of relative acceptability, in that the highest frequency
of "totally unacceptable" judgments was for E- sentences
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and the next highest was for D- sentences. However, the
results for the judgments of absolute acceptability do not
provide a clear answer to the question of whether adults
actually regard E- and D- sentences as unacceptable, or
whether they simply prefer the E+ and D+ versions but think
all the sentence types are acceptable. Out of the 16
subjects, 8 judged at least one of the E- sentences to be
totally unacceptable, and 6 judged at least one of the D-
sentences to be totally unacceptable. None of the subjects
judged all the sentences of a given type to be totally
unacceptable. Thus, there was a lack of consensus both
across items and across subjects regarding the status of
the E- and D- sentences.
When we consider the children's performance in this
experiment, it will be worthwhile bearing in mind that,
while the adult data provide some justification for
classing E- and D- responses as "incorrect", they also
suggest that the distinction between "correct" and
"incorrect" may be relative rather than absolute.
6.4.2 Children's ability to make the deductive/empirical
distinction.
Table 32 shows the mean number of items correct for
each age group for the empirical and deductive items
separately and for all the items combined. In Table 33
the results are presented as percentages to allow the
children's performance to be compared with the adults'.
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(Maximum = 16) (Maximum
5 years 15.25 3.50 18.75
8 years 15.38 8.12 23.50
10 years 15.19 10.31 25.50
Sentence
Completion
5 years 13.50 7.19 20.69
8 years 13.38 8.06 21.44
10 years 14.19 11.75 25.94
The results indicate that, on the whole, the children
performed very well on the empirical items, but that they
had some difficulty with the deductive items. This was
explored further by looking at the number of subjects
passing each type of item. In order to pass, a subject had
to give the correct response to at least 12 out of the 16
items. (From the Binomial distribution, the probability
of this outcome occurring by chance is less than 0.05.)
The results in Table 34 indicate that a considerable
proportion of the subjects, especially in the younger
groups, passed only on the empirical items. The subjects
who failed on the deductive items might have done so
either by responding randomly to these items or by
systematically responding to the deductive items as if
they were empirical items. A subject was assigned to the
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Table 33. Correct responses as percentage of total







5 years 95.31% 21.88% 58.59%
8 years 96.09% 50.78% 73.44%
10 years 94.92% 64.45% 79.69%
Adults 97.50% 85.00% 91.25%
Sentence
completion
5 years 84.38% 44.92% 64.65%
8 years 83.59% 50.39% 66.99%
10 years 88.67% 73.44% 81.05%
Adults 91.25% 92.50% 91.88%
Table 34. Number of subiects who passed (i. e. scored
12/16 or more) on Empirical items only,
both types of item , or neither type of i tern.







5 years 15 0 1 0
8 years 11 O 5 0
10 years 8 1 7 0
Sentence
completion
5 years 9 2 3 2
8 years 7 3 5 1
10 years 5 1 10 0
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"systematic error" category if he scored 4 or less on a
particular type of item. Table 35 shows that many of the
subjects in the two younger groups tended to treat the
deductive items as if they were empirical items, whereas
there was almost no evidence of the opposite tendency.
Table 35. Number of subjects assigned to systematic error
category (i.e. who scored 4/16 or less) for




5 years 0 12
8 years 0 6
10 years 0 3
Sentence
completion
5 years 0 6
8 years 0 7
10 years 1 1
6.4.3 Age effects
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs indicated that there
were no significant age effects for performance on the
empirical items in either the Questions task or the
Sentence Completion task. On the other hand, for the
deductive items, there was a significant age effect both
in the Questions task (p< 0.02) and in the Sentence
Completion task (p<0.05). Mann-'vvhitney U tests (1-tailed)
yielded significant results for the difference between the
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5-year-olds' and the 8-year-olds' performance on the
deductive items in the Questions task (p< 0.025), and for
the difference between the 8-year-olds' and the 10-year-
olds' performance on the deductive items in the Sentence
Completion task (p<0.05), but the other differences were
non-significant. Thus, the results provide some support
for the hypothesis that the ability to distinguish between
the deductive and empirical modes increases with age.
6.4.4 Temporal order and content
It was predicted that if the children were following
an order-of-mention strategy, they would respond correctly
to deductive items and incorrectly to empirical items
when the underlying events/states were sequential, but
that they would respond randomly to both deductive and
empirical items when the underlying events/states were
simultaneous. As Table 36 shows, the results fail to
support this prediction, in that the pattern of results
is the same for both the sequential and the simultaneous
items. In both cases, performance was better for the
empirical items than for the deductive items. These
results indicate that the children were not making use of
an order-of-mention strategy, and also that the temporal
order variable did not have any effect on their
performance.
The results in Table 37 indicate that performance
was not affected by whether the content was physical or
psychological. This is congruent with the findings of
Experiments 1 to 5.
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Table 36. Comparison of Sequential and Simultaneous
items with respect to mean scores for
empirical and deductive items. (Maximum per
cell = 8. )
Sequential Simultaneous
Empirical Deductive Empirical Deduc tive
Questions
5 years 7.75 1.50 7.50 2.00
8 years 7.94 3.94 7.44 4.19
10 years 7.69 5.06 7.50 5. 25
Sentence
completion
5 years 6.68 3.56 6.81 3.62
8 years 6. 50 4.44 6.88 3.62
10 years 7.00 6.56 7.19 5.19
Table 37. Comparison of Physical and Psychological items
with respect to total mean scores. (Maximum
per cell = 16.)
Questions Physical Psychological
5 years 9.75 9.00
8 years 11.56 11.94
10 years 12.50 13.00
Sentence
completion
5 years 10.44 10. 25
8 years 10.81 10.62
10 years 13.12 12.81
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6,4.5 Comparison between Questions and Sentence
Completion tasks.
Since the sentence fragments used in the Sentence
Completion task are potentially ambiguous, it was
predicted that the children would be better at
distinguishing between the empirical and deductive modes
in the Questions task than in the Sentence Completion task.
Mann-Whitney U tests (1-tailed) showed that for the
empirical items, performance on the Questions task was
significantly better (p< 0.025) than performance on the
Sentence Completion task, for the 5-year-olds and for the
8-year-olds but not for the lO-year-olds. However, for
the deductive items and for the total set of items, there
were no significant differences between the two tasks.
Thus, there is some evidence that 5-year-olds and 8-year-
olds find Why? more useful than because as a cue for them
to supply a cause rather than evidence.
Since many of the issues raised by the results of
this experiment are also relevant to Experiment 7, further
discussion of the results will be postponed until the end
of the chapter. (See section 6.8.)
Experiment 7 - The Deductive Marking Experiment
6.5 Hypotheses for Experiment 7.
This experiment was designed to investigate the extent
to which subjects would show an understanding of the
deductive/empirical distinction through their use of
deductive markers and of the causal connectives, when
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they were cued into the deductive mode by the context. It
was predicted that the use of deductive markers to indicate
that a conclusion was being expressed would increase with
age, but that even adults would not always mark deductive
sentences as deductive. It was also predicted that the
ability to use because and so in the way appropriate to
the deductive mode (i.e. to follow because with a reference
to the evidence and so with a reference to the conclusion)
would increase with age.
The items used in this experiment varied in terms of
whether the underlying events/states were simultaneous
or sequential, and also in terms of whether the content
was physical, psychological or logical. It seemed possible
that these differences would have some effect on the way
the subjects expressed their deductive explanations, though
there were no grounds for formulating specific predictions.
6.6 Method
6.6.1 Subjects
There were 36 8-year-olds and 36 10-year-olds. The
mean ages for these groups were 8;6 and 10;4, and the ages
ranged from 7;11 to 8;10 and from 9;11 to 11;3. In the
younger group, there were 13 boys and 23 girls; and, in
the older group, there were 20 boys and 16 girls. All the
children were attending the same Local Authority school,
Wardie Primary.
A total of 49 undergraduates also took part in the
experiment. Of these, 34 received written versions of the
tasks presented to the children, and 15 completed a
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questionnaire which asked for judgments of the accepta¬
bility of sentences. None of the adult subjects had
completed any of the other questionnaires.
6.6.2 Design
Half of the children in each age group received a
Sentence Completion task, and half received an Open-ended
task. In the Sentence Completion task, the child was asked
to complete sentence fragments which ended with jjo. Each
sentence fragment referred to a piece of evidence which
the child was expected to be able to use to draw a
conclusion. In this task, the linguistic and non-linguistic
contexts were such that the child would be likely to
complete the sentence by referring to a conclusion. The aim
of this task was to assess the extent to which the children
used deductive markers to make it explicit that they were
expressing a conclusion. In the Open-ended task, the child
was asked to report the evidence and the conclusion to an
"accomplice", but no restrictions were imposed regarding
the type of linguistic construction he should use. This
task was designed to provide data not only on the children's
use of deductive markers, but also on their use of causal
connectives.
Each task was made up of three sub-tasks, and each
sub-task consisted of four items. Sub-task A involved
making inferences about events which were prior to the
evidence. Thus, the items in this sub-task corresponded to
the items in the sequential category in the Deductive/
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Empirical experiment. However, for all the items in sub-
task A, the relation between the events/states was a
physical one. Sub-task B involved making inferences about
states which were simultaneous with the evidence. For two
of the items, the relation between the states was one of
physical causality, and for the other two items, it was
one of psychological causality. These four items
corresponded to the simultaneous items in the Deductive/
Empirical experiment. Sub-task C, like sub-task B,
involved making inferences about states which were
simultaneous with the evidence. However, in sub-task C,
the relation between the states was based on an arbitrary
rule rather than being causal. This sub-task was expected
to elicit deductive sentences with logical content. Each
subject received all three sub-tasks in a single session.
The order of the sub-tasks was counter-balanced across
subjects for each age group and for each task (Sentence
Completion or Open-ended). The order of the items within
each sub-task was the same for all the subjects. (See
Appendix 9.)
One group of adults (consisting of 18 subjects)
received a written version of the Sentence Completion task,
and another group (of 16 adults) received a written
version of the Open-ended task. For both tasks, all the
adults received the sub-tasks in the same order: A,B,C.
The remaining 15 adults completed a questionnaire which
asked them to judge the acceptability of sentences. For
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each item, there were six sentences to be judged, and these
sentences had the following forms:
(6.41) B so we can tell that A.
(6.42) B so A (must).
(6.43) B so A.
(6.44) We can tell that A because B.
(6.45) A (must) because B.
(6.46) A because B. ,
where B corresponds to the evidence and A corresponds to
the conclusion. This set of sentences incorporates a number
of contrasts: between explicitly deductive ((41), (42),
(44), (45)) and implicitly deductive sentences ((43) and
(46)); between the two different deductive markers (can
tell and must); and, between ^o sentences and because
sentences. The questionnaire consisted of 12 items and
these were based on the 12 items used in the Sentence
Completion and Open-ended tasks. The order of the items
was the same as for the other two adult groups. The order
of the six types of sentence was varied randomly across
items, but was the same for all the subjects. (See
Appendix 10.)
6.6.3 Procedure
All the children were tested individually in a room
in their school. The experimenter and the child sat at
adjacent sides of a small table. All the sessions were
recorded onto audio-tape.
205
The experiment was presented as a "deductive game"
in which the child was asked to help the Pink Panther to
solve some mysteries. The experimenter showed the child a
toy Pink Panther, and suggested that the child try to help
the Pink Panther to work out some things. Then, the
experimenter placed the Pink Panther behind a screen, and
said to the child:
"Let's pretend that the Pink Panther is in
another room. The Pink Panther can't see
you, but you can talk to him on the phone.
I've got some clues that will help us to
solve the mysteries. You have to phone the
Pink Panther and tell him about the clue and
about what you've worked out."
A toy phone was placed beside the Pink Panther, and
another toy phone was placed on the table in front of the
child. In both the Sentence Completion and the Open-
ended conditions, each clue was presented to the child
non-verbally and then verbally.
In both conditions, the session began with a practice
item which was used to introduce the child to the general
procedure. The child was presented with the picture of
John with his leg in plaster (which had been used in the
Deductive/Empirical experiment), and was asked to help
the Pink Panther to work out what was wrong with John.
Sub-task A (sequential):
The child was presented with a set of four pictures
each showing a cloaked and hooded figure committing a
crime. The four pictures were arranged in a row on the
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table, and remained there throughout the sub-task. The
experimenter pointed to each picture in turn and briefly
described each crime:
"In this picture, someone is stealing flowers
out of a garden. In this picture, someone
is eating a cake. In this picture, someone
is breaking into a jeweller's shop. In this
picture, someone is painting red spots onto
a fence."
The child was asked what was happening in each of the
pictures. Then, the experimenter told the child that the
Pink Panther had caught the four baddies, and that the
baddies were: Snoopy, Charlie Brown, Donald Duck and
Mickey Mouse, but that the Pink Panther did not know
"which baddy did which naughty thing". The child was
asked to help the Pink Panther to work out what each
baddy had done. For each item, the child was presented
with a clue which consisted of a picture of one of the
four cartoon characters bearing traces of the crime which
he had committed. The first picture showed Snoopy with
cream on his face, the second showed Charlie Brown with
red paint on his hands, the third showed Donald Duck with
muddy feet, and the fourth showed Mickey Mouse with a
necklace sticking out of his pocket. For each item in the
Sentence Completion condition, the child was asked to
complete a sentence fragment, such as:
Snoopy has cream on his face so... .
For each item in the Open-ended condition, the experimenter
gave a description of the clue, such as :
The clue is that Snoopy has cream on his face,
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and asked the child to tell the Pink Panther about the
clue and about what he had worked out. (The complete set
of pictures, descriptions and sentence fragments are
presented in Appendix 9.) The pictures representing the
clues were presented one at a time, and each picture was
removed after the child had given a response.
Sub-task B (simultaneous and causal):
The first two items involved deducing a person's
location on the basis of physical cues. The child was told
that the Pink Panther was looking for Charlie Brown and
that he knew Charlie Brown always hid in houses. The child
was asked to help the Pink Panther to work out which house
Charlie was in. For each item, the clue consisted of a
picture of two houses of different colours. The picture
for the first item showed a blue house with footprints
leading up to the door, and a yellow house with no
footprints. The verbal versions of the clue were:
There are footprints to the blue house so ...
The clue is that there are footprints to the blue house.
For the second item, the picture showed a red house with a
light on in one of the rooms and a green house with no
lights on. The clue was presented verbally in one of the
following ways:
There is a light on in the red house so...
The clue is that there is a light on in the red house.
The other two items in sub-task B were based on
psychological rather than physical relations. The child's
task was to work out how Charlie Brown was feeling on the
basis of his facial expression. The child was told that the
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Pink Panther wanted to know whether Charlie was feeling
happy, sad, cross or scared, and he was asked to help the
Pink Panther to work out how Charlie was feeling. The
verbal versions of these items were:
Charlie is crying so ...
The clue is that Charlie is crying.
Charlie is smiling so ...
The clue is that Charlie is smiling. ,
and the non-verbal versions were a picture of Charlie
crying and a picture of Charlie smiling.
Sub-task C (simultaneous and arbitrary/logical):
This consisted of two phases. In the first phase, the
child was taught two biconditional rules. The experimenter
placed three red tins and three green tins on the table.
Each red tin contained a toy horse, and each green tin
contained a toy pig. The child was asked to open all the
red tins, and then all the green tins, and to say what was
inside them. Then, the experimenter stated the bi¬
conditional rules in the following way:
"All the red tins have horses, inside
haven't they? ... And all the horses are
in red tins, aren't they? ... All the
green tins have pigs inside, haven't
they?... And all the pigs are in green
tins, aren't they?"
Next, the experimenter removed the animals from the tins,
shuffled the tins, and asked the child to put the animals
'into the right tins. As a final check that the child had
grasped the rules, the experimenter asked four questions:
Which tins do the pigs go into?
Which animals go into the red tins?
Which tins do the horses go into?
Which animals go into the green tins?
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Any errors which were made either in responding to these
questions or in putting the animals into the tins were
corrected by the experimenter.
In the second phase of the task, the child had to
use the biconditional rules as a basis for some deductions.
The child was told that the Pink Panther wanted to know
what was inside a tin, but that the tin was stuck shut.
As a clue, the child received an envelope containing a
red tin, and he was asked to put the tin on the table.
Then, the experimenter gave the verbal version of the
clue:
It's a red tin so ... , or
The clue is that it's a red tin.
For the next item, this procedure was repeated with a
green tin serving as the clue. The other two items in
this sub-task required the child to deduce the colour of
a hidden tin. The experimenter produced a cloth bag, and
told the child that there was a tin inside it. The child
was asked to help the Pink Panther to work out what
colour the tin was. However, certain constraints were
imposed, and the experimenter presented these to the child
in the following way:
"We're not allowed to look inside the
special bag, and we're not allowed to
take the tin out of its special bag.
But I'm allowed to put my hand in and
bring the animal out of the tin."
The non-verbal presentation of the clue, for these two
items, consisted of the experimenter showing the animal
to the child. (These were the only items for which the
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clue was not presented in an envelope.) For the first of
these items, the animal was a horse, and for the second it
was a pig. The clues were presented verbally as:
There's a horse/pig inside so ...
The clue is that there's a horse/pig inside.
Procedure used with adult subjects:
All the adult subjects were presented with written
descriptions of the contexts and clues, and were asked to
read about the appropriate context and clue before
completing each item. (The questionnaires are reproduced
in Appendix 10.) In the Sentence Completion condition,
the subjects were asked to complete the sentence fragments
in a way which would help the Pink Panther. For each item
in the Open-ended condition, the subjects were asked to
write down what they would say if they were telling the
Pink Panther about the clue and about what they had worked
out. The subjects who received the acceptability judgment
questionnaire were asked to assume that the sentences
which they were judging were being used to tell the Pink
Panther about the clue and about what had been worked out
on the basis of the clue. For each item, the subjects
were asked to rank the six sentences for acceptability
using a scale which ranged from 1 ("most acceptable"/
"sounds best") to 6 ("least acceptable"/"sounds worst").
Equal ranks could be assigned to sentences which the
subject thought were equally acceptable. The subjects were
also asked to mark (with an asterisk) any sentence which
they thought was totally unacceptable. Here is an example
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of a set of six sentences based on one of the items
presented to the children:
Snoopy has cream on his face so we can tell that he ate
the cake.
Snoopy has cream on his face so he must have eaten the cake.
Snoopy has cream on his face so he ate the cake.
We can tell that Snoopy ate the cake because he has cream
on his face.
Snoopy must have eaten the cake because he has cream on his
face.
Snoopy ate the cake because he has cream on his face.
6.7 Results
6.7.1 Adults* treatment of the marked/unmarked distinction.
The percentage of the adults' responses which contained
deductive markers was 41.2% in the Sentence Completion
condition and 37.5% in the Open-ended condition. Thus,
more than half of the responses were not marked. Also,
there were 6 (out of 34) subjects who did not give any
marked responses.
Table .38 shows the sum of the ranks assigned to each
type of sentence in the acceptability judgment question¬
naire. The results are similar to those obtained for
Experiment 6, in that the sentences containing deductive
markers tended to be judged as more acceptable than the
unmarked sentences. The same pattern emerged when the
response profiles of the individual subjects were examined,
with one exception in each case, the subjects judged
B so we can tell that A sentences to be more acceptable than
B so A sentences, and We can tell that A because B sentences
to be more acceptable than A because B sentences.
The second column in Table 38 shows the number of
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judgments of "totally unacceptable" which were given for
each sentence type. These judgments of absolute accept¬
ability are broadly consistent with the judgments of
relative acceptability, in that the highest number of
"totally unacceptable" judgments occurred for the A because B
sentences. Six of the subjects said that at least one of
these sentences was "totally unacceptable", compared with
two subjects for the B so A sentences and one subject for
the We can tell that A because B and the Must A because B
sentences. However, only one subject judged all the A
because B sentences to be "totally unacceptable".
Table 38. Results of acceptability questionnaire based on
Experiment 7. Sum of ranks (across all subjects
and all items); and number of judgments of
"totally unacceptable" (as frequencies and as
percentages of total number of responses to each
sentence type).
Sentence type Sum of ranks "Totally
unacceptable"
1 %
B so we can tell that A 547 0 0%
B so A (must) 442 0 0%
B so A 796.5 4 2.22%
We can tell that A
because B 551 1 0.55%
A (must) because B 526.5 6 3.33%
A because B 917 32 17.78%
Furthermore, the 32 judgments of "totally unacceptable"
which were given for A because B sentences represent only
18% of the total number of responses for that sentence type.
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Thus, even the least acceptable of the sentence types is
not consistently judged to be "totally unacceptable".
6,7,2 Children's use of deductive markers
Table 39 shows the percentage of responses which
contained a deductive marker, and the number of subjects
who used at least one deductive marker in the Sentence
3
Completion condition, (Phrases like the one who and
that's where were counted as deductive markers, since they
seem to indicate that a conclusion is being expressed by
emphasising the fact that the speaker has made a choice
from a set of alternatives.) The results indicate that
the 8-year-old and 10-year-old groups were similar in the
extent to which they used deductive markers, and that the
children used deductive markers less frequently than the
adults.
Table 39. The percentage of responses for each age group
which contained deductive markers, and the
number of subjects who used at least the
deductive marker in the Sentence Completion
Condition of Experiment 7.
Marked responses Number of Ss
8 years (N=18) 24.07% 9
10 years (N=18) 27.31% 10
Adults (N=18) 41.20% 15
Table 40 shows that, in the Open-ended condition, the
10-year-olds used deductive markers more than the 8-year-
olds, and the children used deductive markers more than
the adults. A comparison of Tables 39 and 40 indicates
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that, for both the 8-year-olds and the 10-year-olds,
deductive markers were used more frequently in the
Open-ended condition than in the Sentence Completion
condition.
Table 40. The percentage of responses for each age group
which contained deductive markers, and the
number of subjects who used at least one
deductive marker in the Open-ended condition
of Experiment 7.
Marked responses Number of Ss
8 years (N=18) 48.61% 13
10 years (N=18) 69.44% 17
Adults (N=16) 37.50% 13
These differences were explored further by looking at
the particular linguistic forms which were used as
deductive markers. The results presented in Table 41 reveal
that the differences between the conditions and between the
8-year-olds and 10-year-olds in the Open-ended condition
are mainly attributable to differences in the frequency of
think and I've worked out that. In the Open-ended condition,
think was used very frequently whereas it was not used at
all in the Sentence Completion condition. Also, think was
used more frequently by the 10-year-olds than by the 8-year-
olds. The phrase I've worked out that was used frequently
by the 10-year-olds in the Open-ended condition, but it was
not used at all by the 8-year-olds or in the Sentence
Completion condition.
One possible explanation of these differences would
be that forms which explicitly refer to the speaker's own
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cognitive processes and which involve the use of a first
person pronoun are more likely to occur when the child is
responsible for the whole utterance than when he is
contributing to an utterance initiated by the experimenter.
An alternative (but related) explanation would be that the
form think, which expresses notions of possibility and
uncertainty, did not occur in the Sentence Completion
condition because the constrained nature of the task
encouraged the subject to believe that a definite
conclusion could be drawn. A similar atmosphere of
"formality" might have been created by the written versions
of the tasks, and would account for the fact that the
adults' performance was similar under both conditions.
freguencies for each age group in each condition
of Experimen t 7.
Deductive Sentence Completion Open-ended
marker.
8 yrs. AO vrs. Adult 8 yrs. 10 yrs. Adul
the one who 8 11 2 9 10 6
work out 32
will 19 10 2 1 5 < 2
must 20 34 69 36 36 41
might 2 5 4 1 2
could 2 4 8
think 27 57 1
probably 4 7 3 6
OTHER 1 4 3 21 6 6
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The 10-year-olds' frequent use of I've worked out that
may have been due to their parrotting part of the
instructions given by the experimenter, though it is not
obvious why this should have occurred for the 10-year-
olds but not for the 8-year-olds.
6.7.3 Use of the causal connectives
If the subjects in the Open-ended condition were
using the causal connectives in the way which is
appropriate for the deductive mode, then they would have
used because when they mentioned the conclusion before the
evidence (Conclusion Evidence) and so when they
mentioned the evidence before the conclusion (Evidence
Conclusion). The results presented in Table 42 indicate
that all the children's uses of the connectives and all
except 4 of the adults' uses of the connectives conformed
to this pattern. The percentage of the total number of
responses to the Open-ended task which contained a causal
connective was 41% for the 8-year-olds, 45% for the 10-
year-olds and 46% for the adults. Thus, causal connectives
were not used particularly frequently, but when they were
used they were used correctly. These results fail to
support the prediction that the ability to use the
connectives correctly in the deductive mode would increase
with age.
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Table 42. Relation between order in which the evidence
and conclusion were mentioned and the choice
of connective (frequencies) in Open-ended
condition of Experiment 7.
Evidence ■» Conclusion Conclusion -» Evidence
Because
8 years 0 34
10 years 0 33
Adults 4 48
So
8 years 55 0
10 years 64 0
Adults 36 0
6.7.4 Temporal order and content
Table 43 shows that neither the temporal order nor
the content variable had any clear effect on the subjects'
use of deductive markers. (Within sub-task B, the
frequencies for the physical items were similar to those
for the psychological items.) Also, since the causal
connectives were always used correctly, the temporal order
and content variables obviously did not affect the
subjects' ability to use the connectives in the way
appropriate to the deductive mode.
21 8
Table 43. Comparison of sub-tasks,in Experiment 7 with
respect to frequency of deductive markers.
Sequential Simultaneous Simultaneous




8 years 20 10 22
10 years 21 15 23
Adults 28 43 18
Open-ended
8 years 44 31 30
10 years 60 44 46
Adults 26 24 22
6.8 Discussion of Experiments 6 and 7.
The experiments reported in this chapter aimed to
assess the status of the empirical/deductive distinction
for both children and adults, and also to investigate the
use of causal connectives in the deductive mode. Experiment
6 assessed the subjects' ability to respond to the
linguistic cues which can be used to signal the distinction
between the modes. Experiment 7 investigated the extent to
which the subjects used deductive markers to make the
empirical/deductive distinction explicit, and the extent
to which the subjects took account of the empirical/
deductive distinction in their use of the causal
connectives.
The results for the adult subjects indicate that,
while a distinction can be drawn between the type of
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linguistic construction which is characteristic of the
empirical mode and the type of linguistic construction
which is characteristic of the deductive mode, the
distinction is not totally clear-cut. In Experiment 7,
(the Deductive Marking Experiment), the adults' judgments
of relative acceptability revealed a strong preference for
the sentences containing deductive markers over the
unmarked sentences. However, on the whole, the adults
were reluctant to judge the unmarked sentences to be
"totally unacceptable". Also, the adults who received the
Sentence Completion and Open-ended tasks produced unmarked
sentences more frequently than marked sentences.
Similarly, in Experiment 6 (the Deductive/Empirical
experiment), the adults demonstrated an ability to make a
clear distinction between deductive and empirical
sentences, in the Questions and Sentence Completion tasks
and when they were judging the relative acceptability of
sentences. However, there was a lack of consensus (bo.th
across subjects and across items) as to whether the E- and
D- sentences were "totally unacceptable".
The children's performance on Experiment 7 was very
similar to the adults' with respect to the frequency of
deductive markers. Although unmarked responses were
frequent, the fact that many of the children did make
some use of deductive markers indicates that they do have
the ability to mark the deductive/empirical distinction
linguistically. Also, when the children used because and
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so, they always used them in the correct way for the
deductive mode. This demonstrates that 8- and 10-year-
olds know how because and so are used in the deductive
mode, and that they do not confuse the deductive uses with
the empirical uses.
In Experiment 6 (the Deductive/Empirical experiment),
the 5-year-olds did not respond to the linguistic cues
which signal the deductive/empirical distinction, and they
showed a strong tendency to interpret all the items as if
they were in the empirical mode. This tendency was less
marked for the 8-year-olds, and decreased further between
the 8-year-old and the 10-year-old groups. However, even
in the 10-year-old group, 13 (out of 32) subjects did not
pass on the deductive items.
The discrepancy between the children's performance
and the adults' performance is considerably greater for
the Deductive/Empirical experiment than for the Deductive
Marking experiment. It may be that adults (or at any rate
highly educated adults) find it easier to make a consistent
distinction between the two modes when they are cued into
that distinction by the structure of the task (as in the
Deductive/Empirical experiment) than when the situation is
less constrained (as in the Deductive Marking experiment).
This proposal is consistent with the finding that, while
the adults in the Deductive Marking experiment produced
unmarked sentences more frequently than marked sentences,
the adults who completed the acceptability judgment
questionnaire showed a strong preference for the marked
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sentences. In contrast to the adults, the children may
find it difficult to focus on the relevant linguistic cues
in the Deductive/Empirical experiment and to perceive the
structure of the task. Thus, the adults would benefit
from the constraints of the task whereas the children would
not. The fact that the adults received a written version
of the task may have contributed to this effect by making
the contrast between the two types of item particularly
obvious to the adults.
The results of these experiments have important
implications for the way in which inversions are identified
in studies of children's knowledge of because and so. Since
both the children and the adults made considerable use of
unmarked because and ^o sentences in deductive contexts,
and since the adults did not consistently judge such
sentences to be "totally unacceptable", it would be
inappropriate to assume that sentences of the form A
because B or B so A are necessarily inversions of empirical
sentences. Piaget claims that when young children produce
such sentences, they are producing inversions and that
they do so because they lack an understanding of the
directional nature of causal relations. Piaget's claim
that these inversions occur frequently until the age of
7 or 8 is not supported by the results of Experiments 1
to 5. However, it may be that some of the responses which
Piaget classed as inversions were actually unmarked
deductive sentences. One of Piaget's main reasons for
arguing against such an interpretation is that justification
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does not have an "autonomous existence" for the young
child and that it only begins to emevge in its own right
at about the age of 7 or 8. It would be difficult to
reconcile this claim with the finding that, in Experiment
7, the 8-year-olds were using the causal connectives in
the way appropriate to the deductive mode, and were
performing at essentially the same level as the adults.
This suggests that the children are not unaccustomed to
giving deductive explanations and therefore that the
deductive mode has established an "autonomous existence"
well before the age of 8. It would be worthwhile exploring
this further by testing some younger subjects (possibly
4
5-year-olds) on the Deductive Marking Experiment.
The findings of Experiment 6 may appear to run
counter to the argument which has just been advanced, in
that the younger children showed a tendency to respond to
the deductive items as if they were empirical items.
However, the children's difficulty in dealing with this
task is probably due to the fact that they were being
required to respond to the specifically linguistic cues
which can be used to make the distinction between the
empirical and deductive modes explicit, rather than being
due to an inability to deal with the deductive mode. It
may be that children do not often have to rely on these
linguistic cues, since the context may usually make it
clear which explanatory mode is being employed. The
deductive markers may frequently be partially redundant.
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Support for this proposal is provided by the finding that ,
in Experiment 7, both the children and the adults were
inclined to omit the deductive markers from their deductive
explanations.
On the other hand, the results of Experiment 6 do
suggest that young children's knowledge of the empirical
use of because may be more firmly established than their
knowledge of the deductive use of because. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that young children are unable to deal
with deductive explanations adequately. Indeed, the results
of Experiment 7 indicate that, when the context is less
ambiguous, children do show an understanding of the way
because and so are used in the deductive mode. Thus, at
least by the age of 8, children know not only that because
may be used to introduce the cause of an event or of an
action, but also that because may be used to introduce the
"cause" of a conclusion and that this "cause" corresponds
to the evidence on which the conclusion is based.
224
CHAPTER 7 : GENERAL DISCUSSION
7.1 Overview of thesis
The review of previous studies of the development of
the causal connectives (see Chapter 2) revealed a
discrepancy between the evidence from children's
spontaneous speech, which indicates that children as young
as 2^ years have an understanding of the directional
element of the causal connectives' meaning, and the
evidence from comprehension experiments, which suggests
that such understanding is not present until the age of
about 7 or 8 years. Two gaps in the existing literature
were also identified. First, there was a lack of
systematic studies of pre-school children's production of
the causal connectives in an experimental setting. Second,
previous experiments had been based almost exclusively
on the empirical mode. The present study aimed to reduce
these two gaps in our knowledge and also to provide an
explanation for the discrepancy between the spontaneous
speech data and the data from comprehension experiments.
In Chapter 3, some elicited production studies were
reported. These yielded data on the way 3- to 5-year-olds
use the causal connectives when they are giving
explanations of a range of phenomena in an experimental
setting.
Chapter 4 reported an experiment which was based on
the empirical mode and which was designed to test a
hypothesis about the reason for the discrepancy between
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the two types of data: the causal direction hypothesis.
This hypothesis states that children understand the
directional element of the causal connectives' meaning in
terms of causal direction before they understand that the
causal connectives can also convey information about
temporal order. The results supported this hypothesis,
in that performance was better on a task which allowed the
children (5-, 8- and 10-year olds) to make use of knowledge
about causal direction (the Causal task) than on a task
which required knowledge about temporal order (the Temporal
task). Most previous comprehension experiments have
assessed the child's knowledge of the temporal order
information which can be conveyed by the causal connectives.
However, the child's production and comprehension of the
causal connectives in normal discourse may be guided by
knowledge about causal direction rather than about
temporal order.
The remaining experiments sought to extend our picture
of the child's knowledge of the causal connectives'
meaning to include the intentional and deductive modes.
Chapter 5 reported an experiment based on the intentional
mode in which 5- and 8-year-olds were presented with
information about actions and the results of these actions,
and were asked to explain the actions. To give a success¬
ful intentional explanation, the child had to infer that
the reason for the action was the agent's intention to
achieve the result, and he also had to use a linguistic
construction which was appropriate to the intentional
mode.
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In Chapter 6, two experiments based on the deductive
mode were reported. Experiment 6 (the Deductive/Empirical
experiment) assessed 5-, 8- and 10-year olds' ability to
distinguish between the deductive and empirical modes on
the basis of linguistic cues provided by the experimenter.
To succeed on this task, the child had to respond by
referring to the cause of "B" when he was asked Why B? or
when he was asked to complete a sentence of the form
B because ... (empirical items), and he had to respond by
referring to the evidence for "B" when he was asked How do
you know B? or when he was asked to complete a sentence of
the form We can tell that B because ... (deductive items).
Experiment 7 (the Deductive Marking experiment) investigated
the extent to which 8- and 10-year-olds use deductive
markers (such as must, know that, think) to show that they
are expressing a conclusion. In order to create a context
which would be likely to encourage the production of
deductive explanations, this experiment was presented as a
detective game in which the evidence ("clues") and
conclusions ("what you've worked out") were to be reported
by the child to the Pink Panther.
Although each of the experimental chapters had a
different emphasis, there were also a number of common
themes which were present throughout the thesis. The main
findings will now be summarised in relation to these
themes.
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7.2 Summary of findings
7.2.1 Children's knowledge of causal relations and of the
causal connectives' meaning.
Even the youngest children showed an ability to
distinguish between causes and effects, and an understand¬
ing of how this distinction is encoded linguistically.
The preschool children who took part in the elicited
production studies produced very few cause-effect
inversions. When they used causal connectives, they almost
always used them correctly. Similarly, in the Causal task
of Experiment 4, even the 5-year-olds performed at a high
level. They consistently completed the because sentences
by referring to a cause, and some of them consistently
completed the so sentences by referring to an effect.
The results of Experiment 5 (intentional mode) both
confirm and add to our impression of how competent
children are at dealing with causal expressions. Again,
the inversion rate was very low which indicates that the
children's ability to produce correct because and so
sentences extends to the intentional mode. The children
also showed that they could infer the reason for an action
on the basis of information about the result of the action.
At the same time, they did not confuse the reason with the
result, and they made it clear that they were giving a
reason rather than a result by using an appropriate
linguistic construction. They also observed the
distinction which holds between because and so,., in the—U)
228
intentional mode, since they followed because with a
construction containing was going to or wanted to, whereas
they followed .so^^ with a construction containing would
or could.
In the sentence completion condition of the Deductive/
Empirical experiment, the children in all the age groups
performed at a high level on the empirical items. This
lends further support to the claim that, from an early
age, children know that because is used to introduce a
cause. However, the fact that performance on empirical
items was even better in the questions condition than in
the sentence completion condition suggests that Why? is
an even more powerful cue than because. Some of the
children also responded appropriately to the linguistic
cues which indicate that a deductive explanation should
be given. However, in general, performance was poorer for
the deductive items than for the empirical items. Indeed,
a considerable number of the 5- and 8-year-olds and a few
of the 10-year-olds systematically responded to the
deductive items as if they were empirical items. This may
indicate that the knowledge that because can be used to
introduce a cause becomes firmly established at an earlier
age than the knowledge that because can be used to
introduce a piece of evidence. Alternatively, it may
indicate that many of the younger children are not
sensitive to the linguistic cues which can be used to make
the distinction between the empirical and deductive modes
explicit. However, this does not necessarily mean that
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these children totally lack an understanding of the
deductive mode.
Indeed, the results of the Deductive Marking
experiment suggest that, at least by the age of 8 years,
children know how because and so are used in giving
deductive explanations. When the children (8- and 10-year-
olds) in this experiment used causal connectives, they
always did so in the way which is appropriate to the
deductive mode. That is, they used so to introduce the
conclusion and because to introduce the evidence supporting
the conclusion. It may be that children are better able to
reveal their understanding of the deductive mode when the
context calls for a deductive explanation than when they
have to respond to the linguistic cues which signal the
deductive mode.
The difficulty which some of the children had in
responding to the linguistic cues which signal the
deductive mode becomes more comprehensible when considered
in the light of the finding that, in the Deductive Marking
experiment, neither the adults nor the children
consistently used deductive markers when they were giving
deductive explanations. This suggests that when the
context makes it clear that the deductive mode is being
employed, the deductive markers may be regarded as
redundant and may be omitted. If many of the situations
which the child encounters are of this type, then he will
not have much occasion to rely on the linguistic cues
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which signal the deductive mode.
While the adults were similar to the children in the
extent to which they used deductive markers in the
Deductive Marking experiment, the adults were much better
than the children at responding to the relevant linguistic
cues in the Deductive/Empirical experiment. Also, although
adults frequently used unmarked forms in giving deductive
explanations, they showed a clear preference for the
marked forms when they were asked to rank sentences for
acceptability. These results highlight the fact that
different types of task tap different aspects of linguistic
ability, and they suggest that one of the main differences
between the children and the adults may lie in the ability
to focus on the deductive markers and to use them as a
source of relevant information in the Deductive/Empirical
experiment.
7.2.2 Developmental effects
The results of the experiments reported in this
thesis indicate that even the younger children have a
considerable ability to use and understand causal sentences
in several explanatory modes. Nevertheless, some develop¬
mental effects did emerge.
Significant age effects occurred for both tasks in
Experiment 4 (empirical mode). In the Temporal task, the
only clear effect was for the so items, on which the 10-
year-olds performed better than the 8-year-olds, who, in
turn, performed better than the 5-year-olds. In the Causal
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task, there was a significant improvement in performance
between the 5-year-olds and the 8-year-olds for the
because items, and between the 8-year-olds and the 10-year-
olds for the so items. However, these various age effects
give rise to different interpretations. The improvement
with age in performance on the so items in the Temporal
task is mainly attributable to an increase in the number
of children using an order-of-mention strategy, although
there is also evidence to suggest that some of the 10-
year-olds had overcome this strategy and were showing an
understanding of the connectives' function as indicators
of temporal order. The developmental effect for the so
items in the Causal task also suggests that there is a
major development in children's understanding of the
empirical use of so between the ages of 8 and 10 years.
On the other hand, the developmental effect for the
because items in the Causal task seems to represent a
slight increase in the consistency of the responses,
rather than a dramatic increase in understanding, in that
all except one of the 5-year-olds scored well above
chance on the because items.
Similarly, in Experiment 5 (intentional), the
inversion rate was very low for both age groups, so the
decrease in the number of inversions which occurs between
the 5-year-old and the 8-year-old group probably represents
the refinement of an existing ability rather than the
emergence of a new ability.
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In Experiment 6 (deductive/empirical), significant
age effects were obtained for the deductive items but not
for the empirical items (on which the children were
performing close to ceiling level). On the deductive items,
the 10-year-olds scored higher than the 8-year-olds who
scored higher than the 5-year-olds. As a group, the 5-
year-olds• performance on deductive items was below chance
level, and even the 10-year-olds' performance was well
below the adult level. This suggests that the ability to
provide deductive explanations in response to the
appropriate linguistic cues (How do you know...? and We
can tell that ...) undergoes considerable development both
between the ages of 5 and 10 and after the age of 10.
However, in addition to this general upward trend, there
is a large amount of individual variation within each age
group.
Thus, the most marked developmental effects occurred
for performance on so sentences in the empirical mode and
for performance on deductive items in the Deductive/
Empirical experiment.
7.2.3 'Because' and 'so'
In the Causal task of Experiment 4, performance was
better on because items than on so items (for the 5- and
8-year-olds), whereas in the Temporal task performance
was better on so items than on because items (for the 8-
and 10-year-olds). It was argued that the superior
performance on so in the Temporal task could be explained
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as an artefact of the order-of-mention strategy. On the
other hand, the superior performance on because in the
Causal task could not readily be explained as an artefact
of the children's strategies, and it was interpreted as
evidence that young children understand the meaning of
because better than the meaning of ^o. Further evidence
in support of this claim comes from the finding that when
the children (in the Causal task) were asked to say the
whole sentence, they substituted because for so more
frequently than they substituted s>o for because. Also, in
the elicited production studies, because was produced more
frequently than so.
However, the evidence for because being easier than
so is restricted to the empirical mode. In the intentional
experiment, there was no difference in performance between
because and so sentences, either with respect to the
number of intentional responses or with respect to the
inversion rate. Similarly, in the open-ended condition of
the Deductive Marking experiment, the children did not
show a strong preference for either connective, and there
were no inversions for either connective. (These data are
limited by the fact that more than half of the responses
did not contain either because or so, and also by the fact
that only 8- and 10-year-olds took part in this
experiment.)
7.2.4 Temporal order and causal direction
With regard to the child's knowledge of the causal
connectives.' meaning, four alternative hypotheses have
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been put forward either in previous studies or in the
present study. (See section 2.1.4.) These can be
summarised as follows:
1) The child assumes that the order-of-mention
corresponds to the order-of-occurrence of the events.
Therefore, he makes no distinction between because and so,
and treats them both as being equivalent to and then. In
particular tasks, this gives the appearance that the
child understands so but not because.
2) The child does not understand the directional element
of the causal connectives' meaning, although he may under¬
stand that a causal relation is involved. Therefore, he
responds randomly and makes no systematic distinction
between because and so.
3) The child has an understanding of the causal
connectives' function as indicators of temporal order.
Therefore, he makes an appropriate distinction between
because and so.
4) The child has an understanding of the causal
connectives' function as indicators of causal direction.
Therefore, he makes an appropriate distinction between
because and so.
The results reported in the preceding section fail
to support hypothesis (1). It was only in the Temporal
task that the children employed an order-of-mention
strategy, so it is a task-specific strategy rather than
an appropriate characterisation of children's knowledge
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of the causal connectives' meaning. Further evidence for
this conclusion comes from the results of the deductive/
empirical experiment. If the children had been relying
on the order-of-mention strategy, then, for the sequential
items, they would have given correct responses to the
deductive items and incorrect responses to the empirical
items, whereas for the simultaneous items they would have
responded randomly. However, the results did not conform
to this pattern.
The results of all the experiments reported in this
thesis argue strongly against hypothesis (2). Even pre¬
school children have some knowledge of the connectives'
meaning.
The results of Experiment 4 (empirical) constitute
evidence in support of hypothesis (4) and against
hypothesis (3). Performance on the Causal task was better
than performance on the Temporal task, and even the 5-
year-olds performed at a high level on the Causal task.
In contrast, on the Temporal task, even in the 10-year-
old group, most of the children still did not demonstrate
knowledge of the connectives' function as indicators of
temporal order. Furthermore, the ability which the
children showed in dealing with intentional explanations
can be accounted for more readily in terms of hypothesis
(4) than in terms of hypothesis (3).
Thus, the results reported in this thesis indicate
that the child's knowledge of the causal connectives'
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meaning cannot be characterised adequately in terms of
temporal order, but should rather be characterised in
terms of causal direction.
7.2.5 Content
Content variables were built into all the studies.
Usually, the comparison was between physical and
psychological content, but the elicited production studies
and the deductive marking experiment also included some
logical content, and the intentional experiment included
a cause/condition comparison. None of these content
variables affected the children's performance. This
indicates that children's ability to use and understand
the causal connectives is not restricted to one type of
content. Also, the results of the elicited production
studies demonstrate that even preschool children are able
to give explanations which are appropriate to the type of
phenomenon they are asked to explain, and that they do
not show a strong tendency to psychologize.
In Experiment 4, the 8- and 10-year-olds in the
Causal task performed better on the non-reversible items
than on the reversible items. This suggests that pragmatic
cues influence children's understanding of causal
sentences. In particular, it suggests that children have
a notion of plausible cause, and that they make use of
this notion in their comprehension and production of
causal sentences.
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7.3 Implications of the findings
7.3.1 The nature of children's knowledge
The central claim of this thesis is that young
children are remarkably competent at using and understanding
the causal connectives. This has important implications
both with respect to children's linguistic knowledge and
with respect to their cognitive abilities.
On the linguistic side, the findings imply that the
children have some knowledge of the semantics of because
and so, and of the types of linguistic constructions which
are appropriate to each of the modes of explanation.
However, this linguistic knowledge presupposes certain
cognitive abilities. In particular, the children must
be able to distinguish between a cause and an effect,
between an action and an intention, between a conclusion
and evidence, and among the various modes of explanation.
The linguistic knowledge is separable from these
cognitive abilities in the sense that it would be possible
to possess the cognitive abilities without knowing how
the various distinctions are encoded linguistically. On
the other hand, it would not be possible to possess the
linguistic knowledge without possessing the cognitive
abilities. In other words, the cognitive abilities are
pre-requisites of the ability to use and understand the
causal connectives appropriately. This means that when
children show that they are able to comprehend and produce
the causal connectives adequately as they did in this
study, we can conclude that they possess certain cognitive
abilities.
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In order to use the causal connectives appropriately,
the children also require a certain amount of world
knowledge, since they have to have some understanding of
what constitutes a plausible cause for a given effect. For
instance, they need to be able to distinguish among
physical, psychological and logical relations, and to
select the type of relation which is appropriate to the
phenomenon they are explaining. The results of the
elicited production studies indicate that even preschool
children have this ability.
The children must also have some specific knowledge
of the particular phenomenon which they are trying to
explain. If they lack such knowledge, they may confuse the
cause with the effect and produce an inverted causal
sentence. In the present study, an attempt was made to
ensure that the children would not lack the necessary
world knowledge, by selecting phenomena with which they
were likely to be familiar. Under these conditions, the
children showed that they were able to distinguish between
causes and effects, and that they understood the meaning
of the causal connectives. Therefore, if children
produce inversions when they are asked to explain less
familiar phenomena, then this is more likely to be due to
a lack of world knowledge than to an inability to
distinguish between causes and effects or to a lack of
understanding of the causal connectives' meaning.
239
7,3,2 The ability to explain
We are now in a position to assess the validity of
the assumption that explanations and justifications can
be used as a research tool. (See section 1.1.) The
present findings indicate that young children have a secure
grasp of the rudiments of the ability to explain. In
particular, they know that Why ... ? signals a request
for an explanation and that because and so(i) are used
to introduce explanations. They also know that an event
should be explained by referring to its cause rather than
to its effect, and that an action should be explained by
referring to the agent's intention to achieve a particular
result rather than by referring to the result itself.
On the other hand, while the results of the Deductive
Marking experiment indicate that 8-year-olds are able to
handle deductive explanations when the context cues them
in to the deductive mode, the children in the Deductive/
Empirical experiment had difficulty in responding to the
linguistic cues which can be used to signal the deductive
mode. Therefore, there is reason for being cautious
about using children's deductive explanations (or
justifications) as a research tool unless the context
contains obvious cues to indicate that an explanation in
the deductive mode is required.
When children are being asked for explanations in the
empirical or intentional modes, the problems involved in
using their explanations as a research tool are reduced.
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However, we are not yet in a position to rule out totally
the possibility that a child's failure may be attributable
to a deficit in his ability to explain rather than to a
deficit in the ability which the investigator is trying
to assess. Although the abilities which we have studied
are fundamental components of the ability to explain,
other abilities may also be important, especially when
more complex phenomena are being explained. For example,
if an explanation involved a number of steps or multiple
causes, the child would have to be able to express these
in an appropriately structured manner.
7,3.3 Comprehension and production
The present findings are also relevant to the issue
of the relationship between comprehension and production.
(See section 1.6.) The explanation which was proposed for
the discrepancy between children's ability to use the
causal connectives appropriately and children's
performance in comprehension experiments attributes the
discrepancy to methodological factors, rather than to a
difference between the comprehension and production
processes or between the knowledge guiding comprehension
and the knowledge guiding production. In particular, it
was argued that the type of knowledge which has typically
been assessed in previous comprehension experiments
differs from the type of knowledge which guides the
child's comprehension and production of the causal
connectives in normal discourse. These comprehension
experiments were assessing the child's knowledge of the
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causal connectives' function as indicators of temporal
order, whereas the child's comprehension and production of
the causal connectives are guided by knowledge of the
connectives' function as indicators of causal direction.
The same general type of argument could probably be used
to account for some of the other comprehension/production
discrepancies, since these often involve a discrepancy
between the results of a comprehension experiment and
observations of spontaneous production. Comprehension
experiments reflect the investigator's assumptions about
the nature of the knowledge which underlies comprehension
and production of the linguistic forms which are being
studied. Therefore, if there is a mismatch between these
assumptions and the type of knowledge which the child is
actually employing, then the child will be liable to
fail the task. On the other hand, when the child is
producing language, it does not matter what type of
knowledge he uses to guide his production as long as it
yields appropriate utterances.
Of course, the fact that this type of argument can be
used to explain some comprehension/production discrepancies
does not necessarily mean that there are no "genuine"
differences between comprehension and production. However,
it does highlight the importance of taking account of the
differences in the way comprehension and production are
commonly assessed.
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7.3.4 Developments in the ability to explain
It is evident, from what was said in section 7.3.1,
that there are many aspects of the ability to explain
which do not show any development during the age range
studied. For example, even the youngest children
demonstrated an understanding of the directional element
of the causal connectives' meaning, of the distinction
between a cause and an effect, and of the physical/
psychological/logical distinction.
However, the results of the present study indicate
that three types of ability do undergo development between
the ages of 5 and 10 years:
(i) The ability to make inferences about temporal order
on the basis of information provided by the causal
connectives.
(ii) The ability to deal with causal constructions which
do not conform to the natural order for giving an
explanation (^o sentences in the empirical mode).
(iii) The ability to respond to the linguistic cues which
caui be used to signal that an explanation is in the
deductive mode.
It is noteworthy that all these abilities involve dealing
with particular linguistic forms in a manner which is
atypical in some respect. The causal connectives' primary
function is not to convey information about temporal
order, but rather to convey information about causal
direction. The natural order for giving an explanation is
'what is being explained' 'explanation'. In the
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empirical mode, because sentences conform to this order
but so sentences do not. Therefore, it was argued that if
a speaker wants to focus on the causal relation, he will
be more likely to use because than so. (See section 4.1.2.)
The task of responding to the linguistic cues which can be
used to signal the deductive mode is atypical in that the
context frequently renders such cues redundant, and also
in that these linguistic cues are far from universal in the
deductive explanations produced by children and by adults.
In Karmiloff-Smith's terms (1979), the linguistic cues are
being made to carry a much heavier "communicative burden"
than they would carry in normal discourse. Thus, it
seems that what the children are learning to do between
the ages of 5 and 10 is to exploit the full range of
information which can be conveyed by the causal
connectives and by the deductive markers, even when the
information is non-salient.
7.3.5 Implications for future research
The findings of the present study suggest a number
of directions which future research might take. Further
investigation of children's ability to deal with
explanations in the deductive mode would be likely to
prove fruitful. It would be particularly worthwhile to
try to identify the precise nature of the children's
difficulty in distinguishing between the deductive and
empirical modes in Experiment 6, and to explore ways of
helping them to overcome their difficulties. Since
deductive explanations play an especially important role
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in the educational process, it would be useful to know
more about children's strengths and weaknesses in this
area.
Also, having established that young children possess
the basic "building blocks" for giving explanations, we
should now ask what further developments there may be in
the ability to explain. One possible type of development
would be in the child's notion of plausible cause. The
present study employed only content with which the child
was likely to be familiar and only very simple causal
chains in which each event had a single cause. Also, all
the causes were facilitative rather than inhibitory, in
that they made another event occur rather than preventing
it from occurring. It seems likely that the child's
notion of plausible cause will become more and more
elaborate as his knowledge of the world increases and
as he begins to understand more complex causal relations,
such as those involving multiple or interacting causes.
Research on children's causal inferences does appear to
be thriving at present (Sedlak and Kurtz, 1981), but so
far it has had a social or a cognitive bias. It would
be interesting to introduce a more linguistic dimension
by investigating the relationship between the nature of
the child's causal inferences and the way he expresses
these inferences linguistically when he is giving
explanations (if he does express them at all).
Another possible development concerns the role of
the causal connectives. So far, we have stressed the
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intimate connection between knowledge of the causal
connectives' meaning and the notion of plausible cause.
This implies that the connective's role is usually to
reinforce a causal link which is compatible with the
hearer's notion of plausible cause. However, it is some¬
times possible to use a causal connective to inform the
hearer of a causal link which was outside his previous
knowledge. In such a case, the communicative burden on
the connective is increased, since the connective is the
hearer's main evidence for assuming that the causal link
exists. This way of using the connectives constitutes an
extremely powerful intellectual tool, because it is a way
of extending the hearer's notion of plausible cause.
Therefore, it would be useful to find out when this
"autonomous" role of the connectives begins to develop.
7.3.6 Implications for our view of the young child.
The results presented in this thesis create a very
promising picture of the young child's knowledge of the
causal connectives and of explanation. This picture is in
sharp contrast to the picture which had previously been
built up on the basis of Piaget's work and on the basis of
comprehension experiments involving the causal connectives.
(See Chapter 2.) Instead of seeing the young child as
being in a state of confusion in which causes are
indistinguishable from effects, physical relations are
interpreted as psychological relations, and because lacks
a clear meaning, we can now view the child's knowledge
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and abilities in a much more positive light. Well before
the age of 7, children are able to distinguish appropriately
between causes and effects, and among physical, psycho¬
logical and logical relations. They also know that
because is used to introduce a cause, and this knowledge
enables them to produce well-formed causal sentences.
Moreover, their ability is not restricted to explanations
in the empirical mode, but extends to the intentional mode.
They know that an action can be explained in terms of the
agent's intention to achieve a particular result, and
they are able to distinguish between the intention-action
relation and the action-result relation, and to mark the
distinction linguistically.
The linguistic analyses presented in this thesis have
revealed that the linguistic structure of causal sentences
is much more complex than previous investigators had
assumed it to be. Thus, it is clear that the child's task
is not an easy one. However, it is also clear that the
young child is equal to the task.
247
Appendix 1 ; Details of procedures for elicited production
experiments.
Experiment 1 : Ker Plunk (physical)
The apparatus is presented without any sticks
inserted, but with a bundle of sticks lying beside it.
E - "Have you ever played with this toy before? ... Watch
what happens."
Some marbles are dropped through the hole at the top of
the tube.
E - "What happened? ... The marbles fell down and made a
loud noise, didn't they? I don't want the marbles to fall
down and make a loud noise. ... I wonder how I could stop
them falling. ... Maybe I could put these sticks in here."
The experimenter inserts the sticks (and invites the child
to help).
E - "What do you think will happen now? ... What do you
think will happen when I put the marbles in?"
The experimenter drops in some marbles. (They should stay
on the s ticks!)
E - "What happened? ... Oh! I've changed my mind now. I
want the marbles to fall down and make a loud noise,
again. ... How could I make the marbles fall? ... Maybe I
could pull out some sticks. ... What do you think will
happen when I pull out some sticks? ... "
The experimenter pulls out some sticks which are not
supporting any marbles.
E - "What happened? ... I wonder why. ... Do you know why?..."
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The experimenter pulls out some sticks which are
supporting some marbles.
E - "What happened? ... I wonder why. ... Do you know
why? ... Now, let's see who's here."
The experimenter brings out a large toy panda from behind
a screen.
E - "This is Choo-Choo. Choo-Choo has not seen this toy
before. Please will you play with the toy, and tell Choo-
Choo all about what is happening?"
Where necessary, the experimenter encourages the child to
give explanations, with comments like:
"Choo-Choo wants to know what's happening."
and:
"Tell Choo-Choo why that happened."
Experiment 2 : Facial expressions (psychological)
The experimenter presents the boy/girl doll.
E - "What's this? ... It's a boy/girl, isn't it? ... The
boy/girl is called Jack/Jill. Look, we can give Jack/Jill
a happy face, or a sad face, or a cross face, or a scared
face."
(The experimenter attaches each face to the doll as she
names it, and then removes it.)
E - "Now, let's play a game. I'll put one of the faces on
Jack/Jill."
The experimenter attaches one of the faces (chosen at
random) to the doll.
E - "Oh look, it's the happy/sad/cross/scared face. I'd
like you to tell me a little story about Jack/Jill. ...
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What do you think has happened to Jack/Jill? ... What do
you think Jack/Jill has done? ... I wonder why Jack/Jill
is happy/sad/cross/scared.-;.. Why is Jack/Jill happy/
sad/cross/scared? ..." (This is repeated for each of the
facial expressions.)
Experiment 3 ; Game with rules (logical)
The materials are presented. (See Appendix 2.)
E - "Look what we've got here. This is a river. These are
stepping-stones. There are red stepping-stones, green
stepping-stones, and yellow stepping-stones. This is a
piece of cheese. This is a dice with colours on it."
(The experimenter points to each item as she mentions it.)
E - "Now, I'll tell you how to play the game. You move
this mouse. I'll move this mouse. The mouse which gets to
the cheese first will be the winner.. Your mouse can only
go onto these stepping-stones, and my mouse can only go
onto these stepping-stones. We throw the dice and see
what colour we get. The colour on the dice has to be the
same as the colour of the stepping-stone for you to put
your mouse on the stepping-stone. The mice must stay on
the stepping-stones. They must not go into the water. The
mice must jump onto all the stepping-stones. They must
not miss out any stepping-stones. Now, let's try playing
the game. You throw the dice first. ... What colour did
you get? ... So, what do you do? ..."
If the child gives a correct response, the experimenter
says: "That's right."
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If the child gives an incorrect response, the experimenter
says: "Can you do that? ... No, you can't do that", and
then re-states the rule which has been violated.
E - "Now, I'll throw the dice."
This procedure is continued until two games have been
completed.
E - "Now, let's see who's here."
The toy panda, Choo-Choo, is presented.
E - "Do you remember him? ... Who is this? ... This is
Choo-Choo. Choo-Choo would like to play the game too,
but he doesn't know how to play. Please will you tell
Choo-Choo how to play the game?"
Where necessary, the experimenter prompts the child with
comments like:
"Tell Choo-Choo what to do." and: "Is there anything else
he has to do?", until the child seems to have completed
his explanation.
E - "Okay. Let's see if Choo-Choo can play the game with
you now. Choo-Choo says: '(the child's name), please will
you tell me if I make a mistake?' Okay? You tell Choo-
Choo if he does anything wrong. I'll help him to throw
the dice and move his mouse." The experimenter tries to
ensure that Choo-Choo makes a couple of mistakes. If the
child points out a mistake, the experimenter says:
"Oh, Choo-Choo's wrong, is he? ... Tell him what he's
done wrong. ... Tell Choo-Choo why he's wrong? ... What
should Choo-Choo have done?" If the child fails to point
out a mistake, then at the end of the game the
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experimenter asks:
"Did Choo-Choo do anything wrong? ... Tell him what he
did wrong. ... Tell Choo-Choo why he's wrong. ... What
should Choo-Choo have done?..."
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white mouse black mouse
R = red stepping-stone
Y = yellow stepping-stone
G = green stepping-stone
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Appendix 3 ; Sequences and items for Experiment 4
Causal sequences
Psychological Reversible
(1) Coco pulls Daisy's hair 9 Daisy hits Coco 9 Coco
pushes Daisy.
(2) Daisy laughs at Coco 9 Coco gets cross 9 Daisy runs
away.
Physical Reversible
(3) Coco bumps into Daisy 9 Daisy falls 9 Daisy has a
sore leg.
(4) the boat hits a rock 9 the boat tips 9 Mary falls out.
Psychological Non-reversible
(5) Coco breaks Daisy's doll 9 Daisy starts to cry 9 Coco
gives Daisy a sweetie.
(6) Daisy gives Coco a spider 9 Coco gets a fright 9
Daisy laughs at Coco.
Physical Non-reversible
(7) Daisy pushes Coco 9 Coco falls into the flowerpot 9
Coco gets all dirty
(8) Coco pushes the cup 9 the cup falls 9 the cup breaks.
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DAISY HAS SORE LEG)
COCO BUMPS DAISY)






















Coco falls into the (COCO GETS DIRTY)
flowerpot because... (DAISY PUSHES COCO)
8














The "Pictures" column gives descriptions of the
pictures which were presented for each item, and
the position of each description corresponds to
the position in which the picture was placed on the
table. The numbers in the "Position" column refer
258
to the position of each item in the order of
presentation (e.g. item (2) was the third item
to be presented in any session).
The "Subset" column indicates which of the two
parallel subsets each item was assigned to.
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ternsforTemporalask tem 1)a 1)b 2)a 2)b 3)a 3)b 4)a 4)b 5)a 5)bSentence DaisyhitCocobecau e hepullsrai DaisyhitCocoso hepushesr Cocogetscrosbe ause Daisylaughsthim Cocogetscrosss Daisyrunawa Daisyfallbecau e Cocobumpsintoher Daisyfallso shehassoreleg Theboattipsecause ithitsarock Theboattipsso Maryfallsout
Picture-strips
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ItemSentencePictur -stripsPositionSubset (6)aCocogetsfri htbecause(DAISYGIVESSPIDER4OCOETFRIGHT)17B Daisygiveshimspider(COCOGETSFRIGHT4AISYIVESSPIDER) (6)bCocogetsafri htsoDAISYLAUGHS4OCOGETFR GHT)7 Daisylaughthim(COCOGETSFRIGHT4AISYLAUGHS)1 (7)aCocofallsintotheflowerp tOCOFALLS4D ISYPUSHESCOCO)18 becauseD i ypusheshim( AISYPUSHESCOCO4F LLS) (7)bCocofallsintothelowerp tOCOFALLS4GETDIRTY)8B soheg tsalldir y(COCOGETSDIR Y4FALLS)1 (8)aThecupfallsbe a eCUPFALLS4OCOPUSHESP)2B Cocopushesit( OCOPUSHESUP4FALL )1 (8)bThecupfallssoCUPFALLS4BREAKS)12 îtbreaks(CUPBREAKS4FALLS) Notes:The"Picture-strips"columngiv sdescriptio sfpicturewhicherer s t d foreachit m,andhepositionfdescriptic rrespo dsthepo itioni whichthepicture-stripaslac donabl . Thesuperscript"1"designatestp cture- tripwhi hspresentedfioa givenitem. Thenumbersith"position"c lumnrefpositionfachit rder ofpresentation(e.g.it m2)washirdbresentedna ysessio ). The"subset"columnindicat swhichfthoparallelubsetseit a assignedto.
Appendix 4; Pictures used in Experiment 4.
Causal 'task.
Coco pulls Daisy's hair.
Coco pushes Daisy.
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Daisy laughs at Coco.
Daisy runs away.
263
Coco bumps into Daisy




Coco breaks Daisy's doll.
Coco gives Daisy a sweetie.
266
Daisy gives Coco a spider.
Daisy laughs at Coco.
267
Daisy pushes Coco.
Coco gets all dirty.
268
Coco pushes the cup.
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Temporal task: Subset A.
Daisy runs away. 270 Coco gets cross.
i
Coco gets cross. Daisy runs away.




Coco breaks Daisy's doll?
Daisy starts to cry. Coco breaks Daisy's doll.
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Coco falls into the flowerpot. Daisy pushes Coco.
- r








Temporal task: Subset B.
Daisy laughs at Coco. 276 Coco gets cross.
Coco gets cross. Daisy laughs at Coco.
Daisy falls. Daisy has a sore leg.
(4)
The boat tips. The boat hits a rock.
Daisy starts to cry. Coco gives Daisy a sweetie.
Daisy gives Coco a spider. Coco gets a fright.




Coco falls into the flowerpot. Coco gets all dirty.
Coco gets all dirty. Coco falls into the flowerpot.
The cup falls. Coco pushes the cup.
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Appendix 5: Materials used in Experiment 5.
Stories
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE.
One day, when Mary was out shopping, she bought a
silly nose. It was a big, round, black, shiny nose, on a
piece of elastic. When she got home, she put the nose on.
Then, she said to Fluff, the cat - "Come on, Fluff, let's
go and look for John." When John saw Mary wearing her
silly nose, he laughed and laughed and laughed. He thought
it was really funny. Mary was very pleased.
(ACTION = Mary put on a silly nose.
RESULT = John laughed.)
2. DISTRACTOR: PHYSICAL CAUSE.
Mummy said: "Come on, Mary. It's bath-time". Mummy and
Mary started to go upstairs. But, just then, the phone
rang so Mummy went to answer the phone and Mary went up to
the bathroom by herself. Mary put the plug in the bath
and turned on the taps. Out came the water with a big
"WhooshJ". Soon, the bath filled up with water. Mary
shouted: "All ready, Mummy!"
(ACTION = Mary turned on the taps.
RESULT = The bath filled up with water.)
3. PHYSICAL CONDITION.
John took his Daddy's spade out of the garden shed, and he
dug some holes in the garden - one, two, three holes. Then,
he put a little tree into each hole. Planting trees is very
hard work, so when John had finished, he went into the
house and had a nice big drink of juice.
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(ACTION = John dug some holes.
RESULT = John planted some trees.)
4. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION.
One day, after lunch, Mary went upstairs and put on her
pretty dress. Mary brushed her hair and her Mummy tied
her ribbons for her. Then, Mary said goodbye to Mummy and
went to Anne's house. It was Anne's birthday so she was
having a party. When Anne opened the door, Mary said,
"Happy birthday, Anne" and gave Anne a present. Then, Mary
went in to party. Everybody had a lovely time.
(ACTION = Mary put on a pretty dress.
RESULT = Mary went to a party.)
5. PHYSICAL CAUSE.
Every day, John filled up his watering can with water and
went out into the garden. Very carefully, he poured some
water onto all the bulbs, and he tried not to stand on any
of the bulbs. The bulbs grew and grew and grew, until one
day there were lots of beautiful flowers in the garden.
(ACTION = John watered the bulbs.
RESULT = Flowers grew.)
6. DISTRACTOR: PHYSICAL CONDITION
One morning when Mummy was outside hanging up the washing,
Mary was feeling hungry. She remembered that there was a
jar of sweets on a shelf in the kitchen. She put a stool
under the shelf, and, very carefully, she climbed up onto
the stool. She pulled the lid off the jar, and took out
some sweets. Then, she popped the sweets into her mouth.
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(ACTION = Mary climbed onto a stool.
RESULT = Mary got some sweets.)
7. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION.
This is Mr. Jones. He has lots of lovely flowers on his
little cart. One day, John bought a nice bunch of flowers
from Mr. Jones. Then, John walked along the road to the
hospital, and went inside to visit his Granny. Granny was
in hospital because she wasn't very well. Granny said -
"These are beautiful flowers, John. Thank you very much
for bringing them to me."
(ACTION = John bought a bunch of flowers.
RESULT = John visited his Granny in hospital.)
8. PHYSICAL CAUSE.
One day, John got a new toy - it was a toy car. John wound
up the toy car with a special little key. Then, he put the
car down on the floor and off it went - Broom, broom,
broom1 John said -
"This is a great toy."
(ACTION = John wound up the car.
RESULT = The car went.)
9. DISTRACTOR: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION.
It was a rainy day so Mary couldn't go outside to play.
She put on her nurse's outfit. It was a lovely outfit -
there was a little hat, an apron, and a dress with blue and
white stripes. Mary played at "hospitals". She put
bandages on Teddy's arms and on his head. Then, she tucked
him up in bed.
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(ACTION = Mary put on her nurse's outfit.
RESULT = Mary played at "hospitals".)
10. PHYSICAL CONDITION.
One day, after breakfast, John put some old, stale bread
into a little bag. Then, he went to the pond in the park.
There were lots of ducks swimming on the pond. John broke
the bread into little pieces and threw the bits of bread
to the ducks. The ducks gobbled the bread up - gobble!
gobble! gobble! All gone.
(ACTION = John put some bread in a bag.
RESULT = John fed the ducks.)
11. PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE.
One night, just before bed-time, John crept upstairs very,
very quietly. He went into Mary's bedroom and put a little
mouse in her bed. Then, John ran away and hid. Mary went
into her bedroom, and picked up her cuddly rabbit. Then,
she found the mouse in her bed. She screamed: "Eee! Eee!
A mouse!" Poor Mary got a terrible fright.
(ACTION = John put a mouse in Mary's bed.
RESULT = Mary got a fright.)
12. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION.
John went into the bathroom and washed his bands. Then,
he went downstairs and started eating his tea- He ate
some sandwiches, and a little cake with a cherry on top,
and he drank a cup of milk. The cat and the dog wanted
something to eat too, but John didn't give them anything.
(ACTION = John washed his hands.
RESULT = John ate his tea. )
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13. DISTRACTOR: PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE.
John went into the kitchen and he saw some dirty dishes
beside the sink. John put on his apron. Then, he filled
the sink with warm, soapy water, and washed up all the
dishes. Mummy came into the kitchen and saw that the
dishes were all nice and clean. She said: "Oh, what a
lovely surprisei Thank you very much, John."
(ACTION = John washed up all the dishes.
RESULT = Mummy got a surprise.)
14. PHYSICAL CONDITION.
Mary opened the drawer and took out her crayons. Then, she
shut the drawer and sat down at the table. She opened
her colouring book and started colouring in a picture.
Her teddy was sitting on top of the chest of drawers.
Maybe he was watching what Mary was doing.
(ACTION = Mary took out her crayons.
RESULT = Mary coloured in.)
15. PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE.
Mary put a dog biscuit down on the carpet just outside her
bedroom door. She put down another biscuit, and another,
and another, and another. Then, she sat down on her bed
and waited. Soon, Blackie, the dog, started eating the
biscuits, and he went right into Mary's room. Mary said -
"Hello, Blackie. You are a nice dog.", and she shut her
bedroom door quickly. Blackie couldn't get out.
(ACTION = Mary put down some dog biscuits.
RESULT = The dog went into Mary's room.)
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16. PHYSICAL CAUSE.
One day, Mary and Blackie the dog went to the train station
to meet Auntie Lucy. Auntie Lucy was very tired so she
sat down on a seat for a little while. Mary found a
chocolate machine. She stood on her tiptoes, and put some
money into the machine. Out popped a lovely big bar of
chocolate]
(ACTION = Mary put some money into the machine.
RESULT = A bar of chocolate came out.)
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Items used in Questions Task : according to age group and
item set (A/B).
5 years 8 years
Set A Set B
1. Why did Mary put on a silly nose? y - /
Mary put on a silly nose, didn't
she?... Then what happened?
- / -
2. Mary turned on the taps, didn't
she?... Then what happened?
- - /
3. Why did John dig some holes? - / /
John dug some holes, didn't he?
... Then what did he do? /
— —
4. Why did Mary put on a pretty
dress?
- / /
Mary put on a pretty dress,
didn't she?... Then what did
she do?
•
5. Why did John water the bulbs? - / /
John watered the bulbs, didn't
he?... Then what happened?
/ — -
6. Mary climbed onto the stool,
didn't she?... Then what did
she do?
- -
7. Why did John buy a bunch of
flowers?
/ - /
John bought a bunch of flowers,
didn't he?... Then what did he
do?
/ '
8. Why did John wind up the car? / - /
John wound up the car, didn't
he?... Then what happened?
— / —
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5 years 8 years
Set A Set B
9. Mary put on her nurse's outfit - - J
didn't she?... Then what did
she do?
10. Why did John put some bread */ ~ /
into a bag?
John put some bread into a bag, - J -
didn't he?... Then what did he
do?
11. Why did John put a mouse in ~ </ /
Mary's bed?
John put a mouse in Mary's bed, y
didn't he?... Then what
happened?
12. Why did John wash his hands? - J y
John washed his hands, didn't v/ ~ ~
he?... Then what did he do?
13. John washed up all the dishes, - - J
didn't he?
Then what happened?
14. Why did Mary take out her / - J
crayons?
Mary took out her crayons, /
didn't she?... Then what
did she do?
15. Why did Mary put down some dog J - y
biscuits?
Mary put down some dog biscuits, _ / _
didn't she?... Then what
happened?
16. Why did Mary put some money into - / y
the machine?
Mary put some money into the / _ _
machine, didn't she?... Then
what happened?
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Items used in Sentence Completion Task.
Set A. Set B.
1. Mary put on a silly nose because... J -
Mary put on a silly nose so... - */
2. Mary turned on the taps and then... / </
3. John dug some holes because... -J
John dug some holes so... J -
4. Mary put on a pretty dress because... - \/
Mary put on a pretty dress so.. J -
5. John watered the bulbs because... - /
John watered the bulbs so... v -
6. Mary climbed onto the stool and then... J J
7. John bought a bunch of flowers because... / -
John bought a bunch of flowers so... - </
8. John wound up the car because... J -
John wound up the car so... - */
9. Mary put on her nurse's outfit and J y
then...
10. John put some bread into a bag because... ^ -
John put some bread into a bag so... - v/
11. John put a mouse in Mary's bed because... - </
John put a mouse in Mary's bed so... v/ -
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Set A. Set B.
12. John washed his hands because... - y
John washed his hands so... »/ -
13. John washed up all the dishes and then... / v/
14. Mary took out her crayons because... /
Mary took out her crayons so... - /
15. Mary put down some dog biscuits because... / -
Mary put down some dog biscuits so... - v
16. Mary put some money into the machine - y
because...
Mary put some money into the machine so... y -
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Appendix 6: Questionnaires based on Experiment 5.
Questionnaire I:
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally to
you if you were speaking, and try not to spend too long
thinking about any item. Please do the items in the order
in which they are presented.
For each item, the child is told a short story and is shown
some pictures. Then, he is asked a question about the story.
The stories are on page 2 of this questionnaire. Please read
each story and then answer the corresponding question below.
1. Why did Mary put on a silly nose?
2. Why did John dig some holes?
3. Why did Mary put on a pretty dress?
4. Why did John water the bulbs?
5. Why did John buy a bunch of flowers?
6. Why did John wind up the car?
7. Why did John put some bread into a bag?
8. Why did John put a mouse in Mary's bed?
9. Why did John wash his hands?
10. Why did Mary take out her crayons?
11. Why did Mary put down some dog biscuits?
12. Why did Mary put some money into the machine?
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Stories included in questionnaires:
1. One day, when Mary was out shopping, she bought a
silly nose. It was a big, round, black, shiny nose,
on a piece of elastic. When she got home, she put
the nose on. Then, she said to Fluff, the cat - "Come
on, Fluff] Let's go and look for John'." When John saw
Mary wearing her silly nose, he laughed and laughed
and laughed. He thought it was really funny. Mary was
very pleased.
2. John took his Daddy's spade out of the garden shed, and
he dug some holes in the garden - one, two, three holes.
Then, he put a little tree into each hole. Planting
trees is very hard work, so when John had finished, he
went into the house and had a nice big drink of juice.
3. One day, after lunch, Mary went upstairs and put on
her pretty dress. Mary brushed her hair and her Mummy
tied her ribbons for her. Then Mary said "goodbye" to
Mummy, and went to Anne's house. It was Anne's birthday
so she was having a party. When Anne opened the door,
Mary said "Happy birthday, Anne" and gave Anne a present.
Then Mary went in to the party. Everybody had a lovely
time.
4. Every day John filled up his watering can with water
and went out into the garden. Very carefully, he poured
some water onto all the bulbs, and he tried not to
stand on any of the bulbs. The bulbs grew and grew and
grew, until one day there were lots of beautiful
flowers in the garden.
5. Mr. Jones has lots of lovely flowers on his little cart.
One day John bought a nice bunch of flowers from Mr.
Jones. Then John walked along the road to the hospital,
and went inside to visit his Granny. Granny was in
hospital because she wasn't very well. Granny said -
"These are beautiful flowers, John. Thank you very much
for bringing them to me".
6. One day, John got a new toy - it was a toy car. John
wound up the toy car with a special little key. Then,
he put the car down on the floor and off it went.
Broom, broom, broom.* John said - "This is a great toy!"
7. One day, after breakfast, John put some old, stale
bread into a little bag. Then he went to the pond in
the park. There were lots of ducks swimming on the
pond. John broke the bread into little pieces and
threw the bits of bread to the ducks. The ducks
gobbled the bread up - gobble, gobble, gobble] All
gone J
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8. One night, just before bedtime, John crept upstairs
very, very quietly. He went into Mary's bedroom and put
a little mouse in her bed. Then John ran away and hid.
Mary went into her bedroom, and picked up her cuddly
rabbit. Then she found the mouse in her bed. She
screamed: "Eee! Eee! A mouse!" Poor Mary got a terrible
fright.
9. John went into the bathroom and washed his hands. Then,
he went downstairs and started eating his tea. He ate
some sandwiches, and a little cake with a cherry on top,
and he drank a cup of milk. The cat and the dog wanted
something to eat too, but John didn't give them anything.
10. Mary opened the drawer and took out her crayons. Then
she shut the drawer and sat down at the table. She
opened her colouring book and started colouring in a
picture. Her teddy was sitting on top of the chest of
drawers. Maybe he was watching what Mary was doing.
11. Mary put a dog biscuit down on the carpet just outside
her bedroom door. She put down another biscuit, and
another, and another, and another. Then she sat down on
her bed and waited. Soon, Blackie the dog started eating
the biscuits, and he went right into Mary's room. Mary
said - "Hello, Blackie. You are a nice dog", and she
shut her bedroom door quickly. Blackie couldn't get
out.
12. One day, Mary and Blackie the dog went to the train
station to meet Auntie Lucy. Auntie Lucy was very tired
so she sat down on a seat for a little while. Mary found
a chocolate machine. She stood on her tiptoes, and put
some money into the machine. Out popped a lovely big
bar of chocolate!
Note: The above set of stories was presented on page 2
of all three versions of the questionnaire (I, Ila
and lib).
Questionnaire Ila:
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally to
you if you were speaking, and try not to spend too long
thinking about any item. Please do the items in the order
in which they are presented.
For each item, the child is told a short story and is shown
some pictures. Then, he is asked to complete a sentence
based on the story. The stories are on page 2 of this
questionnaire. Please read each story and then complete the
corresponding sentence below.
1. Mary put on a silly nose because
2. John dug some holes so
3. Mary put on a pretty dress so
4. John watered the bulbs so
5. John bought a bunch of flowers because
6. John wound up the car because
7. John put some bread into a bag because
8. John put a mouse in Mary's bed so
9. John washed his hands so
10. Mary took out her crayons because
11. Mary put down some dog biscuits because
12. Mary put some money into the machine so
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Questionnaire lib:
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally to
you if you were speaking, and try not to spend too long
thinking about any item. Please do the items in the order
in which they are presented.
For each item, the child is told a short story and is shown
some pictures. Then he is asked to complete a sentence
based on the story. The stories are on page 2 of this
questionnaire. Please read each story and then complete
the corresponding sentence below.
1. Mary put on a silly nose so
2. John dug some holes because
3. Mary put on a pretty dress because
4. John watered the bulbs because
5. John bought a bunch of flowers so
6. John wound up the car so
7. John put some bread into a bag so
8. John put a mouse in Mary's bed because
9. John washed his hands because
10. Mary took out her crayons so
11. Mary put down some dog biscuits so
12. Mary put some money into the machine because
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1. John breaks Mary's doll 4 Mary is sad 4 Mary is crying.
7. Mary hides John's car 4 John is cross 4 John is
stamping his feet.
11. Mary finds a mouse in her bed 4 Mary is scared 4 Mary
is hiding in the corner
15. Mummy buys John an ice-cream 4 John is happy 4 John
is smiling
PSYCHOLOGICAL + SEQUENTIAL
2. John scribbles on the wallpaper 4 Mummy gives John a
row 4 John is crying
8. John washes up all the dishes 4 Mummy tells John he is
a good boy 4 John is smiling
10. Mary tears John's book 4 John shouts at Mary 4 Mary has
her hands over her ears.
12. Mary paints a beautiful picture for the competition 4
Mary wins a prize 4 Mary is dancing round the room.
PHYSICAL + SIMULTANEOUS
3. John drops a match 4 the house is on fire 4 flames
and smoke are coming out of the house
5. Mary gets soaked 4 Mary has a cold 4 Mary is sneezing
14. John falls off his bike 4 John has a broken leg 4
John's leg is in plaster.
16. Mary switches on the kettle 4 the kettle is boiling 4
steam is coming out of the kettle.
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PHYSICAL + SEQUENTIAL
4. Mary hits John with a pillow 4 the pillow bursts 4
Mary is covered in feathers
6. Mary trips over the cat 4 Mary falls into the pond 4
Mary is dripping wet
9. John throws a ball at the window the window breaks 4
there is broken glass on the ground
13. John bumps into Mary 4 Mary spills the milk 4 there is
a puddle of milk on the floor
Items used in Questions task ; Subset A (arranged in order
of presentation).
1. Mary is sad, isn't she?... Why is Mary sad?
2. Mummy gave John a row, didn't she?... Why did Mummy give
John a row?
3. The house is on fire, isn't it?... How do you know the
house is on fire?
4. The pillow burst, didn't it?... Why did the pillow burst?
5. Mary has a cold, hasn't she?... Why does Mary have a cold?
6. Mary fell into the pond, didn't she?... How do you know
Mary fell into the pond?
7. John is cross, isn't he?... How do you know John is
cross?
8. Mummy told John he was a good boy, didn't she?... How
do you know Mummy told John he was a good boy?
9. The window broke, didn't it?... How do you know the
window broke?
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10. John shouted at Mary, didn't he?... How do you know
John shouted at Mary?
11. Mary is scared, isn't she?... Why is Mary scared?
12. Mary won a prize, didn't she?... Why did Mary win a
prize?
13. Mary spilt the milk, didn't she?... Why did Mary spill
the milk?
14. John has a broken leg, hasn't he?... Why does John have
a broken leg?
15. John is happy, isn't he?... How do you know John is
happy?
16. The kettle is boiling, isn't it?... How do you know
the kettle is boiling?
Items used in Questions task : Subset B.
1. Mary is sad, isn't she?... How do you know Mary is sad?
2. Mummy gave John a row, didn't she?... How do you know
Mummy gave John a row?
3. The house is on fire, isn't it?... Why is the house on
fire?
4. The pillow burst, didn't it?... How do you know the
pillow burst?
5. Mary has a cold, hasn't she?... How do you know Mary
has a cold?
6. Mary fell into the pond, didn't she?... Why did Mary
fall into the pond?
7. John is cross, isn't he?... Why is John cross?
8. Mummy told John he was a good boy, didn't she?... Why
did Mummy tell John he was a good boy?
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9. The window broke, didn't it?... Why did the window
break?
10. John shouted at Mary, didn't he?... Why did John shout
at Mary?
11. Mary is scared, isn't she?... How do you know Mary is
scared?
12. Mary won a prize, didn't she?... How do you know Mary
won a prize?
13. Mary spilt the milk, didn't she?... How do you know
Mary spilt the milk?
14. John has a broken leg, hasn't he?... How do you know
John has a broken leg?
15. John is happy, isn't he?... Why is John happy?
16. The kettle is boiling, isn't it?... Why is the kettle
boiling?
Items used in Sentence Completion task : Subset A.
1. Mary is sad because...
2. Mummy gave John a row because...
3. We can tell that the house is on fire because...
4. The pillow burst because...
5. Mary has a cold because...
6. We can tell that Mary fell into the pond because...
7. We can tell that John is cross because...
8. We can tell that Mummy told John he was a good boy
because...
9. We can tell that the window broke because...
10. We can tell that John shouted at Mary because...
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11. Mary is scared because...
12. Mary won a prize because...
13. Mary spilt the milk because...
14. John has a broken leg because...
15. We can tell that John is happy because...
16. We can tell that the kettle is boiling because
Items used in Sentence Completion task : Subset B.
1. We can tell that Mary is sad because...
2. We can tell that Mummy gave John a row because
3. The house is on fire because...
4. We cam tell that the pillow burst because...
5. We earn tell that Mary has a cold because...
6. Mary fell into the pond because...
7. John is cross because...
8. Mummy told John he was a good boy because...
9. The window broke because...
10. John shouted at Mary because...
11. We can tell that Mary is scared because...
12. We can tell that Mary won a prize because...
13. We can tell that Mary spilt the milk because..
14. We can tell that John has a broken leg because
15. John is happy because...
16. The kettle is boiling because...
Descriptions of pictures (for both tasks)
l(i) John breaks Mary's doll
(ii) Mary is crying
2(i) John scribbles on the wallpaper
(ii) John is crying
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I(i) John drops a match
(ii) Flames and smoke are coming out of the house
r(i) Mary hits John with a pillow
(ii) Mary is covered in feathers
»(i) Mary gets soaked
(ii) Mary is sneezing
i(i) Mary trips over the cat
(ii) Mary is dripping wet
(i) Mary hides John's car
(ii) John is stamping his feet
>(i) John washes up all the dishes
(ii) John is smiling
'(i) John throws a ball at the window
(ii) There is broken glass on the ground
>(i) Mary tears John's book
(ii) Mary has her hands over her ears
(i) Mary finds a mouse in her bed
(ii) Mary is hiding in the corner
!(i) Mary paints a beautiful picture for the competition
I
(ii) Mary is dancing round the room
t(i) John bumps into Mary
(ii) There is a puddle of milk on the floor
t(i) John falls off his bike
(ii) John's leg is in plaster
>(i) Mummy buys John an ice-cream
(ii) John is smiling
>(i) Mary switches on the kettle
(ii) Steam is coming out of the kettle.
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Appendix 8: Questionnaires based on Experiment 6.
Questions A.
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally if
you were speaking, and try not to spend too long thinking
about any item. Please do the items in the order in which
they are presented.
For each item, the child is shown two pictures and these
pictures are described to him. Then he is asked a question.
You will find descriptions of the pictures on page 10.*
Please read the descriptions for each item, and then
answer the corresponding question below:
1. Why is Mary sad?
2. Why did Mummy give John a row?
3. How do you know the house is on fire?
4. Why did the pillow burst?
5. Why does Mary have a cold?
6. How do you know Mary fell into the pond?
7. How do you know John is cross?
8. How do you know Mummy told John he was a good boy?
9. How do you know the window broke?
10. How do you know John shouted at Mary?
11. Why is Mary scared?
12. Why did Mary win a prize?
13. Why did Mary spill the milk?
14. Why does John have a broken leg?
15. How do you know John is happy?
16. How do you know the kettle is boiling?
*Page 10 of each of the questionnaires in this Appendix




This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally if
you were speaking, and try not to spend too long thinking
about any item. Please do the items in the order in which
they are presented.
For each item the child is shown two pictures and these
pictures are described to him. Then he is asked a question.
You will find descriptions of the pictures on page 10.
Please read the descriptions for each item, and then answer
the corresponding question below.
1. How do you know Mary is sad?
2. How do you know Mummy gave John a row?
3. Why is the house on fire?
4. How do you know the pillow burst?
5. How do you know Mary has a cold?
6. Why did Mary fall into the pond?
7. Why is John cross?
8. Why did Mummy tell John he was a good
9. Why did the window break?
10. Why did John shout at Mary?
11. How do you know Mary is scared?
12. How do you know Mary won a prize?
13. How do you know Mary spilt the milk?
14. How do you know John has a broken leg?
15. Why is John happy?
16. Why is the kettle boiling?
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Sentence Completion A.
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally if
you were speaking, and try not to spend too long thinking
about any item. Please do the items in the order in which
they are presented.
For each item, the child is shown two pictures and these
pictures are described to him. Then, he is asked to complete
a sentence. You will find descriptions of the pictures on
page 10. Please read the descriptions for each item, and
then complete the corresponding sentence below.
1. Mary is sad because
2. Mummy gave John a row because
3. We can tell that the house is on fire because
4. The pillow burst because
5. Mary has a cold because
6. We can tell that Mary fell into the pond because
7. We can tell that John is cross because
8. We can tell that Mummy told John he was a good boy
because
9. We can tell that the window broke because
10. We can tell that John shouted at Mary because
11. Mary is scared because
12. Mary won a prize because
13. Mary spilt the milk because
14. John has a broken leg because
15. We can tell that John is happy because
16. We can tell that the kettle is boiling because
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Sentence Completion B
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally if
you were speaking, and try not to spend too long thinking
about any item. Please do the items in the order in which
they are presented.
For each item, the child is shown two pictures and these
pictures are described to him. Then, he is asked to complete
a sentence. You will find descriptions of the pictures on
page 10. Please read the descriptions for each item, and
then complete the corresponding sentence below.
1. We can tell that Mary is sad because
2. We can tell that Mummy gave John a row because
3. The house is on fire because
4. We can tell that the pillow burst because
5. We can tell that Mary has a cold because
6. Mary fell into the pond because
7. John is cross because
8. Mummy told John he was a good boy because
9. The window broke because
10. John shouted at Mary because
11. We can tell that Mary is scared because
12. We can tell that Mary won a prize because
13. We can tell that Mary spil t the milk because
14. We can tell that John has a broken leg because
15. John is happy because
16. The kettle is boiling because
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Acceptability judgments
This questionnaire is designed to obtain adults' judgments
about the acceptability of certain sentences. These
judgments will help me to analyse the results of my research
on children's language.
The items are based on a task in which the child is shown
two pictures and these pictures are described to him. Then,
he is asked to complete a sentence based on the pictures.
For each item, please begin by reading the descriptions of
the pictures (see page 10). Then, read the corresponding
set of sentences below. Your task is to rank the sentences
for acceptability by placing a "1" beside the sentence
which "sounds best"; a "2" beside the sentence which "sounds
the next best"; and so on. If you think that two or more
sentences are equally acceptable, then give them equal
ranks by using an "=" sign (e.g., "2="). Please rank all
the sentences in the set. If you think that any sentence
is totally unacceptable, then place an asterisk beside it
(as well as giving it a rank). Try not to spend too long
thinking about any item. Please finish ranking each set of
sentences before proceeding to the next set. Here is a
summary of the ranking scale:
MOST ACCEPTABLE LEAST ACCEPTABLE
("sounds best") ("sounds worst")
1 2 3 4
"=" = equally acceptable = totally unacceptable
RANK
1.We can tell that Mary is sad because John
broke her doll ....
We can tell that Mary is sad because she is crying ....
Mary is sad because John broke her doll ....
Mary is sad because she is crying ....
2.Mummy gave John a row because he scribbled on
the wallpaper
Mummy gave John a row because he is crying
We can tell that Mummy gave John a row because
he scribbled on the wallpaper ....
We can tell that Mummy gave John a row because
he is crying
3.We can tell that the house is on fire because
John dropped a match ....
We can tell that the house is on fire because
flames and smoke are coming out of it ....
The house is on fire because flames and smoke
are coming out of it ....
The house is on fire because John dropped a match
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RANK
4. The pillow burst because Mary is covered in feathers ....
The pillow burst because Mary hit John with the
pillow ....
We can tell that the pillow burst because Mary is
covered in feathers ....
We can tell that the pillow burst because Mary hit
John with the pillow ....
5. We can tell that Mary has a cold because she got
soaked ....
Mary has a cold because she is sneezing ....
Mary has a cold because she got soaked ....
We can tell that Mary has a cold because she is
sneezing ....
6. Mary fell into the pond because she is dripping wet ....
We can tell that Mary fell into the pond because
she tripped over the cat
We can tell that Mary fell into the pond because
she is dripping wet
Mary fell into the pond because she tripped over
the cat ....
7. We can tell that John is cross because he is
stamping his feet ....
John is cross because Mary hid his car
We can tell that John is cross because Mary hid
his car ....
John is cross because he is stamping his feet ....
8. Mummy told John he was a good boy because he washed
up all the dishes ....
Mummy told John he was a good boy because he is
smiling
We can tell that Mummy told John he was a good boy
because he is smiling
We can tell that Mummy told John he was a good boy
because he washed up all the dishes ....
9. We can tell that the window broke because there is
broken glass on the ground
We can tell that the window broke because John
threw a stone at it ....
The window broke because there is broken glass
on the ground
The window broke because John threw a stone at it
10.We can tell that John shouted at Mary because Mary
has her hands over her ears
We can tell that John shouted at Mary because Mary
tore John's book
John shouted at Mary because Mary tore John's book




11. We can tell that Mary is scared because she found ....
a mouse in her bed
Mary is scared because she found a mouse in her bed ....
We can tell that Mary is scared because she is
hiding in the corner ....
Mary is scared because she is hiding in the corner ....
12. Mary won a prize because she painted a beautiful
picture for the competition ....
We can tell that Mary won a prize because she is
dancing round the room ....
We can tell that Mary won a prize because she
painted a beautiful picture for the competition....
Mary won a prize because she is dancing round the
room ....
13.Mary spilt the milk because John bumped into her ....
We can tell that Mary spilt the milk because John
bumped into her ....
Mary spilt the milk because there is a puddle of
milk on the floor ....
We can tell that Mary spilt the milk because there
is a puddle of milk on the floor ....
14.John has a broken leg because he fell off his bike ....
We can tell that John has a broken leg because his
leg is in plaster ....
John has a broken leg because his leg is in plaster ....
We can tell that John has a broken leg because he
fell off his bike ....
15.We can tell that John is happy because Mummy
bought him an ice cream ....
John is happy because Mummy bought him an
ice cream ....
John is happy because he is smiling ....
We can tell that John is happy because he is
smiling ....
16.We can tell that the kettle is boiling because
steam is coming out of it ....
The kettle is boiling because steam is coming out
of it ....
The kettle is boiling because Mary switched it on ....
We can tell that the kettle is boiling because
Mary switched it on ....
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Appendix 9: Materials used in Experiment 7 (Deductive
Marking)
Sentence fragments used in Sentence Completion task
Sub-task A (Seguential)
1. Snoopy has cream on his face so ....
2. Charlie Brown has red paint on his hands so ....
3. Donald Duck has muddy feet so ....
4. Mickey Mouse has a necklace sticking out of his pocket
SO 0000
Sub-task B (Simultaneous and causal)
5. There are footprints to the blue house so ....
6. There is a light on in the red house so ....
7. Charlie is crying so ....
8. Charlie is smiling so ....
Sub-task C (Simultaneous and arbitrary/logical)
9. It's a red tin so ....
10. It's a green tin so ....
11. There's a horse inside so ....
12. There's a pig inside so ....
Descriptions of clues used in Open-ended task
Sub-task A (Seguential)
1. The clue is that Snoopy has cream on his face.
2. The clue is that Charlie Brown has red paint on his
hands.
3. The clue is that Donald Duck has muddy feet.
4. The clue is that Mickey Mouse has a necklace sticking
out of his pocket.
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Sub-task B (Simultaneous and causal)
5. The clue is that there are footprints to the blue house.
6. The clue is that there is a light on in the red house.
7. The clue is that Charlie is crying.
8. The clue is that Charlie is smiling.
Sub-task C (Simultaneous and arbitrary/logical)
9. The clue is that it's a red tin.
10. The clue is that it's a green tin.
11. The clue is that there's a horse inside.
12. The clue is that there's a pig inside.
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Pictures used in Experiment 7,
'Someone is
stealing flower















Appendix 10; Questionnaires based on Experiment 7
Sentence Completion
This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally to
you if you were speaking, and try not to spend too long
thinking about any item. Please do the items in the order
in which they are presented.
The items are based on a task in which the child has to
help the Pink Panther to "work things out" on the basis of
clues. These clues are presented to the child (usually in
the form of pictures), but the Pink Panther does not know
about the clues.
For each item, please begin by reading about the context
and the clue (see page 7). Then complete the corresponding
sentence below, in a way which would help the Pink Panther.
1. Snoopy has cream on his face so
2. Charlie Brown has red paint on his hands so
3. Donald Duck has muddy shoes so
4. Mickey Mouse has a necklace sticking out of his pocket
so
5. There are footprints to the blue house so
6. There is a light on in the red house so
7. Charlie is crying so
8. Charlie is smiling so
9. It's a red box so
10. It's a yellow box so
11. There's a monkey inside so
12. There's a horse inside so
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Contexts and clues:
Context for items (1) to (4)
Some crimes have been committed. The Pink Panther has the
following set of pictures which depict the crimes:
(a) A picture of a cloaked and hooded figure stealing
flowers out of a garden.
(b) A picture of a cloaked and hooded figure eating a cake.
(c) A picture of a cloaked and hooded figure breaking into
a jeweller's shop.
(d) A picture of a cloaked and hooded figure painting red
spots onto a fence.
The Pink Panther has caught the criminals but he does not
know which one carried out which crime. The child's task
is to work out what each criminal has done. For each item,
the child is given a clue which the Pink Panther has not
received. Here are descriptions of these clues:
1. Clue = A picture of Snoopy with cream on his face.
2. Clue = A picture of Charlie Brown with red paint on
his hands.
3. Clue = A picture of Donald Duck with muddy shoes.
4. Clue = A picture of Mickey Mouse with a necklace
sticking out of his pocket.
Context for items (5) and (6)
The Pink Panther is looking for Charlie Brown. He knows
that Charlie is in a house, but he does not know which
house. The child's task is to work out where Charlie is
using clues which the Pink Panther has not received. Here
are descriptions of these clues:
5. Clue = A picture of a blue house with footprints
leading up to the door, and a picture of a
yellow house with no footprints.
6. Clue = A picture of a red house with a light on in one
of the rooms, and a picture of a green house
with no lights on.
Context for items (7) and (8)
The Pink Panther wants the child to work out how Charlie
is feeling. Charlie might be happy, sad, cross or scared.
Here are descriptions of the clues which are available to
the child but not to the Pink Panther:
7. Clue = A picture of Charlie crying
8. Clue = A picture of Charlie smiling
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Context for items (9) and (10)
Imagine that we have a set of small wooden boxes with lids,
and that each box contains a toy animal. There are red
boxes and yellow boxes, and there are toy horses and toy
monkeys. Assume that the following rules hold:
All the red boxes have horses inside
All the horses are in red boxes
All the yellow boxes have monkeys inside
All the monkeys are in yellow boxes
These rules can be summarised as:
red box (=) horse
yellow box (=) monkey
The child's task is to work out what is inside a locked box.
Here are descriptions of the clues which are given to the
child but not to the Pink Panther:
9. Clue = The child is shown a red box
10. Clue = The child is shown a yellow box
Context for items (11) and (12)
The objects and rules are the same as for items (9) and
(10). However, this time the child's task is to work out
the colour of a hidden box. Here are descriptions of the
clues which are given to the child but not to the Pink
Panther.
11. Clue = The child is shown a toy monkey and is told
that that is what is inside the hidden box
12. Clue = The child is shown a toy horse and is told
that that is what is inside the hidden box
Note: The above set of contexts and clues were presented




This questionnaire is designed to collect data on adults'
responses to items which I am using for my research on
children's language. The children receive an oral rather
than a written version of the task, so please try to give
the response which you think would come most naturally to
you if you were speaking, and try not to spend too long
thinking about any item. Please do the items in the order
in which they are presented.
The items are based on a task in which the child has to
help the Pink Panther to "work things out" on the basis of
clues. These clues are presented to the child (usually in
the form of pictures), but the Pink Panther does not know
about the clues.
For each item, please begin by reading about the context
and the clue (see page 7). Then, write down (in the
appropriate space below) what you would say if you were
















This questionnaire is designed to obtain adults' judgments
about the acceptability of certain sentences. These
judgments will help me to analyse the results of my research
on children's language.
The items are based on a task in which the child has to
help the Pink Panther to "work things out" on the basis of
clues. These clues are presented to the child (usually in
the form of pictures), but the Pink Panther does not know
about the clues. Assume that the sentences which you are
asked to judge are being used to tell the Pink Panther
about the clue and about what has been worked out on the
basis of the clue.
For each item, please begin by reading about the context
and the clue (see page 7). Then, read the corresponding
set of sentences below. Your task is to rank the sentences
for acceptability by placing a "1" beside the sentence which
"sounds best", a "2" beside the sentence which "sounds next
best", and so on. If you think that two or more sentences
are equally acceptable, then give them equal ranks by using
an "=" sign (e.g. "2="). Please rank all the sentences in
the set. If you think that any sentence is totally
unacceptable, then place an asterisk beside it (as well as
giving it a rank). Try not to spend too long thinking
about any item. Please finish ranking each set of sentences
before proceeding to the next set. Here is a summary of the
ranking scale:
MOST ACCEPTABLE LEAST ACCEPTABLE
("sounds best") ("sounds worst")
1 2 3 4 5 6
»'=» ( = ) equally acceptable ( = ) totally unacceptable
RANK
1. Snoopy has cream on his face so we can tell
that he ate the cake. ....
Snoopy has cream on his face so he must have
eaten the cake. ....
Snoopy must have eaten the cake because he
has cream on his face. ....
Snoopy has cream on his face so he ate the
cake. ....
We can tell that Snoopy ate the cake because
he has cream on his face. ....




2. We can tell that Charlie Brown painted the
spots onto the fence because he has red
paint on his hands. ...
Charlie Brown has red paint on his hands so
we can tell that he painted the spots onto
the fence. ...
Charlie Brown painted the spots onto the fence
because he has red paint on his hands ...
Charlie Brown must have painted the spots onto
the fence because he has red paint on his hands ..
Charlie Brown has red paint on his hands so he
must have painted the spots onto the fence. ...
Charlie Brown has red paint on his hands so he
painted the spots onto the fence. ...
3. Donald Duck must have stolen the flowers because
he has muddy shoes. ...
Donald Duck has muddy shoes so we can tell
that he stole the flowers. ...
Donald Duck has muddy shoes so he must have
stolen the flowers. ...
Donald Duck has muddy shoes so he stole the
flowers. .,.
Donald Duck stole the flowers because he
has muddy shoes. ...
We can tell that Donald Duck stole the
flowers because he has muddy shoes. ...
4. Mickey Mouse must have broken into the jeweller's
shop because he has a necklace sticking out
of his pocket. ...
Mickey Mouse has a necklace sticking out of
his pocket so we can tell that he broke into
the jeweller's shop. ...
Mickey Mouse broke into the jeweller's shop
because he has a necklace sticking out of his
pocket. ...
We can tell that Mickey Mouse broke into the
jeweller's shop because he has a necklace
sticking out of his pocket. ...
Mickey Mouse has a necklace sticking out of
his pocket so he broke into the jeweller's
shop.
Mickey Mouse has a becklace sticking out of




5. There are footprints to the blue house so
Charlie must be in the blue house.
Charlie is in the blue house because there
are footprints to the blue house.
Charlie must be in the blue house because
there are footprints to the blue house.
There are footprints to the blue house so we
can tell that Charlie is in the blue house.
We can tell that Charlie is in the blue house
because there are footprints to the blue house
There are footprints to the blue house so
Charlie is in the blue house.
6. There is a light on in the red house so we
can tell that Charlie is in the red house.
Charlie is in the red house because there is
a light on in the red house.
There is a light on in the red house so Charlie
must be in the red house.
There is a light on in the red house so Charlie
is in the red house.
Charlie must be in the red house because there
is a light on in the red house.
We can tell that Charlie is in the red house
because there is a light on in the red house.
7. Charlie is crying so we can tell that he is sad.
Charlie is crying so he is sad.
We can tell that Charlie is sad because he
is crying.
Charlie is crying so he must be sad.
Charlie is sad because he is crying.
Charlie must be sad because he is crying.
8. Charlie must be happy because he is smiling.
We can tell that Charlie is happy because he
is smiling.
Charlie is happy because he is smiling.
Charlie is smiling so he is happy.
Charlie is smiling so we can tell that he
is happy.
Charlie is smiling so he must be happy.
9. It's a red box so there's a horse inside.
It's a red box so we can tell that there's
a horse inside.
There must be a horse inside because it's
a red box.
It's a red box so there must be a horse inside
There's a horse inside because it's a red box.
We can tell that there's a horse inside
because it's a red box.
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10. It's a yellow box so there's a monkey inside
It's a yellow box so we can tell that
there's a monkey inside.
It's a yellow box so there must be a monkey
inside.
We can tell that there is a monkey inside
because it's a yellow box.
There's a monkey inside because it's a
yellow box.
There must be a monkey inside because it's
a yellow box.
11. It's a yellow box because there's a monkey
inside.
We can tell that it's a yellow box because
there's a monkey inside.
There's a monkey inside so it's a yellow box.
There's a monkey inside so it must be a
yellow box.
It must be a yellow box because there's a
monkey inside.
There's a monkey inside so we can tell it's
a yellow box.
12. There's a horse inside so it must be a red box.
We can tell that it's a red box because
there's a horse inside.
It must be a red box because there's a
horse inside.
There's a horse inside so it's a red box.
It's a red box because there's a horse inside.
There's a horse inside so we can tell that
it's a red box.
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Notes on Chapter 1.
1. The disadvantage of this strategy is that it might lead
to false negatives if the children possessed the
cognitive abilities but lacked the specifically
linguistic knowledge which would enable them to use and
understand the causal connectives appropriately.
However, the strategy can be defended on the grounds
that explaining is essentially a verbal activity. In
any case this problem did not arise, since the children
performed at a high level on the tasks.
2. This taxonomy may not be exhaustive. It might prove
necessary to include additional categories, or to
assign some phenomena to areas of overlap between two
categories. Also, in the present study we shall be
dealing only with particular subsets of the phenomena
in each category. For example, all the physical
phenomena involve observable events and no appeals are
made to intervening variables.
3. In his discussion of converseness, Lyons is concerned
with logical equivalence. As we shall see later (in
section 4.1.2), because and ^o sentences are not
equivalent in terms of their thematic structure.
4. The introduction of a CAUSE predicate has precedents
both in the generative semanticists' work on causative
verbs (e.g. McCawley, 1974), and in Miller and Johnson-
Laird's work (1976) on procedural semantics.
5. The claim that because and sx> convey temporal order
information is much more debatable when the explanation
is in the intentional or deductive mode rather than the
empirical mode. (See sections 5.1.3 and 6.1.4.)
6. This has been proposed by Margaret Donaldson (personal
communication).
7. This distinction between primary and secondary functions
owes much to Karmiloff-Smith's distinction (1979)
between primary and secondary focussing functions.
However, there is a certain amount of ambiguity in
Karmiloff-Smith's account as to whether these functions
are to be regarded as intrinsic properties of particular
words, or as characterisations of the way speakers use
the words on particular occasions. Thus, it is not
totally clear whether a word's primary focussing
function is fixed or variable. The former interpretation
(intrinsic property of word/fixed) seems more useful
for our present purposes, and this is the sense in which
we shall use "primary function" and "secondary function".
8. An explanation of this apparent paradox is given in
section 4.1.4.
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Notes on Chapter 2.
1. Piaget's subjects were Swiss, and the experiments were
carried out in French.
2. Piaget did present an oral version of the task to a
smaller group of 6- to 10-year-olds, but he reports
neither the details of the items nor the details of the
results.
3. This assumption is closely related to Grice's maxim of
quality (Grice, 1975).
4. Flores d'Arcais did include some "filler" items which
consisted of synonymous sentences, but he does not give
any details of these items.
5. This task could be regarded either as a comprehension
task or as a production task. It has been included in
the comprehension category because it is the experimenter
rather than the child who produces the causal connective.
6. This study is also reported in Hood and Bloom (1979).
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Notes on Chapter 3.
1. The story-telling task used in this experiment is an
"inverse" version of a task used by Light (1979) in
which the child was presented with a story and was
asked to select a facial expression to match the story.
Both Light's task and the present task employ the same
four emotional categories, but the schematic faces used
in the two studies are not identical.
2. It was hoped that the delay would result in the author
forgetting the connectives which had appeared in the
original transcripts. Of course, even if the actual
connectives were forgotten, it would still be possible
for the connectives to influence the coding indirectly.
The connectives might have affected the author's
initial interpretation of the relations, and this
initial interpretation might have been remembered even
when the connectives were forgotten. Nevertheless, it
is likely that this procedure at least reduced the
influence of the connectives on the coding.
3. This type of response was probably encouraged by the
experimenter's script, which included such comments as
"I don't want the marbles to fall down and make a loud
noise". (See Appendix 1.)
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Notes on Chapter 4.
1. Clark (1973), in discussing temporal conjunctions such
as before and after, puts forward an argument similar
to the one advanced here. She argues that the
alternative constructions for describing time sequences
serve different functions, and that the thematic
structure plays an important role in determining which
construction is used.
2. This was considered preferable to comparing performance
on because-medial sentences with performance on
because-initial sentences, since the children would
probably be very unfamiliar with the because-initial
sentences.
3. All the sequences except sequence (8) (see Appendix 3)
were acted out in both orders. The normal order of
sequence (8) (Coco pushes the cup -) the cup falls 9
the cup breaks) was acted out and video-taped. For
the reversed order, the events were acted out and
video-taped in the following way:
(a) Coco pushes the cup (to the edge of the table)
(b) the cup falls the cup breaks. (The cup was made
to fall by pulling it with a thread which was not
visible on the video-tape, rather than by Coco
pushing it.)
Then, the desired sequence was obtained by editing the
video-tape.
4. The procedure used in the Temporal task differs from
that used in Emerson's PST in four main ways. Firstly,
Emerson did not include any training items for the
PST. Secondly, the present experiment made use of
video-taped sequences whereas Emerson's did not.
Thirdly, this Temporal task is based on causal sequences
consisting of three events. However, for any given item
in the Temporal task, the child had to deal with only
two of the events from the three-event sequence.
Although the video-taped sequence showed all three
events, each sentence and each pair of picture-strips
represented only two of these events. Fourthly, the
present experiment used because and so sentences, while
Emerson's experiment used two types of because sentence.
(See note 2.)
5. The data used in constructing this table do not
include the data from two of the 5-year-olds and two
of the 8-year-olds, because some responses to this part
of the task were lost due to recording faults.
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6. A distinction can be drawn between the reversibility
of an event sequence and the reversibility of the
sentence which is used in describing the event sequence.
For example, a sequence in which a red ball moves and
in so doing causes a blue ball to move could be reversed
so that the blue ball moves and in so doing causes the
red ball to move. However, the following sentence which
could be used to describe the original event sequence
is non-reversible:
The blue ball moved because the red ball pushed it.
Conversely, a sentence may be reversible by virtue of
the fact that both Y because X and X because Y can be
given plausible interpretations even if the sequence
X Y is not itself reversible.
For example, the sentence:
Daisy fell because Coco bumped into her
can be reversed to give:
Coco bumped into Daisy because she fell.
However, it is not possible to take the event sequence
described by the first sentence and simply "run it
backwards" to produce the event sequence described by
the second sentence. Of course, in some cases, the
distinction between sentence reversibility and event
reversibility will collapse. In the present
experiment, it was sentence reversibility which was
manipulated, though as far as possible examples were
selected which did not involve too much of a clash
between the two types of reversibility. For both
sentence reversibility and event reversibility, the
reversibility is a matter of degree rather than being
an all-or-nothing phenomenon.
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Notes on Chapter 5.
1. For convenience, "result" will be used to refer to the
event/state which the agent intends to bring about
irrespective of whether the relation between the action
and this event/state is causal or conditional.
2. We shall leave open the question of whether this is
an instance of polysemy or of homonymy. While this
question is of considerable interest from the point of
view of theoretical linguistics, it is not directly
relevant to our present concern.
3. In the Sentence Completion task, the children sometimes
used a connective other than the one at the end of
the sentence fragment, for example:
E - Mary put on a pretty dress so ...
S - Because she was going to Anne's party.
These responses were coded twice: once on the basis of
the original connective and once on the basis of the
connective used by the subject. The results presented
in Table 26 are based on the connective used by the
subject. However, equally striking results are
obtained when the analysis is based on the original
connective.
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Notes on Chapter 6.
1. Piaget's distinction between justification and
explanation is similar to our distinction between
the deductive and empirical modes.
2. The prior/future/simultaneous distinction is relevant
only when the content is physical or psychological.
Deductive sentences which have logical content can
only be in the simultaneous category.
3. The analysis was based on the responses the children
gave when they were asked to produce the whole sentence.
This is because some of the children produced the
whole sentence as soon as the experimenter had given
the sentence fragment, rather than completing the
fragment first. Therefore, all the children gave a
"whole sentence" response to all the items, whereas
the 'fcompletion" data are incomplete. In most cases,
where both types of response were given, they were
fairly similar to one another. The connective so was
used in 96% of the whole sentence responses produced
by each of the age groups. -
4. When the Deductive Marking experiment was carried out,
the 8-year-olds were tested first and the decision
to compare their performance with that of an older
rather than a younger age group was based on a
preliminary analysis of their responses. Since many of
the 8-year-olds' responses did not contain deductive
markers, it was decided to test a group of 10-year-
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